



1  
00:00:04,390 --> 00:00:12,230

[Music]

2  
00:00:17,670 --> 00:00:14,390

what's up everybody

3  
00:00:19,990 --> 00:00:17,680

that's red we're live streaming this

4  
00:00:21,269 --> 00:00:20,000

and they're already late

5  
00:00:26,710 --> 00:00:21,279

so

6  
00:00:28,630 --> 00:00:26,720

to a hot start here you know

7  
00:00:30,250 --> 00:00:28,640

hopefully it's because they're preparing

8  
00:00:38,310 --> 00:00:30,260

questions

9  
00:00:41,990 --> 00:00:38,320

[Music]

10  
00:00:44,869 --> 00:00:42,000

thanks everybody for joining us today

11  
00:00:47,430 --> 00:00:44,879

so bright and early

12  
00:00:48,470 --> 00:00:47,440

we got uh we got a lot of people here

13  
00:00:50,709 --> 00:00:48,480

with us

14

00:00:53,029 --> 00:00:50,719

everybody wants to say what's up

15

00:00:55,110 --> 00:00:53,039

you're more than welcome to

16

00:00:58,950 --> 00:00:55,120

we got vinnie with graeme rendell jay

17

00:01:00,150 --> 00:00:58,960

hello dan priscilla

18

00:01:01,990 --> 00:01:00,160

wouldn't this be so cool if we could all

19

00:01:04,710 --> 00:01:02,000

do this in a bar you know near to where

20

00:01:07,030 --> 00:01:04,720

this was actually happening

21

00:01:08,710 --> 00:01:07,040

or preferably in the room itself i mean

22

00:01:10,870 --> 00:01:08,720

yeah we'd probably be there but i i

23

00:01:25,270 --> 00:01:10,880

don't think they let you drink so

24

00:01:30,149 --> 00:01:27,350

yeah yeah can you turn the sound a

25

00:01:31,670 --> 00:01:30,159

bartender oh my gosh

26

00:01:36,069 --> 00:01:31,680

uh what's up to everybody in the chat

27

00:01:39,190 --> 00:01:36,079

andres mostly space christian

28

00:01:42,469 --> 00:01:39,200

teemo joes jonathan jason eckos

29

00:01:46,230 --> 00:01:42,479

lara chris daniel

30

00:01:49,590 --> 00:01:48,149

lamb chop that's a really good band

31

00:01:50,870 --> 00:01:49,600

actually a lamp chop if you haven't

32

00:01:51,830 --> 00:01:50,880

checked them out

33

00:01:54,230 --> 00:01:51,840

um

34

00:01:57,670 --> 00:01:54,240

tj

35

00:01:59,749 --> 00:01:57,680

disclosure team glad you could make it

36

00:02:01,190 --> 00:01:59,759

priscilla what's up

37

00:02:02,310 --> 00:02:01,200

mentos

38

00:02:03,510 --> 00:02:02,320

yawn

39

00:02:05,030 --> 00:02:03,520

charlie

40

00:02:06,950 --> 00:02:05,040

king of clubs

41

00:02:08,389 --> 00:02:06,960

wow this is just

42

00:02:11,190 --> 00:02:08,399

we're not going to get to the the

43

00:02:15,190 --> 00:02:11,200

hearings if i keep doing this

44

00:02:17,430 --> 00:02:15,200

okay first question if you made 174 000

45

00:02:19,910 --> 00:02:17,440

a year as each member of the house of

46

00:02:21,430 --> 00:02:19,920

representatives does uh would you show

47

00:02:22,470 --> 00:02:21,440

up late for hearings or would you show

48

00:02:24,150 --> 00:02:22,480

up on time

49

00:02:26,480 --> 00:02:24,160

if i was late it would be because i was

50

00:02:30,790 --> 00:02:26,490

at casolina with my census

51  
00:02:34,630 --> 00:02:32,949  
everyone's on the subways right now like

52  
00:02:37,190 --> 00:02:34,640  
freaking out to their staff members

53  
00:02:38,869 --> 00:02:37,200  
trying to get there as fast as possible

54  
00:02:41,430 --> 00:02:38,879  
we'll trust you on that

55  
00:02:42,949 --> 00:02:41,440  
she's been there

56  
00:02:44,309 --> 00:02:42,959  
i'm curious to see how full it's going

57  
00:02:45,910 --> 00:02:44,319  
to be you know how much interest there

58  
00:02:47,670 --> 00:02:45,920  
is from the public because i mean it's

59  
00:02:49,430 --> 00:02:47,680  
just a curiosity even if you're not

60  
00:02:50,949 --> 00:02:49,440  
fully in this you know

61  
00:02:53,830 --> 00:02:50,959  
yeah true

62  
00:02:56,710 --> 00:02:53,840  
um i'll keep my eye on that for when it

63  
00:02:59,509 --> 00:02:56,720

starts i'll bring it right up

64

00:03:01,350 --> 00:02:59,519

but for now we can put our faces

65

00:03:04,710 --> 00:03:01,360

right up in the cameras for everybody so

66

00:03:07,670 --> 00:03:04,720

they can see us for themselves

67

00:03:09,430 --> 00:03:07,680

vinnie as you can see is there live just

68

00:03:11,430 --> 00:03:09,440

waiting sharing the session man i'm

69

00:03:13,270 --> 00:03:11,440

chairing the session

70

00:03:14,000 --> 00:03:13,280

nobody's around not yet i didn't know

71

00:03:15,670 --> 00:03:14,010

your background

72

00:03:17,110 --> 00:03:15,680

[Laughter]

73

00:03:18,390 --> 00:03:17,120

i was looking for one like that and i

74

00:03:19,830 --> 00:03:18,400

was like i'll just go with the spaceship

75

00:03:20,790 --> 00:03:19,840

because i couldn't find one that looked

76

00:03:21,990 --> 00:03:20,800

good

77

00:03:23,350 --> 00:03:22,000

uh well

78

00:03:25,270 --> 00:03:23,360

depending

79

00:03:26,789 --> 00:03:25,280

wait a minute here

80

00:03:29,190 --> 00:03:26,799

i've got it up as well sean so i'll keep

81

00:03:30,470 --> 00:03:29,200

an eye on it too yeah they got 12 000

82

00:03:32,869 --> 00:03:30,480

watching at the moment that's pretty

83

00:03:35,670 --> 00:03:32,879

cool well awesome let's go around the

84

00:03:38,070 --> 00:03:35,680

room and uh what what would your uh

85

00:03:40,229 --> 00:03:38,080

what's your question vinnie you first

86

00:03:45,190 --> 00:03:40,239

question for who for the for the the

87

00:03:49,990 --> 00:03:47,430

i don't so much have a question but i

88

00:03:52,470 --> 00:03:50,000

have a thought and that is that

89

00:03:54,149 --> 00:03:52,480

i think this is just just the start of

90

00:03:57,030 --> 00:03:54,159

more hearings i don't think we'll get

91

00:03:59,350 --> 00:03:57,040

anything juicy disclosure-wise today i

92

00:04:02,149 --> 00:03:59,360

think this is just the first step

93

00:04:04,390 --> 00:04:02,159

and then i think we'll start seeing

94

00:04:06,710 --> 00:04:04,400

more interesting people appear who may

95

00:04:07,910 --> 00:04:06,720

have more information

96

00:04:09,990 --> 00:04:07,920

you know it's just

97

00:04:11,910 --> 00:04:10,000

i've tempered my expectations before we

98

00:04:14,070 --> 00:04:11,920

get started i want to recognize a moment

99

00:04:15,910 --> 00:04:14,080

of silence for the victims of white

100

00:04:17,990 --> 00:04:15,920

supremacist hate crime in buffalo new

101  
00:04:20,629 --> 00:04:18,000  
york the subcommittee has focused

102  
00:04:21,990 --> 00:04:20,639  
intently on that threat in both open and

103  
00:04:23,909 --> 00:04:22,000  
closed hearings

104  
00:04:26,870 --> 00:04:23,919  
it is utterly devastating to see more

105  
00:04:35,830 --> 00:04:26,880  
victims of this violence buffalo

106  
00:04:39,350 --> 00:04:38,310  
with that i ask my colleagues to join

107  
00:04:41,350 --> 00:04:39,360  
pardon me

108  
00:04:44,950 --> 00:04:41,360  
we will now turn to the business of this

109  
00:04:49,749 --> 00:04:47,030  
more than 50 years ago

110  
00:04:50,790 --> 00:04:49,759  
the u.s government ended project blue

111  
00:04:53,430 --> 00:04:50,800  
book

112  
00:04:55,830 --> 00:04:53,440  
an effort to catalog and understand

113  
00:04:58,469 --> 00:04:55,840

sightings of objects in the air

114

00:05:00,629 --> 00:04:58,479

that could not otherwise be explained

115

00:05:03,029 --> 00:05:00,639

for more than 20 years that project

116

00:05:05,749 --> 00:05:03,039

treated unidentified anomalies in our

117

00:05:08,870 --> 00:05:05,759

airspace as a national security threat

118

00:05:10,950 --> 00:05:08,880

to be monitored and investigated

119

00:05:12,230 --> 00:05:10,960

in 2017 we learned for the first time

120

00:05:15,029 --> 00:05:12,240

that the department of defense had

121

00:05:17,510 --> 00:05:15,039

quietly restarted a similar organization

122

00:05:19,110 --> 00:05:17,520

tracking what we now call unidentified

123

00:05:19,909 --> 00:05:19,120

aerial phenomena

124

00:05:21,590 --> 00:05:19,919

or

125

00:05:23,990 --> 00:05:21,600

uaps

126

00:05:26,230 --> 00:05:24,000

last year congress rewrote the charter

127

00:05:28,310 --> 00:05:26,240

for that organization now called the

128

00:05:30,310 --> 00:05:28,320

airborne object identification and

129

00:05:31,350 --> 00:05:30,320

management synchronization group

130

00:05:33,670 --> 00:05:31,360

or

131

00:05:35,670 --> 00:05:33,680

aim sog

132

00:05:38,310 --> 00:05:35,680

for short today we will bring that

133

00:05:40,469 --> 00:05:38,320

organization out of the shadows this

134

00:05:41,270 --> 00:05:40,479

hearing and oversight work

135

00:05:44,950 --> 00:05:41,280

has

136

00:05:47,909 --> 00:05:44,960

a simple idea at its core

137

00:05:50,469 --> 00:05:47,919

unidentified aerial phenomena are a

138

00:05:52,390 --> 00:05:50,479

potential national security threat and

139

00:05:55,110 --> 00:05:52,400

they need to be treated that way for

140

00:05:56,710 --> 00:05:55,120

long the stigma associated with uaps has

141

00:05:57,990 --> 00:05:56,720

gotten in the way of good intelligence

142

00:06:00,230 --> 00:05:58,000

analysis

143

00:06:01,909 --> 00:06:00,240

pilots avoided reporting or were laughed

144

00:06:04,070 --> 00:06:01,919

at when they did

145

00:06:06,070 --> 00:06:04,080

dod officials relegated the issue to the

146

00:06:09,189 --> 00:06:06,080

back room or swept it under the rug

147

00:06:10,710 --> 00:06:09,199

entirely fearful of a skeptical national

148

00:06:11,749 --> 00:06:10,720

security community

149

00:06:13,110 --> 00:06:11,759

today

150

00:06:15,909 --> 00:06:13,120

we know better

151

00:06:17,270 --> 00:06:15,919

uaps are unexplained it's true

152

00:06:19,189 --> 00:06:17,280

but they are real

153

00:06:21,990 --> 00:06:19,199

they need to be investigated and many

154

00:06:25,510 --> 00:06:22,000

threats they pose need to be mitigated

155

00:06:28,150 --> 00:06:25,520

under secretary moultrie mr bray

156

00:06:30,070 --> 00:06:28,160

thank you for coming today

157

00:06:32,309 --> 00:06:30,080

first we need you to update us on the

158

00:06:34,230 --> 00:06:32,319

status of aim salk

159

00:06:35,990 --> 00:06:34,240

the legislation creating it was passed

160

00:06:38,309 --> 00:06:36,000

in december the deadline for

161

00:06:40,950 --> 00:06:38,319

implementation is fast approaching

162

00:06:42,309 --> 00:06:40,960

but the group does not even have a named

163

00:06:44,950 --> 00:06:42,319

director

164

00:06:47,350 --> 00:06:44,960

we need to know sirs the status of the

165

00:06:49,029 --> 00:06:47,360

organization and the obstacle to getting

166

00:06:50,309 --> 00:06:49,039

it up and running

167

00:06:53,029 --> 00:06:50,319

secondly

168

00:06:54,870 --> 00:06:53,039

you have to convince the audience today

169

00:06:58,550 --> 00:06:54,880

and most especially

170

00:07:00,150 --> 00:06:58,560

our military and civilian aviators

171

00:07:02,390 --> 00:07:00,160

the culture

172

00:07:04,629 --> 00:07:02,400

has changed

173

00:07:07,749 --> 00:07:04,639

that those who report uaps will be

174

00:07:09,909 --> 00:07:07,759

treated as witnesses not as kooks

175

00:07:12,950 --> 00:07:09,919

thirdly you need to show us

176  
00:07:15,270 --> 00:07:12,960  
congress and the american public whose

177  
00:07:17,110 --> 00:07:15,280  
imagination you have captured

178  
00:07:18,629 --> 00:07:17,120  
you are willing to follow the facts

179  
00:07:20,710 --> 00:07:18,639  
where they lead

180  
00:07:22,790 --> 00:07:20,720  
you know we fear sometimes that the dod

181  
00:07:24,629 --> 00:07:22,800  
is focused more on emphasizing what it

182  
00:07:27,589 --> 00:07:24,639  
can explain

183  
00:07:30,309 --> 00:07:27,599  
not investigating what it can

184  
00:07:32,309 --> 00:07:30,319  
i'm looking for you to assure us today

185  
00:07:34,469 --> 00:07:32,319  
that all conclusions are on the table

186  
00:07:37,270 --> 00:07:34,479  
one final note we are mindful today that

187  
00:07:39,350 --> 00:07:37,280  
aims is not starting from scratch

188  
00:07:41,990 --> 00:07:39,360

this is the third version of this task

189

00:07:45,749 --> 00:07:42,000

force in dod and civil society groups

190

00:07:47,510 --> 00:07:45,759

like the mutual ufo network

191

00:07:50,150 --> 00:07:47,520

mr corbell and others have been

192

00:07:51,670 --> 00:07:50,160

collecting data on this issue for years

193

00:07:53,589 --> 00:07:51,680

i hope you'll explain how you can

194

00:07:56,150 --> 00:07:53,599

leverage the knowledge and experience of

195

00:07:58,550 --> 00:07:56,160

our prior work on this matter to move

196

00:08:01,110 --> 00:07:58,560

the aim salk along the last time

197

00:08:02,550 --> 00:08:01,120

congress had a hearing on uaps was half

198

00:08:04,869 --> 00:08:02,560

a century ago

199

00:08:06,469 --> 00:08:04,879

i hope that it does not take 50 more

200

00:08:08,230 --> 00:08:06,479

years for congress to hold another

201  
00:08:10,390 --> 00:08:08,240  
because transparency is desperately

202  
00:08:13,270 --> 00:08:10,400  
needed i now turn to ranking member

203  
00:08:15,430 --> 00:08:13,280  
crawford for comments he'd like to make

204  
00:08:16,950 --> 00:08:15,440  
thank you mr chairman um honorable

205  
00:08:19,029 --> 00:08:16,960  
moultrie mr bray thank you for coming

206  
00:08:20,629 --> 00:08:19,039  
here today we appreciate it to begin the

207  
00:08:22,869 --> 00:08:20,639  
open dialogue between congress and

208  
00:08:24,550 --> 00:08:22,879  
executive branch on this important topic

209  
00:08:26,550 --> 00:08:24,560  
while this topic evokes creative

210  
00:08:28,230 --> 00:08:26,560  
imaginings of many aside from all the

211  
00:08:31,589 --> 00:08:28,240  
hype and speculation there are important

212  
00:08:33,269 --> 00:08:31,599  
underlying issues posed by uaps despite

213  
00:08:34,550 --> 00:08:33,279

the serious nature of this topic i have

214

00:08:35,990 --> 00:08:34,560

to say i'm more interested in our

215

00:08:37,430 --> 00:08:36,000

understanding of chinese and russian

216

00:08:38,949 --> 00:08:37,440

hypersonic weapon development or

217

00:08:41,190 --> 00:08:38,959

understanding why this administration

218

00:08:43,430 --> 00:08:41,200

was so slow to share actionable

219

00:08:44,949 --> 00:08:43,440

intelligence with the ukrainians however

220

00:08:46,389 --> 00:08:44,959

as much as this topic may help us better

221

00:08:47,750 --> 00:08:46,399

understand the unknown activities of

222

00:08:50,230 --> 00:08:47,760

russia and china

223

00:08:52,310 --> 00:08:50,240

i am on board the intelligence community

224

00:08:53,829 --> 00:08:52,320

has a serious duty to our taxpayers to

225

00:08:56,389 --> 00:08:53,839

prevent potential adversaries such as

226  
00:08:58,949 --> 00:08:56,399  
china and russia from surprising us with

227  
00:09:00,470 --> 00:08:58,959  
unforeseen new technologies

228  
00:09:01,670 --> 00:09:00,480  
as overseers of the intelligence

229  
00:09:03,750 --> 00:09:01,680  
community this committee has an

230  
00:09:05,829 --> 00:09:03,760  
obligation to understand what you are

231  
00:09:08,310 --> 00:09:05,839  
doing to determine whether any uaps are

232  
00:09:10,710 --> 00:09:08,320  
new technologies or not and if they are

233  
00:09:12,389 --> 00:09:10,720  
where they coming from in general the ic

234  
00:09:14,470 --> 00:09:12,399  
spends much of its time and resources

235  
00:09:16,389 --> 00:09:14,480  
trying to understand what we call known

236  
00:09:18,310 --> 00:09:16,399  
unknowns when it comes to foreign

237  
00:09:19,910 --> 00:09:18,320  
nations weapons systems and sensors

238  
00:09:21,990 --> 00:09:19,920

known unknowns are those features that

239

00:09:24,070 --> 00:09:22,000

we don't fully understand yet the

240

00:09:26,070 --> 00:09:24,080

challenge associated with uap is that

241

00:09:27,910 --> 00:09:26,080

they are completely unknown and require

242

00:09:29,990 --> 00:09:27,920

a more expansive collection analysis

243

00:09:31,990 --> 00:09:30,000

effort the intelligence community must

244

00:09:33,910 --> 00:09:32,000

balance addressing known threats to our

245

00:09:36,230 --> 00:09:33,920

nation national security with preventing

246

00:09:37,670 --> 00:09:36,240

technical surprise we must continue to

247

00:09:39,110 --> 00:09:37,680

follow the facts where they lead us and

248

00:09:41,750 --> 00:09:39,120

ensure that there are no technical

249

00:09:43,430 --> 00:09:41,760

surprises the ic must take it seriously

250

00:09:45,430 --> 00:09:43,440

when there are credible observations of

251  
00:09:47,509 --> 00:09:45,440  
phenomena that seem to perform in ways

252  
00:09:49,030 --> 00:09:47,519  
that could pose a threat to safe flight

253  
00:09:50,790 --> 00:09:49,040  
operations or they could be signs of a

254  
00:09:51,829 --> 00:09:50,800  
foreign adversary's attempt to develop a

255  
00:09:53,910 --> 00:09:51,839  
strategic

256  
00:09:55,269 --> 00:09:53,920  
technological surprise against the

257  
00:09:56,870 --> 00:09:55,279  
united states

258  
00:09:59,110 --> 00:09:56,880  
it's also essential that our pilots and

259  
00:10:02,710 --> 00:09:59,120  
others feel they can report uaps they

260  
00:10:04,949 --> 00:10:02,720  
observe without any stigma for doing so

261  
00:10:06,470 --> 00:10:04,959  
this is the open unclassified portion of

262  
00:10:08,790 --> 00:10:06,480  
our hearing we'll have a closed

263  
00:10:09,990 --> 00:10:08,800

classified part later it's important for

264

00:10:12,310 --> 00:10:10,000

the public to know that the

265

00:10:14,710 --> 00:10:12,320

classification of information exists to

266

00:10:16,470 --> 00:10:14,720

protect national security not to try to

267

00:10:18,310 --> 00:10:16,480

hide the truth when we're trying to

268

00:10:20,069 --> 00:10:18,320

determine if any uaps are new

269

00:10:22,230 --> 00:10:20,079

technologies being developed by foreign

270

00:10:24,310 --> 00:10:22,240

governments we are inevitably going to

271

00:10:26,470 --> 00:10:24,320

run into classified information about

272

00:10:28,790 --> 00:10:26,480

what new systems and technologies we do

273

00:10:30,949 --> 00:10:28,800

know or in the works here or abroad but

274

00:10:32,550 --> 00:10:30,959

where information does not risk national

275

00:10:34,710 --> 00:10:32,560

security it should be shared with our

276

00:10:36,150 --> 00:10:34,720

allies and the public when feasible i

277

00:10:37,829 --> 00:10:36,160

hope that we can have your assurance to

278

00:10:39,190 --> 00:10:37,839

this end today it's my hope that the

279

00:10:41,030 --> 00:10:39,200

intelligence community will continue to

280

00:10:43,110 --> 00:10:41,040

try to determine the nature of uaps

281

00:10:44,630 --> 00:10:43,120

we've observed and will keep congress

282

00:10:46,150 --> 00:10:44,640

fully apprised of all developments i

283

00:10:47,829 --> 00:10:46,160

look forward to this hearing and can

284

00:10:50,389 --> 00:10:47,839

continue dialogue and oversight with the

285

00:10:51,750 --> 00:10:50,399

intelligence community on this topic and

286

00:10:53,590 --> 00:10:51,760

without a yield back

287

00:10:54,949 --> 00:10:53,600

gentleman yields back and now turn to

288

00:10:56,949 --> 00:10:54,959

our distinguished chairman adam schiff

289

00:10:58,949 --> 00:10:56,959

for any comments he wishes to make

290

00:11:01,190 --> 00:10:58,959

thank you chairman carson uh for holding

291

00:11:03,110 --> 00:11:01,200

this open hearing on unidentified aerial

292

00:11:04,310 --> 00:11:03,120

phenomenon and for your leadership on

293

00:11:05,670 --> 00:11:04,320

this issue

294

00:11:08,389 --> 00:11:05,680

holding a portion of our discussion

295

00:11:10,790 --> 00:11:08,399

today in open session is critical to the

296

00:11:12,389 --> 00:11:10,800

cause of transparency and openness

297

00:11:14,230 --> 00:11:12,399

which was congress's intent in

298

00:11:15,430 --> 00:11:14,240

authorizing and funding this new task

299

00:11:16,790 --> 00:11:15,440

force

300

00:11:19,430 --> 00:11:16,800

the larger effort that is being

301  
00:11:20,470 --> 00:11:19,440  
undertaken to study and characterize uap

302  
00:11:21,910 --> 00:11:20,480  
reports

303  
00:11:23,910 --> 00:11:21,920  
is an important step towards

304  
00:11:25,750 --> 00:11:23,920  
understanding these phenomena what we

305  
00:11:27,350 --> 00:11:25,760  
know and don't know

306  
00:11:28,949 --> 00:11:27,360  
and i look forward to hearing more

307  
00:11:30,230 --> 00:11:28,959  
during both the open session and the

308  
00:11:33,350 --> 00:11:30,240  
closed setting

309  
00:11:34,710 --> 00:11:33,360  
about how dod and the ic are undertaking

310  
00:11:36,949 --> 00:11:34,720  
that task

311  
00:11:38,630 --> 00:11:36,959  
uap reports have been around for decades

312  
00:11:41,110 --> 00:11:38,640  
and yet we haven't had an orderly way

313  
00:11:42,949 --> 00:11:41,120

for them to be reported without stigma

314

00:11:45,350 --> 00:11:42,959

and to be investigated

315

00:11:47,269 --> 00:11:45,360

that needs to change uap reports need to

316

00:11:49,430 --> 00:11:47,279

be understood as a national security

317

00:11:51,670 --> 00:11:49,440

matter and that message needs to go out

318

00:11:52,949 --> 00:11:51,680

across dod the ic and the whole of the

319

00:11:54,230 --> 00:11:52,959

us government

320

00:11:56,230 --> 00:11:54,240

when we spot something we don't

321

00:11:58,069 --> 00:11:56,240

understand or can't identify in our

322

00:12:00,150 --> 00:11:58,079

airspace it's the job of those we

323

00:12:02,550 --> 00:12:00,160

entrust with our national security to

324

00:12:04,150 --> 00:12:02,560

investigate and to report back

325

00:12:05,910 --> 00:12:04,160

that is why it's important that we hold

326

00:12:08,310 --> 00:12:05,920

this open hearing for the public to hear

327

00:12:10,470 --> 00:12:08,320

directly from the department of defense

328

00:12:12,790 --> 00:12:10,480

on the steps it's taking to track

329

00:12:14,230 --> 00:12:12,800

analyze and transparently communicate

330

00:12:15,190 --> 00:12:14,240

the work that is being done on this

331

00:12:16,870 --> 00:12:15,200

issue

332

00:12:18,310 --> 00:12:16,880

it is also the responsibility of our

333

00:12:21,030 --> 00:12:18,320

government and this panel to share as

334

00:12:23,269 --> 00:12:21,040

much as we can with the american people

335

00:12:25,990 --> 00:12:23,279

since excessive secrecy only breeds

336

00:12:27,590 --> 00:12:26,000

distrust and speculation

337

00:12:29,190 --> 00:12:27,600

i look forward to hearing how the uap

338

00:12:31,030 --> 00:12:29,200

task force is being stood up what

339

00:12:32,550 --> 00:12:31,040

challenges they still face

340

00:12:34,949 --> 00:12:32,560

and how this committee can make sure the

341

00:12:37,430 --> 00:12:34,959

task force is able to shed light on one

342

00:12:40,150 --> 00:12:37,440

of the world's most enduring mysteries

343

00:12:42,389 --> 00:12:40,160

i thank you gentlemen for your work and

344

00:12:43,430 --> 00:12:42,399

i'll be very interested to hear what you

345

00:12:45,350 --> 00:12:43,440

have to say

346

00:12:46,710 --> 00:12:45,360

to me among the most fascinating

347

00:12:49,350 --> 00:12:46,720

questions

348

00:12:51,269 --> 00:12:49,360

are these phenomena that we can

349

00:12:52,790 --> 00:12:51,279

measure that is

350

00:12:55,670 --> 00:12:52,800

instruments report there is something

351

00:12:57,750 --> 00:12:55,680

there it is not the human eye

352

00:12:59,350 --> 00:12:57,760

confusing objects in the sky

353

00:13:01,590 --> 00:12:59,360

uh there is something there measurable

354

00:13:02,870 --> 00:13:01,600

by multiple instruments and yet it seems

355

00:13:05,190 --> 00:13:02,880

to move in directions that are

356

00:13:08,310 --> 00:13:05,200

inconsistent with what we know of

357

00:13:11,269 --> 00:13:08,320

physics or science uh more broadly and

358

00:13:13,829 --> 00:13:11,279

uh that to me poses uh questions of of

359

00:13:16,230 --> 00:13:13,839

tremendous interest and uh as well as

360

00:13:18,069 --> 00:13:16,240

potential national security significance

361

00:13:19,430 --> 00:13:18,079

so we look forward to hearing what

362

00:13:20,949 --> 00:13:19,440

you're able to report to us today in

363

00:13:23,030 --> 00:13:20,959

open session and i want to thank

364

00:13:24,790 --> 00:13:23,040

chairman carson again for his

365

00:13:26,870 --> 00:13:24,800

extraordinary leadership on this issue

366

00:13:28,870 --> 00:13:26,880

and i yield back

367

00:13:29,990 --> 00:13:28,880

chairman yields back thank you with that

368

00:13:32,629 --> 00:13:30,000

we will start our hearing under

369

00:13:34,710 --> 00:13:32,639

secretary moultrie the floor is your sir

370

00:13:36,710 --> 00:13:34,720

thank you

371

00:13:38,629 --> 00:13:36,720

chairman schiff committee chairman

372

00:13:39,670 --> 00:13:38,639

carson ranking member crawford

373

00:13:41,829 --> 00:13:39,680

distinguished members of the

374

00:13:43,590 --> 00:13:41,839

subcommittee it's a privilege to be here

375

00:13:45,750 --> 00:13:43,600

with you today to address your questions

376  
00:13:47,189 --> 00:13:45,760  
regarding unidentified aerial phenomena

377  
00:13:49,030 --> 00:13:47,199  
or uap

378  
00:13:51,030 --> 00:13:49,040  
i'm pleased to be joined by mr scott

379  
00:13:52,310 --> 00:13:51,040  
bray the deputy director of naval

380  
00:13:54,629 --> 00:13:52,320  
intelligence who will speak to the

381  
00:13:56,949 --> 00:13:54,639  
navy's unidentified aerial phenomenon

382  
00:13:59,590 --> 00:13:56,959  
task force which laid the foundation for

383  
00:14:01,110 --> 00:13:59,600  
the efforts we will discuss today

384  
00:14:03,750 --> 00:14:01,120  
first i'd like to thank congress for

385  
00:14:07,189 --> 00:14:03,760  
supporting the department's uap efforts

386  
00:14:09,590 --> 00:14:07,199  
the ndaa for fiscal year 2022 has helped

387  
00:14:12,069 --> 00:14:09,600  
us to establish a dedicated office to

388  
00:14:14,629 --> 00:14:12,079

oversee processes and procedures for the

389

00:14:17,590 --> 00:14:14,639

timely collection processing analysis

390

00:14:19,110 --> 00:14:17,600

and reporting of uap related data

391

00:14:22,310 --> 00:14:19,120

what are you ap

392

00:14:24,870 --> 00:14:22,320

put simply uap or airborne objects that

393

00:14:26,150 --> 00:14:24,880

when encountered cannot be immediately

394

00:14:27,670 --> 00:14:26,160

identified

395

00:14:28,870 --> 00:14:27,680

however it is the department's

396

00:14:30,629 --> 00:14:28,880

contention

397

00:14:33,110 --> 00:14:30,639

that by combining appropriately

398

00:14:34,710 --> 00:14:33,120

structured collected data with rigorous

399

00:14:37,110 --> 00:14:34,720

scientific analysis

400

00:14:39,430 --> 00:14:37,120

any object that we encounter

401  
00:14:42,829 --> 00:14:39,440  
can likely be

402  
00:14:45,670 --> 00:14:42,839  
isolated characterized identified and if

403  
00:14:48,389 --> 00:14:45,680  
necessary mitigate it

404  
00:14:50,790 --> 00:14:48,399  
we know that our service members have

405  
00:14:53,350 --> 00:14:50,800  
encountered unidentified aerial

406  
00:14:55,030 --> 00:14:53,360  
phenomena and because uaps pose

407  
00:14:56,310 --> 00:14:55,040  
potential flight safety and general

408  
00:14:58,470 --> 00:14:56,320  
security risk

409  
00:15:00,629 --> 00:14:58,480  
we are committed to a focused effort to

410  
00:15:02,470 --> 00:15:00,639  
determine their origins

411  
00:15:04,069 --> 00:15:02,480  
our effort will include the thorough

412  
00:15:06,150 --> 00:15:04,079  
examination of

413  
00:15:08,710 --> 00:15:06,160

adversarial platforms and potential

414

00:15:10,629 --> 00:15:08,720

breakthrough technologies us government

415

00:15:13,590 --> 00:15:10,639

or commercial platforms

416

00:15:14,870 --> 00:15:13,600

allied or partner systems and other

417

00:15:18,069 --> 00:15:14,880

natural

418

00:15:23,430 --> 00:15:20,310

we also understand that there has been a

419

00:15:25,590 --> 00:15:23,440

cultural stigma surrounding uap

420

00:15:27,430 --> 00:15:25,600

our goal is to eliminate the stigma by

421

00:15:29,670 --> 00:15:27,440

fully incorporating our operators and

422

00:15:31,910 --> 00:15:29,680

mission personnel into a standardized

423

00:15:35,269 --> 00:15:31,920

data gathering process

424

00:15:37,749 --> 00:15:35,279

we believe that making uap reporting a

425

00:15:39,509 --> 00:15:37,759

mission imperative will be instrumental

426

00:15:41,189 --> 00:15:39,519

to the effort's success

427

00:15:43,189 --> 00:15:41,199

the defense intelligence and security

428

00:15:44,949 --> 00:15:43,199

enterprise provides real-time support to

429

00:15:46,710 --> 00:15:44,959

our warfighters and mission personnel

430

00:15:49,670 --> 00:15:46,720

across all domains

431

00:15:51,509 --> 00:15:49,680

to optimize the department's uap work we

432

00:15:53,269 --> 00:15:51,519

are establishing an office

433

00:15:54,389 --> 00:15:53,279

within the office of the secretary of

434

00:15:56,949 --> 00:15:54,399

defense

435

00:15:58,629 --> 00:15:56,959

that office's function is clear to

436

00:16:00,629 --> 00:15:58,639

facilitate the identification of

437

00:16:03,430 --> 00:16:00,639

previously unknown or unidentified

438

00:16:05,430 --> 00:16:03,440

airborne objects in a methodical logical

439

00:16:07,749 --> 00:16:05,440  
and standardized manner

440

00:16:09,269 --> 00:16:07,759  
these goals will ensure that we are

441

00:16:10,949 --> 00:16:09,279  
working closely with operational

442

00:16:13,269 --> 00:16:10,959  
personnel on training and reporting

443

00:16:15,189 --> 00:16:13,279  
requirements developing data and

444

00:16:17,189 --> 00:16:15,199  
intelligence requirements

445

00:16:18,790 --> 00:16:17,199  
standardizing and integrating processes

446

00:16:20,710 --> 00:16:18,800  
and procedures for collection

447

00:16:21,749 --> 00:16:20,720  
operational surveillance analysis and

448

00:16:23,509 --> 00:16:21,759  
reporting

449

00:16:25,910 --> 00:16:23,519  
leveraging our research and development

450

00:16:28,069 --> 00:16:25,920  
capabilities to improve detection

451

00:16:30,949 --> 00:16:28,079

characterization and identification of

452

00:16:33,430 --> 00:16:30,959

uaps developing mitigating solutions and

453

00:16:35,269 --> 00:16:33,440

procedures and identifying strategy and

454

00:16:37,269 --> 00:16:35,279

policy solutions

455

00:16:39,110 --> 00:16:37,279

this effort will maximize collaboration

456

00:16:40,949 --> 00:16:39,120

and build upon already existing

457

00:16:42,949 --> 00:16:40,959

relationships with the office of the

458

00:16:46,710 --> 00:16:42,959

director of national intelligence the

459

00:16:48,310 --> 00:16:46,720

faa dhs and the fbi

460

00:16:49,509 --> 00:16:48,320

we are also committed to strong

461

00:16:50,470 --> 00:16:49,519

partnerships with the department of

462

00:16:53,590 --> 00:16:50,480

energy

463

00:16:55,749 --> 00:16:53,600

noaa the dea nasa

464

00:16:57,670 --> 00:16:55,759  
and the national labs and just as

465

00:16:59,350 --> 00:16:57,680  
importantly our international partners

466

00:17:00,710 --> 00:16:59,360  
and allies

467

00:17:03,590 --> 00:17:00,720  
with regard to the importance of

468

00:17:04,470 --> 00:17:03,600  
transparency the department is fully

469

00:17:06,309 --> 00:17:04,480  
committed

470

00:17:09,189 --> 00:17:06,319  
to the principle of openness and

471

00:17:11,350 --> 00:17:09,199  
accountability to the american people

472

00:17:13,669 --> 00:17:11,360  
however we are also mindful of our

473

00:17:15,750 --> 00:17:13,679  
obligation to protect sensitive sources

474

00:17:18,309 --> 00:17:15,760  
and methods our goal is to strike that

475

00:17:20,470 --> 00:17:18,319  
delicate balance one that enables us to

476  
00:17:22,309 --> 00:17:20,480  
maintain the public's trust while

477  
00:17:24,470 --> 00:17:22,319  
preserving those capabilities that are

478  
00:17:26,470 --> 00:17:24,480  
vital to the support of our service

479  
00:17:28,630 --> 00:17:26,480  
personnel

480  
00:17:29,909 --> 00:17:28,640  
in closing the department is committed

481  
00:17:31,590 --> 00:17:29,919  
to this effort and welcomes the

482  
00:17:32,950 --> 00:17:31,600  
challenge we thank you for your

483  
00:17:40,150 --> 00:17:32,960  
committed support

484  
00:17:44,470 --> 00:17:42,310  
chairman carson ranking member

485  
00:17:45,830 --> 00:17:44,480  
crawford and committee members thank you

486  
00:17:47,270 --> 00:17:45,840  
very much for the opportunity to be here

487  
00:17:49,110 --> 00:17:47,280  
today to highlight the ongoing work of

488  
00:17:51,750 --> 00:17:49,120

the department of defense regarding

489

00:17:53,830 --> 00:17:51,760

unidentified aerial phenomena since the

490

00:17:55,830 --> 00:17:53,840

early 2000s

491

00:17:57,990 --> 00:17:55,840

we have seen an increasing number of

492

00:17:59,029 --> 00:17:58,000

unauthorized and or unidentified

493

00:18:01,270 --> 00:17:59,039

aircraft or objects in

494

00:18:03,110 --> 00:18:01,280

military-controlled training areas

495

00:18:04,230 --> 00:18:03,120

and training ranges and other designated

496

00:18:06,470 --> 00:18:04,240

airspace

497

00:18:07,750 --> 00:18:06,480

reports of sightings are frequent and

498

00:18:09,750 --> 00:18:07,760

continuing

499

00:18:11,430 --> 00:18:09,760

we attribute this increase in reporting

500

00:18:13,750 --> 00:18:11,440

to a number of factors including our

501  
00:18:15,750 --> 00:18:13,760  
work to destigmatize reporting an

502  
00:18:17,750 --> 00:18:15,760  
increase in the number of new systems

503  
00:18:19,990 --> 00:18:17,760  
such as quadcopters and unmanned aerial

504  
00:18:21,669 --> 00:18:20,000  
systems that are in our airspace

505  
00:18:23,590 --> 00:18:21,679  
identification of what we can classify

506  
00:18:25,669 --> 00:18:23,600  
as clutter mylar balloons and other

507  
00:18:27,510 --> 00:18:25,679  
types of air trash

508  
00:18:29,909 --> 00:18:27,520  
and improvements in the capabilities of

509  
00:18:31,430 --> 00:18:29,919  
our various sensors to detect things in

510  
00:18:33,430 --> 00:18:31,440  
our airspace

511  
00:18:34,870 --> 00:18:33,440  
almost two years ago in august of 2020

512  
00:18:36,150 --> 00:18:34,880  
deputy secretary defense nordquist

513  
00:18:38,470 --> 00:18:36,160

directed the establishment of the

514

00:18:40,950 --> 00:18:38,480

unidentified aerial phenomena task force

515

00:18:42,789 --> 00:18:40,960

within the department of the navy the

516

00:18:45,029 --> 00:18:42,799

uap task force was built on the

517

00:18:46,549 --> 00:18:45,039

foundation of the navy's initial efforts

518

00:18:49,190 --> 00:18:46,559

to respond to the reports from our

519

00:18:51,110 --> 00:18:49,200

aviators on unidentified objects

520

00:18:53,669 --> 00:18:51,120

observed in our training ranges

521

00:18:55,669 --> 00:18:53,679

the basic issues then and now are

522

00:18:57,270 --> 00:18:55,679

twofold first

523

00:18:59,350 --> 00:18:57,280

incursions in our training ranges by

524

00:19:01,350 --> 00:18:59,360

unidentified objects represent serious

525

00:19:04,390 --> 00:19:01,360

hazards to safety of flight

526  
00:19:06,710 --> 00:19:04,400  
in every aspect of naval aviation safety

527  
00:19:07,830 --> 00:19:06,720  
of our air crews is paramount

528  
00:19:09,830 --> 00:19:07,840  
second

529  
00:19:12,150 --> 00:19:09,840  
intrusions by unknown aircraft or

530  
00:19:14,870 --> 00:19:12,160  
objects pose potential threats to the

531  
00:19:17,190 --> 00:19:14,880  
security of our operations our aviators

532  
00:19:19,350 --> 00:19:17,200  
train as they would fight

533  
00:19:21,430 --> 00:19:19,360  
so any intrusions that may compromise

534  
00:19:23,669 --> 00:19:21,440  
the security of our operations by

535  
00:19:25,510 --> 00:19:23,679  
revealing our capabilities our tactics

536  
00:19:27,990 --> 00:19:25,520  
techniques or procedures

537  
00:19:29,909 --> 00:19:28,000  
are of great concern to the navy and the

538  
00:19:31,909 --> 00:19:29,919

department of defense

539

00:19:35,029 --> 00:19:31,919

from the very beginning we took these

540

00:19:36,789 --> 00:19:35,039

reports very seriously we instituted a

541

00:19:38,549 --> 00:19:36,799

data-driven approach to the

542

00:19:40,710 --> 00:19:38,559

investigations where we could collect as

543

00:19:43,110 --> 00:19:40,720

much data as possible and use all

544

00:19:44,549 --> 00:19:43,120

available resources to analyze and make

545

00:19:47,029 --> 00:19:44,559

informed decisions on the best ways to

546

00:19:49,669 --> 00:19:47,039

address our findings our main objective

547

00:19:52,470 --> 00:19:49,679

was to transition uap efforts from an

548

00:19:55,110 --> 00:19:52,480

anecdotal or narrative based

549

00:19:58,070 --> 00:19:55,120

approach to a rigorous science and

550

00:19:59,990 --> 00:19:58,080

technology engineering focused study

551  
00:20:01,990 --> 00:20:00,000  
this data-driven approach

552  
00:20:03,350 --> 00:20:02,000  
requires input from a wide variety of

553  
00:20:05,510 --> 00:20:03,360  
sources

554  
00:20:06,870 --> 00:20:05,520  
in the early stages the task force

555  
00:20:08,870 --> 00:20:06,880  
worked to standardize the reporting

556  
00:20:10,390 --> 00:20:08,880  
mechanisms and processes to make it as

557  
00:20:12,149 --> 00:20:10,400  
easy as possible

558  
00:20:14,149 --> 00:20:12,159  
for personnel to report any engagement

559  
00:20:15,990 --> 00:20:14,159  
so that we were getting that wide range

560  
00:20:17,990 --> 00:20:16,000  
of reporting that we needed

561  
00:20:19,350 --> 00:20:18,000  
we also spent considerable efforts

562  
00:20:21,270 --> 00:20:19,360  
engaging directly with our naval

563  
00:20:23,830 --> 00:20:21,280

aviators and building relationships to

564

00:20:25,750 --> 00:20:23,840

help destigmatize the act of reporting

565

00:20:27,510 --> 00:20:25,760

sightings or encounters

566

00:20:28,950 --> 00:20:27,520

and we work with naval aviation

567

00:20:31,750 --> 00:20:28,960

leadership to provide additional

568

00:20:33,909 --> 00:20:31,760

equipment to record any encounter navy

569

00:20:35,590 --> 00:20:33,919

and air force crews now have

570

00:20:38,230 --> 00:20:35,600

step-by-step procedures for reporting on

571

00:20:40,549 --> 00:20:38,240

the uap on their knee board

572

00:20:41,909 --> 00:20:40,559

in their in the cockpit and

573

00:20:44,390 --> 00:20:41,919

in their post

574

00:20:46,470 --> 00:20:44,400

flight debrief procedures

575

00:20:48,630 --> 00:20:46,480

the direct result of those efforts has

576  
00:20:50,070 --> 00:20:48,640  
been increased reporting with increased

577  
00:20:52,710 --> 00:20:50,080  
opportunities to focus a number of

578  
00:20:53,830 --> 00:20:52,720  
sensors on any objects the message is

579  
00:20:55,909 --> 00:20:53,840  
now clear

580  
00:20:56,710 --> 00:20:55,919  
if you see something you need to report

581  
00:20:58,470 --> 00:20:56,720  
it

582  
00:21:01,029 --> 00:20:58,480  
and the message has been received in

583  
00:21:02,789 --> 00:21:01,039  
fact recently i received a call from a

584  
00:21:04,390 --> 00:21:02,799  
senior naval aviator with over 2000

585  
00:21:05,830 --> 00:21:04,400  
flight hours he called me personally

586  
00:21:07,110 --> 00:21:05,840  
from the flight line

587  
00:21:08,950 --> 00:21:07,120  
after landing

588  
00:21:10,310 --> 00:21:08,960

to talk about

589

00:21:12,390 --> 00:21:10,320

an encounter that he had just

590

00:21:14,070 --> 00:21:12,400

experienced

591

00:21:15,510 --> 00:21:14,080

those were just the initial steps we

592

00:21:16,870 --> 00:21:15,520

also made a concerted effort to assemble

593

00:21:17,830 --> 00:21:16,880

subject matter experts from across the

594

00:21:19,510 --> 00:21:17,840

department of defense and the

595

00:21:21,270 --> 00:21:19,520

intelligence community and other us

596

00:21:22,630 --> 00:21:21,280

government agencies and departments we

597

00:21:24,310 --> 00:21:22,640

forged partnerships with the research

598

00:21:25,990 --> 00:21:24,320

development and acquisition communities

599

00:21:28,470 --> 00:21:26,000

with industry partners and with academic

600

00:21:30,310 --> 00:21:28,480

research labs and we brought many allies

601  
00:21:32,549 --> 00:21:30,320  
and international partners into our

602  
00:21:34,470 --> 00:21:32,559  
discussions on uab

603  
00:21:36,630 --> 00:21:34,480  
additionally subject matter experts from

604  
00:21:40,310 --> 00:21:36,640  
a wide variety of fields including

605  
00:21:43,750 --> 00:21:40,320  
physics optics metallurgy meteorology

606  
00:21:45,590 --> 00:21:43,760  
just to name a few have been brought

607  
00:21:48,630 --> 00:21:45,600  
expand our understanding in areas where

608  
00:21:50,230 --> 00:21:48,640  
me we may not have organic expertise

609  
00:21:52,710 --> 00:21:50,240  
in short we've endeavored to bring an

610  
00:21:54,710 --> 00:21:52,720  
all hands on deck approach uh to the to

611  
00:21:57,190 --> 00:21:54,720  
better understand this phenomena so what

612  
00:22:00,630 --> 00:21:57,200  
have we learned so far

613  
00:22:04,070 --> 00:22:00,640

any given observation may be fleeting

614

00:22:07,350 --> 00:22:04,080

or longer it may be recorded or not it

615

00:22:09,029 --> 00:22:07,360

may be observable by one or multiple

616

00:22:11,430 --> 00:22:09,039

assets

617

00:22:12,870 --> 00:22:11,440

in short there's rarely an easy answer

618

00:22:15,110 --> 00:22:12,880

for example let me share with you the

619

00:22:27,029 --> 00:22:15,120

first video that we have here today

620

00:22:29,190 --> 00:22:28,390

there it was

621

00:22:31,110 --> 00:22:29,200

that's

622

00:22:34,470 --> 00:22:31,120

in many cases it was the acorn right

623

00:22:38,070 --> 00:22:34,480

that's all that a report may include

624

00:22:41,270 --> 00:22:38,830

than

625

00:22:43,270 --> 00:22:41,280

this as we detailed in both the

626  
00:22:44,549 --> 00:22:43,280  
unclassified and classified versions of

627  
00:22:45,590 --> 00:22:44,559  
the preliminary assessment released by

628  
00:22:47,669 --> 00:22:45,600  
the office of the director of national

629  
00:22:50,630 --> 00:22:47,679  
intelligence last june this often

630  
00:22:52,230 --> 00:22:50,640  
limited amount of high quality data

631  
00:22:54,070 --> 00:22:52,240  
and reporting hampers our ability to

632  
00:22:55,990 --> 00:22:54,080  
draw firm conclusions about the nature

633  
00:22:58,149 --> 00:22:56,000  
or intent of uap

634  
00:22:59,750 --> 00:22:58,159  
as detailed in the odni report if and

635  
00:23:02,230 --> 00:22:59,760  
when individual uap incidents are

636  
00:23:04,390 --> 00:23:02,240  
resolved they likely fall into one of

637  
00:23:06,630 --> 00:23:04,400  
five potential explanatory categories

638  
00:23:09,029 --> 00:23:06,640

airborne clutter natural atmospheric

639

00:23:11,270 --> 00:23:09,039

phenomena us government or u.s industry

640

00:23:12,950 --> 00:23:11,280

developmental programs foreign adversary

641

00:23:16,149 --> 00:23:12,960

systems or

642

00:23:17,990 --> 00:23:16,159

a other bin that allows for a holding

643

00:23:19,590 --> 00:23:18,000

bin of difficult cases and for the

644

00:23:21,510 --> 00:23:19,600

possibility of surprise and potential

645

00:23:23,909 --> 00:23:21,520

scientific discovery

646

00:23:25,190 --> 00:23:23,919

we stand by those initial results

647

00:23:27,510 --> 00:23:25,200

since the release of that preliminary

648

00:23:29,029 --> 00:23:27,520

report uap task force databases we're

649

00:23:31,909 --> 00:23:29,039

here for the other ben

650

00:23:34,870 --> 00:23:31,919

approximately 400 reports

651

00:23:36,310 --> 00:23:34,880

the stigma has been reduced

652

00:23:38,149 --> 00:23:36,320

we've also made progress in resolving

653

00:23:39,750 --> 00:23:38,159

the character of a limited number of uap

654

00:23:42,549 --> 00:23:39,760

encounters for example let me show you a

655

00:23:46,310 --> 00:23:42,559

couple of another video and image

656

00:23:47,830 --> 00:23:46,320

taken years apart in different areas

657

00:23:49,830 --> 00:23:47,840

in this video

658

00:23:52,070 --> 00:23:49,840

us navy personnel recorded what appears

659

00:23:53,990 --> 00:23:52,080

to be triangles some flashing recorded

660

00:23:55,430 --> 00:23:54,000

several years ago off the coast of the

661

00:23:57,029 --> 00:23:55,440

united states

662

00:23:57,750 --> 00:23:57,039

this was recorded while the u.s navy

663

00:23:59,750 --> 00:23:57,760

ship

664

00:24:02,230 --> 00:23:59,760

observed a number of small unmanned

665

00:24:04,549 --> 00:24:02,240

aerial systems in the area

666

00:24:06,070 --> 00:24:04,559

and importantly the video was taken

667

00:24:08,470 --> 00:24:06,080

through night vision goggles with a

668

00:24:10,549 --> 00:24:08,480

single lens reflex camera

669

00:24:18,549 --> 00:24:10,559

these remained unresolved for several

670

00:24:21,830 --> 00:24:20,149

unresolved is he going to explain what

671

00:24:30,310 --> 00:24:21,840

they are

672

00:24:34,630 --> 00:24:31,909

uh to the person asking yes this is the

673

00:24:37,190 --> 00:24:34,640

one that corbell put out

674

00:24:39,350 --> 00:24:37,200

several years later

675

00:24:42,149 --> 00:24:39,360

and off a different coast

676  
00:24:43,830 --> 00:24:42,159  
u.s navy personnel again in a swarm of

677  
00:24:46,310 --> 00:24:43,840  
unmanned aerial systems and again

678  
00:24:47,590 --> 00:24:46,320  
through night vision goggles and an slr

679  
00:24:49,750 --> 00:24:47,600  
camera

680  
00:24:51,110 --> 00:24:49,760  
recorded this image

681  
00:24:52,870 --> 00:24:51,120  
but this time

682  
00:24:55,029 --> 00:24:52,880  
other us navy assets also observed

683  
00:24:57,590 --> 00:24:55,039  
unmanned aerial systems nearby and we're

684  
00:24:59,269 --> 00:24:57,600  
now reasonably confident that these

685  
00:25:01,669 --> 00:24:59,279  
triangles correlate the unmanned aerial

686  
00:25:02,870 --> 00:25:01,679  
systems in the area the triangular

687  
00:25:05,029 --> 00:25:02,880  
appearance

688  
00:25:06,950 --> 00:25:05,039

is a result of light passing through the

689

00:25:09,269 --> 00:25:06,960

night vision goggles and then being

690

00:25:11,029 --> 00:25:09,279

recorded by an slr camera

691

00:25:12,630 --> 00:25:11,039

i don't mean to suggest that everything

692

00:25:15,430 --> 00:25:12,640

that we observe

693

00:25:16,310 --> 00:25:15,440

is is identifiable but

694

00:25:19,909 --> 00:25:16,320

um

695

00:25:22,630 --> 00:25:19,919

it but this is a great example of how it

696

00:25:25,029 --> 00:25:22,640

takes considerable effort to understand

697

00:25:27,909 --> 00:25:25,039

what we're seeing uh in the examples

698

00:25:29,190 --> 00:25:27,919

that we are able to collect

699

00:25:30,950 --> 00:25:29,200

in this example we accumulated

700

00:25:32,950 --> 00:25:30,960

sufficient data from two similar

701  
00:25:34,950 --> 00:25:32,960  
encounters from two different time

702  
00:25:38,070 --> 00:25:34,960  
periods in two different geographic

703  
00:25:39,990 --> 00:25:38,080  
areas to help us draw these conclusions

704  
00:25:42,870 --> 00:25:40,000  
that's not always the case though we

705  
00:25:45,350 --> 00:25:42,880  
recognize that that can be unsatisfying

706  
00:25:47,110 --> 00:25:45,360  
or insufficient in the eyes of many this

707  
00:25:48,310 --> 00:25:47,120  
is a popular topic in our nation with

708  
00:25:51,110 --> 00:25:48,320  
various theories as to what these

709  
00:25:52,390 --> 00:25:51,120  
objects may be and where they originate

710  
00:25:53,830 --> 00:25:52,400  
by nature

711  
00:25:55,269 --> 00:25:53,840  
we are all curious and we seek to

712  
00:25:57,110 --> 00:25:55,279  
understand the unknown

713  
00:25:59,750 --> 00:25:57,120

and as a lifelong intelligence

714

00:26:01,430 --> 00:25:59,760

professional i'm impatient i want

715

00:26:02,789 --> 00:26:01,440

immediate explanations for this as much

716

00:26:03,990 --> 00:26:02,799

as anyone else

717

00:26:05,909 --> 00:26:04,000

however

718

00:26:07,350 --> 00:26:05,919

understanding can take significant time

719

00:26:09,669 --> 00:26:07,360

and effort it's why we've endeavored to

720

00:26:12,230 --> 00:26:09,679

concentrate on this data-driven process

721

00:26:13,590 --> 00:26:12,240

to drive fact-based results and given

722

00:26:16,390 --> 00:26:13,600

the nature of our business national

723

00:26:18,390 --> 00:26:16,400

defense we've had to sometimes be less

724

00:26:20,950 --> 00:26:18,400

forthcoming with information in open

725

00:26:23,430 --> 00:26:20,960

forums than many would hope

726

00:26:24,870 --> 00:26:23,440

if uap do indeed represent a potential

727

00:26:26,950 --> 00:26:24,880

threat to our security then the

728

00:26:28,950 --> 00:26:26,960

capabilities systems processes and

729

00:26:30,870 --> 00:26:28,960

sources we use to observe record study

730

00:26:32,630 --> 00:26:30,880

or analyze these phenomena

731

00:26:33,750 --> 00:26:32,640

need to be classified at appropriate

732

00:26:36,870 --> 00:26:33,760

levels

733

00:26:39,110 --> 00:26:36,880

we do not want we do not want potential

734

00:26:41,350 --> 00:26:39,120

adversaries to know exactly what we're

735

00:26:43,750 --> 00:26:41,360

able to see or understand or how we come

736

00:26:44,630 --> 00:26:43,760

to the conclusions we make therefore

737

00:26:46,870 --> 00:26:44,640

public

738

00:26:48,870 --> 00:26:46,880

disclosures must be carefully considered

739

00:26:50,710 --> 00:26:48,880

on a case-by-case basis

740

00:26:52,149 --> 00:26:50,720

so what's next we're concentrating on a

741

00:26:54,710 --> 00:26:52,159

seamless transition to the new

742

00:26:57,669 --> 00:26:54,720

organization and future analysis of

743

00:26:59,190 --> 00:26:57,679

complicated uh issues of uap issues will

744

00:27:01,269 --> 00:26:59,200

greatly benefit from the infrastructure

745

00:27:02,870 --> 00:27:01,279

of the process and the procedures that

746

00:27:04,470 --> 00:27:02,880

we've developed to date i'm confident

747

00:27:06,070 --> 00:27:04,480

that the task force under navy

748

00:27:08,070 --> 00:27:06,080

leadership has forged a path forward

749

00:27:09,350 --> 00:27:08,080

that will allow us to anchor assessments

750

00:27:11,510 --> 00:27:09,360

in science and engineering vice

751  
00:27:15,750 --> 00:27:11,520  
anecdotal evidence we remain committed

752  
00:27:17,510 --> 00:27:15,760  
to that goal as i know the usdi uh

753  
00:27:19,430 --> 00:27:17,520  
organization does as well

754  
00:27:21,110 --> 00:27:19,440  
so thank you very much for your interest

755  
00:27:22,789 --> 00:27:21,120  
in continuing support for the uap task

756  
00:27:24,310 --> 00:27:22,799  
force the team's made a lot of progress

757  
00:27:25,430 --> 00:27:24,320  
but we really are just establishing the

758  
00:27:26,950 --> 00:27:25,440  
foundation

759  
00:27:28,389 --> 00:27:26,960  
for the more detailed analysis that's

760  
00:27:30,389 --> 00:27:28,399  
yet to be done and with your continued

761  
00:27:32,230 --> 00:27:30,399  
support we can sustain that momentum

762  
00:27:33,990 --> 00:27:32,240  
necessary to produce data-centric

763  
00:27:35,350 --> 00:27:34,000

analysis and understanding the phenomena

764

00:27:37,190 --> 00:27:35,360

look forward to your questions thank you

765

00:27:39,350 --> 00:27:37,200

thank you mr bray

766

00:27:41,190 --> 00:27:39,360

this is the third version of this task

767

00:27:43,830 --> 00:27:41,200

force and to be frank

768

00:27:45,990 --> 00:27:43,840

one of congress's concerns is

769

00:27:48,549 --> 00:27:46,000

that the executive branch

770

00:27:52,149 --> 00:27:48,559

and administration of both parties

771

00:27:54,870 --> 00:27:52,159

uh has been sweeping concerns about uaps

772

00:27:56,310 --> 00:27:54,880

under the rug by focusing on events

773

00:27:58,630 --> 00:27:56,320

that can be explained and avoiding

774

00:27:59,750 --> 00:27:58,640

events that cannot be explained

775

00:28:04,710 --> 00:27:59,760

what can you

776

00:28:07,750 --> 00:28:04,720

the american people

777

00:28:09,350 --> 00:28:07,760

confidence that you aren't just focusing

778

00:28:15,430 --> 00:28:09,360

our attention on

779

00:28:20,630 --> 00:28:17,430

congressman i'll start and then uh mr

780

00:28:21,590 --> 00:28:20,640

bray um please feel free to uh to weigh

781

00:28:22,470 --> 00:28:21,600

in

782

00:28:24,310 --> 00:28:22,480

so

783

00:28:26,630 --> 00:28:24,320

the way that we're approaching this is

784

00:28:28,870 --> 00:28:26,640

with a more

785

00:28:30,149 --> 00:28:28,880

thorough standardized methodology than

786

00:28:31,590 --> 00:28:30,159

what we have in the past first and

787

00:28:34,549 --> 00:28:31,600

foremost the secretary of defense is

788

00:28:36,149 --> 00:28:34,559

chartering this effort this is not uh

789

00:28:39,029 --> 00:28:36,159

someone lower in the department of

790

00:28:40,870 --> 00:28:39,039

defense and he has assigned that task to

791

00:28:42,789 --> 00:28:40,880

the office of secretary of defense uh

792

00:28:44,950 --> 00:28:42,799

the uh under secretary for intelligence

793

00:28:46,549 --> 00:28:44,960

security that's me because i'm

794

00:28:48,230 --> 00:28:46,559

responsible for looking at intelligence

795

00:28:50,389 --> 00:28:48,240

matters i'm responsible for security

796

00:28:52,789 --> 00:28:50,399

matters this is potentially both

797

00:28:54,870 --> 00:28:52,799

so when you start

798

00:28:56,310 --> 00:28:54,880

concerning the

799

00:28:58,230 --> 00:28:56,320

ourselves with the safety of our

800

00:29:00,310 --> 00:28:58,240

personnel the the safety of our

801  
00:29:02,230 --> 00:29:00,320  
installations and basis there's no other

802  
00:29:04,549 --> 00:29:02,240  
higher priority than what we have than

803  
00:29:05,750 --> 00:29:04,559  
actually getting after this and as you

804  
00:29:09,350 --> 00:29:05,760  
have stated

805  
00:29:11,430 --> 00:29:09,360  
we have been assigned that task to

806  
00:29:13,110 --> 00:29:11,440  
actually stand up in office the aim sog

807  
00:29:14,389 --> 00:29:13,120  
which i believe the name server will

808  
00:29:16,389 --> 00:29:14,399  
likely change

809  
00:29:19,110 --> 00:29:16,399  
but we have moved forward in terms of

810  
00:29:22,389 --> 00:29:19,120  
moving to establish that office we have

811  
00:29:25,190 --> 00:29:22,399  
uh as of this week

812  
00:29:27,269 --> 00:29:25,200  
pick the director for that effort a very

813  
00:29:28,070 --> 00:29:27,279

established and

814

00:29:30,389 --> 00:29:28,080

and

815

00:29:32,310 --> 00:29:30,399

accomplished individual we've identified

816

00:29:34,870 --> 00:29:32,320

spaces we've

817

00:29:36,710 --> 00:29:34,880

worked with personnel across the

818

00:29:38,870 --> 00:29:36,720

department of defense with the services

819

00:29:41,029 --> 00:29:38,880

and we've worked with the ic which is on

820

00:29:44,310 --> 00:29:41,039

board in helping us work through this

821

00:29:47,350 --> 00:29:44,320

standardized methodology for now

822

00:29:49,830 --> 00:29:47,360

bringing in data analyzing that data and

823

00:29:51,590 --> 00:29:49,840

reporting that data in the appropriate

824

00:29:52,950 --> 00:29:51,600

method appropriate means so we can

825

00:29:55,430 --> 00:29:52,960

either get it

826

00:29:57,830 --> 00:29:55,440

to our service personnel to ensure their

827

00:29:59,430 --> 00:29:57,840

safety or get it to you and the congress

828

00:30:01,269 --> 00:29:59,440

and to the public to ensure that you

829

00:30:03,110 --> 00:30:01,279

have oversight to what we're doing so

830

00:30:06,070 --> 00:30:03,120

chartered by the secretary of defense

831

00:30:07,750 --> 00:30:06,080

standardized and

832

00:30:08,950 --> 00:30:07,760

really a methodical approach it's

833

00:30:09,990 --> 00:30:08,960

something we're doing that has not been

834

00:30:12,149 --> 00:30:10,000

done before

835

00:30:14,070 --> 00:30:12,159

can we get some kinds of assurances that

836

00:30:16,470 --> 00:30:14,080

your analysts will follow the facts

837

00:30:18,870 --> 00:30:16,480

where they lead and assess all

838

00:30:21,110 --> 00:30:18,880

hypotheses absolutely so we're open to

839

00:30:23,830 --> 00:30:21,120

all hypotheses we're open to

840

00:30:25,269 --> 00:30:23,840

any uh conclusions that uh that we may

841

00:30:26,789 --> 00:30:25,279

encounter

842

00:30:29,029 --> 00:30:26,799

uh quickly before i pass it to the

843

00:30:31,110 --> 00:30:29,039

ranking member uh and and chairman

844

00:30:32,710 --> 00:30:31,120

schiff i wanna thank you both for taking

845

00:30:34,870 --> 00:30:32,720

the time and i had a good time meeting

846

00:30:36,149 --> 00:30:34,880

with you last week uh director moultrie

847

00:30:37,190 --> 00:30:36,159

under secretary

848

00:30:39,669 --> 00:30:37,200

moultrie

849

00:30:44,070 --> 00:30:41,909

it's fair to say that you are a science

850

00:30:46,230 --> 00:30:44,080

fiction fan is that correct

851

00:30:49,510 --> 00:30:46,240

it is fair to say that i am an

852

00:30:51,350 --> 00:30:49,520

inquisitive mind who has uh spent 40

853

00:30:53,110 --> 00:30:51,360

years in the intelligence field and has

854

00:30:54,789 --> 00:30:53,120

focused on both science and science

855

00:30:55,669 --> 00:30:54,799

fiction that is fair could you tell us

856

00:30:58,149 --> 00:30:55,679

about it

857

00:30:59,509 --> 00:30:58,159

yeah well yeah look my generation grew

858

00:31:01,190 --> 00:30:59,519

up uh

859

00:31:05,110 --> 00:31:01,200

looking at uh

860

00:31:07,909 --> 00:31:05,120

space sagas and and the apollo program

861

00:31:10,789 --> 00:31:07,919

so all of us who uh grew up in the 60s

862

00:31:11,590 --> 00:31:10,799

uh were were just thrilled by watching

863

00:31:13,350 --> 00:31:11,600

um

864

00:31:15,750 --> 00:31:13,360

our first astronaut land on the moon

865

00:31:16,630 --> 00:31:15,760

that was a momentous occasion to people

866

00:31:18,950 --> 00:31:16,640

who

867

00:31:20,549 --> 00:31:18,960

were of different generations uh some of

868

00:31:22,230 --> 00:31:20,559

them didn't believe that happened i

869

00:31:23,669 --> 00:31:22,240

still have relatives and friends who

870

00:31:25,750 --> 00:31:23,679

don't believe it happened right science

871

00:31:27,669 --> 00:31:25,760

fiction to them but to us it was no

872

00:31:28,630 --> 00:31:27,679

that's the progress that we've made

873

00:31:30,789 --> 00:31:28,640

and so

874

00:31:33,909 --> 00:31:30,799

i was enthralled by that and i've taken

875

00:31:39,029 --> 00:31:36,710

the challenge of what may be out there i

876

00:31:40,870 --> 00:31:39,039

have mentioned to you that yes i have

877

00:31:42,310 --> 00:31:40,880

followed science fiction i have gone to

878

00:31:43,669 --> 00:31:42,320

conventions even i'll say it on the

879

00:31:46,470 --> 00:31:43,679

record uh

880

00:31:48,149 --> 00:31:46,480

uh gotta break the ice somehow but uh

881

00:31:50,230 --> 00:31:48,159

you know i have done that right but

882

00:31:52,870 --> 00:31:50,240

there's nothing wrong with that um don't

883

00:31:54,710 --> 00:31:52,880

necessarily dress up but i do uh you

884

00:31:56,950 --> 00:31:54,720

know i do believe that it's important to

885

00:31:58,950 --> 00:31:56,960

show that the department of defense has

886

00:32:00,310 --> 00:31:58,960

um you know we have character and we're

887

00:32:03,190 --> 00:32:00,320

people just like you just like the

888

00:32:04,950 --> 00:32:03,200

american people we have our um

889

00:32:07,110 --> 00:32:04,960

we have our uh

890

00:32:08,950 --> 00:32:07,120

our inquisitiveness uh we have our

891

00:32:10,470 --> 00:32:08,960

questions we want to know what's out

892

00:32:12,310 --> 00:32:10,480

there as much as you want to know what's

893

00:32:13,909 --> 00:32:12,320

out there we get the questions not just

894

00:32:15,830 --> 00:32:13,919

from you we get it from family members

895

00:32:17,590 --> 00:32:15,840

and we get them night and day

896

00:32:19,269 --> 00:32:17,600

not just in committee hearings so

897

00:32:21,029 --> 00:32:19,279

finding what's out there is important

898

00:32:23,029 --> 00:32:21,039

but first and foremost it's

899

00:32:25,430 --> 00:32:23,039

important for us to do that so we can

900

00:32:27,669 --> 00:32:25,440

ensure that our people our personnel our

901  
00:32:29,110 --> 00:32:27,679  
aviators our bases and installations are

902  
00:32:30,950 --> 00:32:29,120  
safe

903  
00:32:32,870 --> 00:32:30,960  
and then that curiosity factor is

904  
00:32:35,029 --> 00:32:32,880  
something else that that we just want to

905  
00:32:36,870 --> 00:32:35,039  
know because that's the human race it's

906  
00:32:39,430 --> 00:32:36,880  
just you know that insatiable desire to

907  
00:32:42,950 --> 00:32:41,590  
thank you sir thank you mccrawford

908  
00:32:47,190 --> 00:32:42,960  
to know what to do

909  
00:32:47,990 --> 00:32:47,200  
he said you don't necessarily dress up

910  
00:32:50,760 --> 00:32:48,000  
uh

911  
00:32:53,029 --> 00:32:50,770  
that wasn't a real strong statement

912  
00:32:54,630 --> 00:32:53,039  
[Laughter]

913  
00:32:56,630 --> 00:32:54,640

gentlemen thank you for being here today

914

00:32:58,310 --> 00:32:56,640

we appreciate it um

915

00:33:00,470 --> 00:32:58,320

and thank you mr mulled for breaking the

916

00:33:02,389 --> 00:33:00,480

ice the way you did appreciate that the

917

00:33:03,830 --> 00:33:02,399

inability to understand objects in our

918

00:33:05,430 --> 00:33:03,840

sensitive

919

00:33:07,269 --> 00:33:05,440

operating areas is tantamount to an

920

00:33:09,190 --> 00:33:07,279

intelligence failure that we certainly

921

00:33:11,190 --> 00:33:09,200

want to avoid it's not about finding

922

00:33:12,630 --> 00:33:11,200

alien spacecraft but about delivering

923

00:33:14,230 --> 00:33:12,640

dominant intelligence across the

924

00:33:15,509 --> 00:33:14,240

tactical operational and strategic

925

00:33:17,830 --> 00:33:15,519

spectrum

926

00:33:22,149 --> 00:33:17,840

so my question is how can aimsog lead to

927

00:33:26,950 --> 00:33:24,630

sure i'll start with that uh so the goal

928

00:33:28,950 --> 00:33:26,960

of our effort is to integrate it into

929

00:33:31,909 --> 00:33:28,960

what we already do on a normal basis

930

00:33:33,269 --> 00:33:31,919

which is look for the unknown unknowns

931

00:33:35,430 --> 00:33:33,279

congressman as you stated in your

932

00:33:36,870 --> 00:33:35,440

opening remarks across all domains so

933

00:33:39,269 --> 00:33:36,880

we've been doing this for decades we've

934

00:33:41,190 --> 00:33:39,279

been looking at the space domain looking

935

00:33:43,430 --> 00:33:41,200

at space objects looking at space

936

00:33:45,269 --> 00:33:43,440

weather looking at space phenomena

937

00:33:47,830 --> 00:33:45,279

we've been looking at things in the air

938

00:33:49,430 --> 00:33:47,840

domain and we as you know we and i'll

939

00:33:51,350 --> 00:33:49,440

talk more about this in classified

940

00:33:53,990 --> 00:33:51,360

session but we have a very concerted

941

00:33:56,070 --> 00:33:54,000

effort to understand adversarial

942

00:33:57,830 --> 00:33:56,080

platforms and adversarial developmental

943

00:33:59,029 --> 00:33:57,840

programs and we do that also in the

944

00:34:01,430 --> 00:33:59,039

ground domain and of course we're very

945

00:34:03,750 --> 00:34:01,440

interested in what happens in the uh

946

00:34:05,509 --> 00:34:03,760

in the underwater or c domain if you

947

00:34:08,589 --> 00:34:05,519

will subsurface domain

948

00:34:11,829 --> 00:34:08,599

so if there are objects that our

949

00:34:16,790 --> 00:34:11,839

aviators or air crews are encountering

950

00:34:18,710 --> 00:34:16,800

in this air domain and their sensors are

951  
00:34:20,950 --> 00:34:18,720  
are discovering or detecting some of

952  
00:34:23,510 --> 00:34:20,960  
these objects we want to just bring that

953  
00:34:25,430 --> 00:34:23,520  
in to the normal process that we have

954  
00:34:26,869 --> 00:34:25,440  
for identifying unknown unknowns we want

955  
00:34:29,030 --> 00:34:26,879  
to make sure we have the intelligence

956  
00:34:31,349 --> 00:34:29,040  
requirements that allow us not only to

957  
00:34:34,230 --> 00:34:31,359  
look at that event from the time that it

958  
00:34:35,909 --> 00:34:34,240  
occurs forward but maybe retrospectively

959  
00:34:37,589 --> 00:34:35,919  
we want to go back and see if we can get

960  
00:34:39,589 --> 00:34:37,599  
to the left of that event to say was

961  
00:34:41,270 --> 00:34:39,599  
there some developmental program

962  
00:34:42,470 --> 00:34:41,280  
that we to get to your technical

963  
00:34:44,149 --> 00:34:42,480

surprise

964

00:34:46,869 --> 00:34:44,159

issue sir that we should have known

965

00:34:48,310 --> 00:34:46,879

about and if so how do we put that

966

00:34:51,190 --> 00:34:48,320

intelligence requirement in place to

967

00:34:53,190 --> 00:34:51,200

ensure that we are following an

968

00:34:55,109 --> 00:34:53,200

adversarial development or any other

969

00:34:56,950 --> 00:34:55,119

development that may be out there so

970

00:34:58,550 --> 00:34:56,960

that's what we we want to do in terms of

971

00:35:00,550 --> 00:34:58,560

normalizing this and bringing it into

972

00:35:02,710 --> 00:35:00,560

the normal process of how we identify

973

00:35:05,190 --> 00:35:02,720

unknown unknowns so you mentioned

974

00:35:07,750 --> 00:35:05,200

fidelity and i think it's important to

975

00:35:11,030 --> 00:35:07,760

talk about the relationship

976  
00:35:13,430 --> 00:35:11,040  
from the navy is the lead agency on this

977  
00:35:15,990 --> 00:35:13,440  
how do you interact with

978  
00:35:17,270 --> 00:35:16,000  
space force air force to create that

979  
00:35:19,430 --> 00:35:17,280  
degree of fidelity we're talking about

980  
00:35:21,030 --> 00:35:19,440  
sensors and so on and i guess

981  
00:35:22,710 --> 00:35:21,040  
where i have some concerns that many of

982  
00:35:25,030 --> 00:35:22,720  
the images that we see

983  
00:35:26,550 --> 00:35:25,040  
commonly

984  
00:35:29,270 --> 00:35:26,560  
in this committee and even in open

985  
00:35:31,510 --> 00:35:29,280  
source the resolution and the clarity

986  
00:35:33,510 --> 00:35:31,520  
that would allow a robust technical

987  
00:35:34,550 --> 00:35:33,520  
intelligence analysis is

988  
00:35:36,390 --> 00:35:34,560

challenging

989

00:35:38,230 --> 00:35:36,400

so is aimshot

990

00:35:40,310 --> 00:35:38,240

prepared to address the quality and and

991

00:35:41,990 --> 00:35:40,320

quantity of data collected on uap to

992

00:35:44,069 --> 00:35:42,000

advance intelligence collection and do

993

00:35:46,470 --> 00:35:44,079

you have the adequate sensors you need

994

00:35:48,230 --> 00:35:46,480

to collect that high quality data

995

00:35:50,230 --> 00:35:48,240

one of the lines of effort that we have

996

00:35:53,030 --> 00:35:50,240

is looking at our sensor capabilities

997

00:35:55,750 --> 00:35:53,040

and to understand whether or not

998

00:35:57,270 --> 00:35:55,760

the video showed that mr bray

999

00:35:59,750 --> 00:35:57,280

displayed

1000

00:36:01,270 --> 00:35:59,760

sometimes it's very fleeting uh data

1001  
00:36:02,069 --> 00:36:01,280  
that we have on some of these objects

1002  
00:36:04,310 --> 00:36:02,079  
and

1003  
00:36:06,470 --> 00:36:04,320  
we want to make sure that one

1004  
00:36:08,390 --> 00:36:06,480  
our systems are calibrated uh to

1005  
00:36:10,150 --> 00:36:08,400  
actually be able to collect on the

1006  
00:36:11,750 --> 00:36:10,160  
objects you know our sensors today are

1007  
00:36:13,349 --> 00:36:11,760  
they're calibrated for

1008  
00:36:15,349 --> 00:36:13,359  
specific things we want to make sure to

1009  
00:36:16,950 --> 00:36:15,359  
calibrate it for things of this nature

1010  
00:36:19,510 --> 00:36:16,960  
things of this size things of this

1011  
00:36:21,910 --> 00:36:19,520  
velocity if i can use that term we want

1012  
00:36:24,790 --> 00:36:21,920  
to make sure that once we have that that

1013  
00:36:27,030 --> 00:36:24,800

that data is stored in some standardized

1014

00:36:28,870 --> 00:36:27,040

method that we can then extract and that

1015

00:36:31,430 --> 00:36:28,880

we can feed into our system real time so

1016

00:36:32,870 --> 00:36:31,440

we do not like want this to take some uh

1017

00:36:35,910 --> 00:36:32,880

prolonged period of time for us to get

1018

00:36:37,910 --> 00:36:35,920

that data but our goal is absolutely to

1019

00:36:39,589 --> 00:36:37,920

have that high fidelity information that

1020

00:36:41,430 --> 00:36:39,599

we get from all sensors and we want to

1021

00:36:43,510 --> 00:36:41,440

be able to integrate that with what we

1022

00:36:44,790 --> 00:36:43,520

may have off a ground-based sensor so

1023

00:36:45,990 --> 00:36:44,800

whatever you may have on a platform

1024

00:36:47,670 --> 00:36:46,000

whatever we may have on the ground

1025

00:36:50,310 --> 00:36:47,680

whatever we may have

1026  
00:36:51,750 --> 00:36:50,320  
from uh other sensors that we may have

1027  
00:36:53,109 --> 00:36:51,760  
in different domains we want to be able

1028  
00:36:55,270 --> 00:36:53,119  
to integrate that all and get this

1029  
00:36:57,190 --> 00:36:55,280  
integrated picture as we would as i said

1030  
00:36:58,710 --> 00:36:57,200  
with any other unidentified objects or

1031  
00:37:00,230 --> 00:36:58,720  
things that we are tracking

1032  
00:37:01,910 --> 00:37:00,240  
as a part of our normal intelligence

1033  
00:37:03,510 --> 00:37:01,920  
responsibilities

1034  
00:37:06,790 --> 00:37:03,520  
thank you last question mr bray if you

1035  
00:37:08,790 --> 00:37:06,800  
would uh i'm a navy pilot i've

1036  
00:37:10,390 --> 00:37:08,800  
encountered a uap walk me through the

1037  
00:37:12,710 --> 00:37:10,400  
reporting protocol

1038  
00:37:14,310 --> 00:37:12,720

um once i see something that i think

1039

00:37:15,349 --> 00:37:14,320  
needs reported

1040

00:37:16,870 --> 00:37:15,359  
uh

1041

00:37:19,030 --> 00:37:16,880  
the first thing that the aviator would

1042

00:37:21,349 --> 00:37:19,040  
do after landing as a part of their

1043

00:37:23,829 --> 00:37:21,359  
normal debriefing is they would

1044

00:37:25,670 --> 00:37:23,839  
contact their intelligence officer their

1045

00:37:28,310 --> 00:37:25,680  
intelligence officer would then uh walk

1046

00:37:30,550 --> 00:37:28,320  
them through first filing a first

1047

00:37:33,349 --> 00:37:30,560  
actually data preservation doing to

1048

00:37:35,190 --> 00:37:33,359  
ensure that that whatever sensor data

1049

00:37:37,270 --> 00:37:35,200  
may be on the aircraft that we preserve

1050

00:37:39,750 --> 00:37:37,280  
that so that it's available for for

1051  
00:37:42,150 --> 00:37:39,760  
later analysis um second they would

1052  
00:37:44,230 --> 00:37:42,160  
actually fill out a a form

1053  
00:37:45,910 --> 00:37:44,240  
that that includes details like where

1054  
00:37:48,630 --> 00:37:45,920  
they were operating altitudes their

1055  
00:37:50,790 --> 00:37:48,640  
operating speeds what they observed

1056  
00:37:52,550 --> 00:37:50,800  
whatever sense of data sensor data they

1057  
00:37:55,430 --> 00:37:52,560  
may have recorded from that

1058  
00:37:57,910 --> 00:37:55,440  
and then that report is filed it goes

1059  
00:38:00,230 --> 00:37:57,920  
two places one it goes through um

1060  
00:38:02,069 --> 00:38:00,240  
through the operational uh chain of

1061  
00:38:04,550 --> 00:38:02,079  
command so that operational units are

1062  
00:38:05,829 --> 00:38:04,560  
aware of what what's being observed and

1063  
00:38:08,390 --> 00:38:05,839

also

1064

00:38:09,750 --> 00:38:08,400

to the uap task force so that they can

1065

00:38:11,829 --> 00:38:09,760

take that data

1066

00:38:14,630 --> 00:38:11,839

database it and

1067

00:38:17,510 --> 00:38:14,640

quite often uh have individuals from the

1068

00:38:19,030 --> 00:38:17,520

task force contact the aviator

1069

00:38:20,870 --> 00:38:19,040

and ask them additional questions if

1070

00:38:23,270 --> 00:38:20,880

there were things that weren't clear uh

1071

00:38:24,550 --> 00:38:23,280

in the in the report uh that thing goes

1072

00:38:27,430 --> 00:38:24,560

into a um

1073

00:38:29,910 --> 00:38:27,440

into a database uh where we been compare

1074

00:38:32,390 --> 00:38:29,920

it with other um observations that we

1075

00:38:36,230 --> 00:38:32,400

have again comparing for locations

1076

00:38:38,230 --> 00:38:36,240

comparing for altitude speeds shapes uh

1077

00:38:40,390 --> 00:38:38,240

if any rf emissions were detected from

1078

00:38:42,069 --> 00:38:40,400

the platform uh all of that so that we

1079

00:38:42,870 --> 00:38:42,079

can try to reach some conclusions on

1080

00:38:47,109 --> 00:38:42,880

that

1081

00:38:51,829 --> 00:38:49,589

thanks chairman um mr bray can you rerun

1082

00:38:53,910 --> 00:38:51,839

that first uh image it looked like it

1083

00:38:55,990 --> 00:38:53,920

was outside of a plane window

1084

00:38:58,310 --> 00:38:56,000

um and if you wouldn't mind going up to

1085

00:39:00,310 --> 00:38:58,320

the screen and tell us what we're what

1086

00:39:01,750 --> 00:39:00,320

we're seeing uh

1087

00:39:03,510 --> 00:39:01,760

not that you can necessarily tell us

1088

00:39:05,270 --> 00:39:03,520

what we're saying but right explain what

1089

00:39:08,069 --> 00:39:05,280

we should be looking at in that first

1090

00:39:11,030 --> 00:39:08,079

image absolutely uh and alexi what i'll

1091

00:39:22,870 --> 00:39:11,040

ask is if you can stop it at a certain

1092

00:39:27,190 --> 00:39:24,390

damn it alex

1093

00:39:29,349 --> 00:39:27,200

lexi not there

1094

00:39:31,270 --> 00:39:29,359

jesus

1095

00:39:33,030 --> 00:39:31,280

does anybody else want alexi to just

1096

00:39:35,530 --> 00:39:33,040

accidentally click top secret video do

1097

00:39:39,190 --> 00:39:35,540

not play yeah whoops

1098

00:39:41,750 --> 00:39:39,200

[Laughter]

1099

00:39:44,230 --> 00:39:41,760

alexi uh just put the georgenet version

1100

00:39:53,589 --> 00:39:44,240

up outside of a civilian aircraft window

1101

00:39:53,599 --> 00:40:00,870

for alexis like panicking

1102

00:40:04,790 --> 00:40:02,950

the shortcuts for vlc media player she

1103

00:40:07,030 --> 00:40:04,800

needs to be hit in the comment that will

1104

00:40:15,829 --> 00:40:07,040

go backwards frame by frame we need dan

1105

00:40:18,069 --> 00:40:17,109

it shows a bit of a lack of planning

1106

00:40:19,589 --> 00:40:18,079

doesn't it that they haven't actually

1107

00:40:20,790 --> 00:40:19,599

got this queued up already that they can

1108

00:40:22,630 --> 00:40:20,800

just show it

1109

00:40:24,790 --> 00:40:22,640

as well yeah you think you'd have it

1110

00:40:26,230 --> 00:40:24,800

screenshot it or something by now yeah

1111

00:40:27,589 --> 00:40:26,240

especially with the object passing

1112

00:40:29,510 --> 00:40:27,599

because before that it's just a bunch of

1113

00:40:31,510 --> 00:40:29,520

you know cockpit

1114

00:40:32,710 --> 00:40:31,520

well exactly i mean i couldn't even see

1115

00:40:34,710 --> 00:40:32,720

it first time around it was the second

1116

00:40:36,470 --> 00:40:34,720

time they showed it when i saw it it

1117

00:40:38,150 --> 00:40:36,480

just goes straight past well i think

1118

00:40:40,069 --> 00:40:38,160

that's important to note though they

1119

00:40:42,069 --> 00:40:40,079

tried to intentionally choose a video

1120

00:40:44,470 --> 00:40:42,079

that is hard to see and i think that's

1121

00:40:46,710 --> 00:40:44,480

telling in and of itself you know

1122

00:40:48,950 --> 00:40:46,720

yeah well they've tried they've used the

1123

00:40:50,950 --> 00:40:48,960

the bokeh one haven't they like what the

1124

00:40:52,790 --> 00:40:50,960

hell whatever you call it um because

1125

00:40:55,109 --> 00:40:52,800

that's that's the low-hanging fruit that

1126

00:40:57,030 --> 00:40:55,119

andre carson talked about and now

1127

00:41:00,550 --> 00:40:57,040

they've got something which is the party

1128

00:41:05,510 --> 00:41:02,069

can you point to the screen again what

1129

00:41:10,470 --> 00:41:08,470

good question mr chef

1130

00:41:12,630 --> 00:41:10,480

because it's becoming a bit of a an

1131

00:41:14,710 --> 00:41:12,640

sh-1t show at the moment

1132

00:41:15,990 --> 00:41:14,720

yeah absolutely they they were prepared

1133

00:41:18,150 --> 00:41:16,000

to give the bog standard answers and

1134

00:41:20,790 --> 00:41:18,160

basically read the report out loud and

1135

00:41:21,510 --> 00:41:20,800

now they can't even queue up this video

1136

00:41:22,710 --> 00:41:21,520

and

1137

00:41:24,630 --> 00:41:22,720

you know we've heard about that 23

1138

00:41:27,030 --> 00:41:24,640

minute video and so on so forth and just

1139

00:41:29,270 --> 00:41:27,040

what is this but this is this is amateur

1140

00:41:30,630 --> 00:41:29,280

hour and you're the journalist

1141

00:41:33,510 --> 00:41:30,640

the journalists in the room are going to

1142

00:41:35,270 --> 00:41:33,520

be shaking their heads at this going

1143

00:41:36,710 --> 00:41:35,280

why are we doing this for

1144

00:41:38,390 --> 00:41:36,720

yeah

1145

00:41:39,910 --> 00:41:38,400

is this good though because it's showing

1146

00:41:41,990 --> 00:41:39,920

like how unprepared they are so more

1147

00:41:43,510 --> 00:41:42,000

legislation might be forthcoming that's

1148

00:41:44,870 --> 00:41:43,520

a good point that's a positive way to

1149

00:41:46,870 --> 00:41:44,880

look at it and i'm glad that he's saying

1150

00:41:54,710 --> 00:41:46,880

slow it down and you know at least

1151  
00:41:59,109 --> 00:41:57,270  
yeah i'd be much less optimistic i would

1152  
00:42:00,950 --> 00:41:59,119  
say that it's even possible this is

1153  
00:42:03,190 --> 00:42:00,960  
intentional

1154  
00:42:06,230 --> 00:42:03,200  
know i know that's skeptical but like no

1155  
00:42:08,390 --> 00:42:06,240  
i i understand yeah so we you can barely

1156  
00:42:10,309 --> 00:42:08,400  
see it it's we couldn't even queue it up

1157  
00:42:12,150 --> 00:42:10,319  
like what are we doing yeah like kind of

1158  
00:42:18,630 --> 00:42:12,160  
doing it it's not that hard to like find

1159  
00:42:23,030 --> 00:42:21,030  
let me get my son over there

1160  
00:42:24,550 --> 00:42:23,040  
between him and down they'll find it and

1161  
00:42:26,630 --> 00:42:24,560  
slow it down

1162  
00:42:28,630 --> 00:42:26,640  
what i really want right now is to see

1163  
00:42:36,470 --> 00:42:28,640

adam schiff's face

1164

00:42:39,109 --> 00:42:37,670

so if you guys are having trouble

1165

00:42:41,460 --> 00:42:39,119

stopping in the right spot how did you

1166

00:42:47,190 --> 00:42:41,470

analyze it

1167

00:42:49,670 --> 00:42:48,420

victory set for dan

1168

00:42:51,990 --> 00:42:49,680

[Laughter]

1169

00:43:02,390 --> 00:42:52,000

um the laptop we're working with uh is

1170

00:43:08,710 --> 00:43:05,670

aircraft that is uh operating in a uh uh

1171

00:43:12,230 --> 00:43:08,720

in a us navy uh training range uh

1172

00:43:15,430 --> 00:43:12,240

observed a spherical object

1173

00:43:17,270 --> 00:43:15,440

uh in that area uh and as they fly by it

1174

00:43:18,309 --> 00:43:17,280

they take a video you see a

1175

00:43:20,470 --> 00:43:18,319

um

1176

00:43:22,870 --> 00:43:20,480

it looks uh reflective in this video

1177

00:43:24,309 --> 00:43:22,880

somewhat reflective uh and it quickly

1178

00:43:27,349 --> 00:43:24,319

passes by

1179

00:43:29,349 --> 00:43:27,359

uh the cockpit of the uh of the aircraft

1180

00:43:31,190 --> 00:43:29,359

and is this one of the phenomena that

1181

00:43:33,910 --> 00:43:31,200

we've been able to pass it i do not have

1182

00:43:35,829 --> 00:43:33,920

an explanation for what this

1183

00:43:37,750 --> 00:43:35,839

this specific uh

1184

00:43:40,950 --> 00:43:37,760

object is and is this one of the

1185

00:43:42,470 --> 00:43:40,960

situations where it is that's that's the

1186

00:43:43,589 --> 00:43:42,480

object that we're looking at right there

1187

00:43:44,710 --> 00:43:43,599

thank you

1188

00:43:47,109 --> 00:43:44,720

um

1189

00:43:48,870 --> 00:43:47,119

and is this a situation where

1190

00:43:50,870 --> 00:43:48,880

it was observed by the pilot and it was

1191

00:43:53,270 --> 00:43:50,880

also recorded by the aircraft's

1192

00:43:59,910 --> 00:43:53,280

instruments uh we'll talk about the

1193

00:44:04,470 --> 00:44:01,829

but in this case uh

1194

00:44:05,349 --> 00:44:04,480

we have at least that

1195

00:44:06,309 --> 00:44:05,359

um

1196

00:44:08,150 --> 00:44:06,319

in the

1197

00:44:10,870 --> 00:44:08,160

director of national intelligence uh

1198

00:44:14,790 --> 00:44:10,880

2021 unclassified report

1199

00:44:19,109 --> 00:44:14,800

um the odni reported 144

1200

00:44:21,109 --> 00:44:19,119

uaps between 2004 and 2021

1201  
00:44:23,589 --> 00:44:21,119  
80 of which were

1202  
00:44:24,550 --> 00:44:23,599  
recorded on multiple instruments

1203  
00:44:26,470 --> 00:44:24,560  
um

1204  
00:44:27,589 --> 00:44:26,480  
and i take it with respect to some of

1205  
00:44:29,910 --> 00:44:27,599  
those

1206  
00:44:32,230 --> 00:44:29,920  
you had the pilot a pilot seeing them it

1207  
00:44:34,230 --> 00:44:32,240  
was observed by a pilot and you had

1208  
00:44:35,829 --> 00:44:34,240  
multiple instruments recording it so you

1209  
00:44:37,430 --> 00:44:35,839  
really have three sensors the human

1210  
00:44:39,430 --> 00:44:37,440  
sensor and two

1211  
00:44:41,510 --> 00:44:39,440  
uh technical uh

1212  
00:44:45,190 --> 00:44:41,520  
sensors detecting the object is that for

1213  
00:44:47,510 --> 00:44:45,200

them for the majority of uh

1214

00:44:49,030 --> 00:44:47,520

incidents that we had in the uh

1215

00:44:52,550 --> 00:44:49,040

last year's report

1216

00:44:54,230 --> 00:44:52,560

the majority had multi-sensor data

1217

00:44:55,430 --> 00:44:54,240

when i talk about the 400 reports that

1218

00:44:56,710 --> 00:44:55,440

we have now

1219

00:44:58,550 --> 00:44:56,720

that number will certainly go down

1220

00:44:59,990 --> 00:44:58,560

because a lot of those

1221

00:45:01,829 --> 00:45:00,000

new reports that we have are actually

1222

00:45:04,550 --> 00:45:01,839

historic reports that are narrative

1223

00:45:07,430 --> 00:45:04,560

based so that percentage will go down

1224

00:45:09,270 --> 00:45:07,440

just as a factor of uh the fact that the

1225

00:45:10,950 --> 00:45:09,280

that the destigmatization has resulted

1226  
00:45:12,390 --> 00:45:10,960  
in more narrative reports and that's the

1227  
00:45:14,630 --> 00:45:12,400  
object we're looking at right there now

1228  
00:45:18,069 --> 00:45:14,640  
that's it right there okay

1229  
00:45:23,750 --> 00:45:20,390  
last year's report also said that of

1230  
00:45:25,910 --> 00:45:23,760  
those 144 18 of them

1231  
00:45:28,309 --> 00:45:25,920  
uh reportedly appeared to exhibit

1232  
00:45:29,750 --> 00:45:28,319  
unusual flight characteristics

1233  
00:45:31,990 --> 00:45:29,760  
appear to demonstrate advanced

1234  
00:45:33,109 --> 00:45:32,000  
technology

1235  
00:45:34,630 --> 00:45:33,119  
and

1236  
00:45:36,630 --> 00:45:34,640  
some of them appeared to remain

1237  
00:45:38,950 --> 00:45:36,640  
stationary in winds aloft move against

1238  
00:45:40,710 --> 00:45:38,960

the wind maneuver abruptly or move at

1239

00:45:43,910 --> 00:45:40,720

considerable speed without discernible

1240

00:45:43,920 --> 00:45:48,470

that's pretty intriguing uh

1241

00:45:51,910 --> 00:45:50,390

and and if you're able to answer this in

1242

00:45:55,750 --> 00:45:51,920

this setting

1243

00:45:58,390 --> 00:45:55,760

are we aware of any uh foreign adversary

1244

00:46:00,390 --> 00:45:58,400

capable of moving objects

1245

00:46:02,230 --> 00:46:00,400

uh without any discernible means of

1246

00:46:04,069 --> 00:46:02,240

propulsion

1247

00:46:06,150 --> 00:46:04,079

um

1248

00:46:08,470 --> 00:46:06,160

i think i would uh without discernible

1249

00:46:10,550 --> 00:46:08,480

means of propulsion i would say that uh

1250

00:46:12,309 --> 00:46:10,560

we're not aware of any adversary that

1251  
00:46:14,150 --> 00:46:12,319  
can move an object without discernible

1252  
00:46:16,230 --> 00:46:14,160  
means of propulsion

1253  
00:46:17,750 --> 00:46:16,240  
the question then becomes in many of

1254  
00:46:19,910 --> 00:46:17,760  
these cases where we don't have a

1255  
00:46:21,829 --> 00:46:19,920  
discernible mean of propulsion in the

1256  
00:46:24,150 --> 00:46:21,839  
data that we have

1257  
00:46:27,750 --> 00:46:24,160  
in some cases

1258  
00:46:30,230 --> 00:46:27,760  
there is likely sensor artifacts that

1259  
00:46:32,550 --> 00:46:30,240  
that may be hiding some of that

1260  
00:46:34,470 --> 00:46:32,560  
there's certainly some degree of

1261  
00:46:36,390 --> 00:46:34,480  
of something that looks like signature

1262  
00:46:38,230 --> 00:46:36,400  
management that we have seen from some

1263  
00:46:39,910 --> 00:46:38,240

of these

1264

00:46:42,390 --> 00:46:39,920

uap

1265

00:46:44,710 --> 00:46:42,400

but i would i would caution i would

1266

00:46:46,870 --> 00:46:44,720

simply say that there are a number of uh

1267

00:46:48,710 --> 00:46:46,880

of events in which we do not have an

1268

00:46:51,030 --> 00:46:48,720

explanation in which then there are a

1269

00:46:53,109 --> 00:46:51,040

small handful in which there are flight

1270

00:46:55,990 --> 00:46:53,119

characteristics or signature management

1271

00:46:57,430 --> 00:46:56,000

um that we can't explain with the data

1272

00:46:58,870 --> 00:46:57,440

that we have

1273

00:47:01,109 --> 00:46:58,880

we'll continue those are obviously the

1274

00:47:03,109 --> 00:47:01,119

ones that are of most interest to us

1275

00:47:05,430 --> 00:47:03,119

earlier when we asked about how you

1276  
00:47:07,190 --> 00:47:05,440  
avoid technological surprise the biggest

1277  
00:47:09,190 --> 00:47:07,200  
way you avoid technological surprises by

1278  
00:47:10,630 --> 00:47:09,200  
collecting this type of data and by

1279  
00:47:12,470 --> 00:47:10,640  
importantly

1280  
00:47:15,190 --> 00:47:12,480  
calibrating the assumptions that you go

1281  
00:47:16,870 --> 00:47:15,200  
into with how you do that analysis i'll

1282  
00:47:17,829 --> 00:47:16,880  
tell you within the uap task force we

1283  
00:47:20,470 --> 00:47:17,839  
have

1284  
00:47:22,710 --> 00:47:20,480  
one basic assumption and that is that

1285  
00:47:25,829 --> 00:47:22,720  
generally speaking generally speaking

1286  
00:47:27,670 --> 00:47:25,839  
our sensors operate as designed

1287  
00:47:30,230 --> 00:47:27,680  
and we make that assumption because many

1288  
00:47:32,549 --> 00:47:30,240

times these are multi-sensor collections

1289

00:47:34,549 --> 00:47:32,559

we make no assumptions about the origin

1290

00:47:36,230 --> 00:47:34,559

of this or that there may or may not be

1291

00:47:38,230 --> 00:47:36,240

some sort of technology that we don't

1292

00:47:40,150 --> 00:47:38,240

understand that's i think the key to

1293

00:47:42,069 --> 00:47:40,160

avoiding technological surprises by

1294

00:47:44,549 --> 00:47:42,079

calibrating those assumptions

1295

00:47:47,270 --> 00:47:44,559

and finally um with respect to the

1296

00:47:49,750 --> 00:47:47,280

second two videos uh showing the

1297

00:47:52,950 --> 00:47:49,760

small triangles

1298

00:47:53,750 --> 00:47:52,960

the hypothesis is that those are

1299

00:47:58,150 --> 00:47:53,760

uh

1300

00:47:59,829 --> 00:47:58,160

use of night vision goggles appear like

1301

00:48:02,230 --> 00:47:59,839

triangles is that the

1302

00:48:04,790 --> 00:48:02,240

operating assessment some type of uh of

1303

00:48:07,750 --> 00:48:04,800

drone some type of unmanned aerial

1304

00:48:10,790 --> 00:48:07,760

system and it is simply that that light

1305

00:48:12,870 --> 00:48:10,800

source uh resolves itself through

1306

00:48:16,150 --> 00:48:12,880

the um through the night vision goggles

1307

00:48:17,829 --> 00:48:16,160

onto the slr camera as a triangle and

1308

00:48:20,790 --> 00:48:17,839

have we in order to prove that

1309

00:48:23,430 --> 00:48:20,800

hypothesis uh flown

1310

00:48:25,589 --> 00:48:23,440

a drone and observed it with that same

1311

00:48:27,910 --> 00:48:25,599

technology to see whether we can

1312

00:48:29,589 --> 00:48:27,920

reproduce the effect the uap task force

1313

00:48:30,630 --> 00:48:29,599

is aware of studies that have done that

1314

00:48:33,430 --> 00:48:30,640

okay

1315

00:48:35,910 --> 00:48:33,440

thank you mr chairman i yield back

1316

00:48:37,510 --> 00:48:35,920

the gentleman yields back

1317

00:48:39,430 --> 00:48:37,520

dr winstrom

1318

00:48:43,349 --> 00:48:39,440

thank you mr chairman thank you all for

1319

00:48:46,950 --> 00:48:45,349

through this process where there's been

1320

00:48:52,230 --> 00:48:46,960

sightings

1321

00:48:55,190 --> 00:48:52,240

have they always been

1322

00:48:57,430 --> 00:48:55,200

cited from a moving object

1323

00:48:58,710 --> 00:48:57,440

from a plane or a ship that may be

1324

00:49:00,630 --> 00:48:58,720

moving

1325

00:49:02,549 --> 00:49:00,640

have these reports ever come from a

1326

00:49:03,990 --> 00:49:02,559

stationary object

1327

00:49:05,430 --> 00:49:04,000

being observed

1328

00:49:08,309 --> 00:49:05,440

in the sky

1329

00:49:10,309 --> 00:49:08,319

the uap task force does have uh reports

1330

00:49:12,309 --> 00:49:10,319

from stationary

1331

00:49:13,270 --> 00:49:12,319

from state reports from a stationary

1332

00:49:15,030 --> 00:49:13,280

observer

1333

00:49:17,190 --> 00:49:15,040

there's a difference observing something

1334

00:49:19,430 --> 00:49:17,200

when you're moving as well it's physics

1335

00:49:20,309 --> 00:49:19,440

right that's why i asked that question

1336

00:49:22,470 --> 00:49:20,319

uh

1337

00:49:24,150 --> 00:49:22,480

are we capable or have we made any

1338

00:49:26,150 --> 00:49:24,160

breakthroughs or anyone made any

1339

00:49:27,190 --> 00:49:26,160

breakthroughs to be able to cite

1340

00:49:30,549 --> 00:49:27,200

something

1341

00:49:33,430 --> 00:49:30,559

and make some determination at all

1342

00:49:35,030 --> 00:49:33,440

of its composition whether it's a solid

1343

00:49:40,470 --> 00:49:35,040

or a gas

1344

00:49:44,390 --> 00:49:42,150

um

1345

00:49:45,829 --> 00:49:44,400

from not asking what i just right

1346

00:49:48,630 --> 00:49:45,839

from some of the returns i mean it's

1347

00:49:50,150 --> 00:49:48,640

clear that uh that the majority well

1348

00:49:52,549 --> 00:49:50,160

it's clear that many of the observations

1349

00:49:55,589 --> 00:49:52,559

we have are physical objects uh from the

1350

00:49:57,510 --> 00:49:55,599

the sensor data that we have

1351

00:49:59,829 --> 00:49:57,520

well gas is physical is a physical

1352

00:50:01,510 --> 00:49:59,839

object it can be and so

1353

00:50:02,950 --> 00:50:01,520

and you see where i'm going with this

1354

00:50:04,470 --> 00:50:02,960

i'm trying to determine what it is we're

1355

00:50:07,109 --> 00:50:04,480

looking at so if we can decide if

1356

00:50:09,270 --> 00:50:07,119

something is a solid or a gas and and if

1357

00:50:12,549 --> 00:50:09,280

there's been any conclusion on its

1358

00:50:13,829 --> 00:50:12,559

capabilities like its capabilities of

1359

00:50:17,190 --> 00:50:13,839

movement

1360

00:50:19,670 --> 00:50:17,200

of turning uh going you know 180 degrees

1361

00:50:21,510 --> 00:50:19,680

or 90 degree turn anything along that

1362

00:50:23,589 --> 00:50:21,520

line that we've been able to determine

1363

00:50:25,910 --> 00:50:23,599

um within the and again i should point

1364

00:50:27,990 --> 00:50:25,920

out that uh you know that there is not a

1365

00:50:29,829 --> 00:50:28,000

single explanation for uap they are make

1366

00:50:32,309 --> 00:50:29,839

up there are a lot of different things

1367

00:50:33,270 --> 00:50:32,319

uh that that are unidentified phenomena

1368

00:50:35,430 --> 00:50:33,280

basically

1369

00:50:37,270 --> 00:50:35,440

we really don't know much on that that's

1370

00:50:39,030 --> 00:50:37,280

that's all i'm trying to get we i'm

1371

00:50:41,349 --> 00:50:39,040

pleased that you have protocol right now

1372

00:50:43,910 --> 00:50:41,359

for our military but are there

1373

00:50:46,069 --> 00:50:43,920

any non-military reports coming forward

1374

00:50:47,589 --> 00:50:46,079

of similar events or is it all coming

1375

00:50:49,030 --> 00:50:47,599

from military

1376

00:50:51,430 --> 00:50:49,040

the uae task force has a very good

1377

00:50:52,950 --> 00:50:51,440

working relationship with the faa

1378

00:50:55,349 --> 00:50:52,960

they have very good working relationship

1379

00:50:58,549 --> 00:50:55,359

with other parts of the us government so

1380

00:51:01,990 --> 00:50:58,559

that we can ingest reports uh from um

1381

00:51:04,150 --> 00:51:02,000

do we have any reports non-military

1382

00:51:06,950 --> 00:51:04,160

yes thank you that's that's that's my

1383

00:51:09,030 --> 00:51:06,960

question um and do we need to put out

1384

00:51:11,270 --> 00:51:09,040

protocol for civilians that may be in

1385

00:51:13,510 --> 00:51:11,280

that arena like through faa do you think

1386

00:51:15,670 --> 00:51:13,520

that would be appropriate and helpful

1387

00:51:18,470 --> 00:51:15,680

i think standardized the reporting

1388

00:51:21,349 --> 00:51:18,480

without a doubt is key to helping us get

1389

00:51:23,270 --> 00:51:21,359

to the to ascertain what some of these

1390

00:51:25,589 --> 00:51:23,280

are i think it would be important as

1391

00:51:28,710 --> 00:51:25,599

well do we um

1392

00:51:30,470 --> 00:51:28,720

there are other people besides uh the us

1393

00:51:32,790 --> 00:51:30,480

that have had these experiences and

1394

00:51:35,910 --> 00:51:32,800

reported them is that correct

1395

00:51:36,870 --> 00:51:35,920

there are that's correct uh is it uh all

1396

00:51:39,750 --> 00:51:36,880

of our

1397

00:51:41,910 --> 00:51:39,760

allies or is it allies and adversaries

1398

00:51:43,750 --> 00:51:41,920

what have we learned publicly so some of

1399

00:51:45,270 --> 00:51:43,760

that i think sir we'll save for closed

1400

00:51:47,589 --> 00:51:45,280

session

1401  
00:51:49,109 --> 00:51:47,599  
well that goes my next question publicly

1402  
00:51:50,950 --> 00:51:49,119  
have others

1403  
00:51:52,870 --> 00:51:50,960  
made anything which would not

1404  
00:51:54,470 --> 00:51:52,880  
have to be considered close so i don't

1405  
00:51:56,230 --> 00:51:54,480  
want you to answer what they've said

1406  
00:51:58,549 --> 00:51:56,240  
necessarily

1407  
00:52:00,870 --> 00:51:58,559  
allies have uh have seen these china has

1408  
00:52:02,950 --> 00:52:00,880  
established its own version of a uap

1409  
00:52:05,510 --> 00:52:02,960  
task force so clearly a number of

1410  
00:52:06,870 --> 00:52:05,520  
countries have observations of

1411  
00:52:09,190 --> 00:52:06,880  
of things in the airspace that they

1412  
00:52:12,630 --> 00:52:09,200  
can't identify and uh

1413  
00:52:15,990 --> 00:52:12,640

do we share data with some with all

1414

00:52:19,270 --> 00:52:17,670

we share data with some and some share

1415

00:52:21,030 --> 00:52:19,280

data with us

1416

00:52:22,870 --> 00:52:21,040

but not necessarily all that have

1417

00:52:23,670 --> 00:52:22,880

publicly reported something that's

1418

00:52:24,549 --> 00:52:23,680

correct

1419

00:52:25,750 --> 00:52:24,559

okay

1420

00:52:27,030 --> 00:52:25,760

um

1421

00:52:28,710 --> 00:52:27,040

and i think that's

1422

00:52:30,470 --> 00:52:28,720

an important thing and for the other

1423

00:52:31,589 --> 00:52:30,480

session actually that we we don't

1424

00:52:32,710 --> 00:52:31,599

discuss

1425

00:52:33,829 --> 00:52:32,720

that now

1426

00:52:35,829 --> 00:52:33,839

um

1427

00:52:37,430 --> 00:52:35,839

because you know obviously something

1428

00:52:39,910 --> 00:52:37,440

like this can be

1429

00:52:41,510 --> 00:52:39,920

a national security challenge for us no

1430

00:52:42,950 --> 00:52:41,520

doubt about it if they're developed by

1431

00:52:44,150 --> 00:52:42,960

an adversary

1432

00:52:46,630 --> 00:52:44,160

um

1433

00:52:48,950 --> 00:52:46,640

through some breakthrough technology

1434

00:52:51,750 --> 00:52:48,960

they can be very disruptive to our

1435

00:52:53,670 --> 00:52:51,760

military actions uh or at least serve as

1436

00:52:56,390 --> 00:52:53,680

a destruction

1437

00:52:59,670 --> 00:52:56,400

so my caution would be

1438

00:53:01,910 --> 00:52:59,680

be careful who we share our data with

1439

00:53:04,870 --> 00:53:01,920

and don't necessarily trust some of the

1440

00:53:07,430 --> 00:53:04,880

data we may get from someone else

1441

00:53:12,870 --> 00:53:07,440

and with that i yield back

1442

00:53:16,150 --> 00:53:14,549

thank you mr chairman

1443

00:53:18,309 --> 00:53:16,160

one of the objectives of this open

1444

00:53:20,470 --> 00:53:18,319

hearing is to um

1445

00:53:23,109 --> 00:53:20,480

try to erode some of the stigma that

1446

00:53:24,630 --> 00:53:23,119

attaches to in particular our military

1447

00:53:28,230 --> 00:53:24,640

men and women reporting this it's

1448

00:53:29,910 --> 00:53:28,240

obviously really very serious because

1449

00:53:32,069 --> 00:53:29,920

should one of our adversaries have

1450

00:53:33,750 --> 00:53:32,079

developed a technology that we don't

1451

00:53:35,910 --> 00:53:33,760

know about it we need to know about it

1452

00:53:38,549 --> 00:53:35,920

yesterday and and obviously

1453

00:53:39,510 --> 00:53:38,559

uh any sort of stigma that prevents our

1454

00:53:40,790 --> 00:53:39,520

our

1455

00:53:42,069 --> 00:53:40,800

military

1456

00:53:43,589 --> 00:53:42,079

from reporting this data as

1457

00:53:45,829 --> 00:53:43,599

comprehensively as possible as a

1458

00:53:47,510 --> 00:53:45,839

national security threat so i i really

1459

00:53:49,910 --> 00:53:47,520

just have two questions in the service

1460

00:53:52,150 --> 00:53:49,920

of that goal uh the first is

1461

00:53:54,150 --> 00:53:52,160

um the chairman asked that we run that

1462

00:53:56,790 --> 00:53:54,160

video again most people when they see a

1463

00:53:58,150 --> 00:53:56,800

video we're all used to seeing things

1464

00:54:00,150 --> 00:53:58,160

from a car

1465

00:54:02,790 --> 00:54:00,160

seeing things from a sidewalk very few

1466

00:54:04,549 --> 00:54:02,800

people have the experience of observing

1467

00:54:07,589 --> 00:54:04,559

something through night vision goggles

1468

00:54:10,390 --> 00:54:07,599

at mach 1.5 so just talk for a minute

1469

00:54:12,069 --> 00:54:10,400

about if you would uh whichever of you

1470

00:54:14,069 --> 00:54:12,079

is most appropriate

1471

00:54:16,470 --> 00:54:14,079

how radically different

1472

00:54:18,630 --> 00:54:16,480

observation is at high speed and three

1473

00:54:21,589 --> 00:54:18,640

dimension than it is for most of us who

1474

00:54:23,910 --> 00:54:21,599

walk around and drive cars

1475

00:54:25,430 --> 00:54:23,920

um so the first thing i think that's

1476

00:54:27,829 --> 00:54:25,440

important to note about this is there

1477

00:54:31,030 --> 00:54:27,839

are lots of things when you are moving

1478

00:54:32,630 --> 00:54:31,040

very fast and an object is between you

1479

00:54:33,910 --> 00:54:32,640

and a stationary reference point like

1480

00:54:35,510 --> 00:54:33,920

the ground

1481

00:54:37,990 --> 00:54:35,520

it gives a lot of different impressions

1482

00:54:39,829 --> 00:54:38,000

about how quickly something is or isn't

1483

00:54:42,230 --> 00:54:39,839

moving and it actually

1484

00:54:44,870 --> 00:54:42,240

means it is a challenge

1485

00:54:46,390 --> 00:54:44,880

especially with narrative based data

1486

00:54:48,069 --> 00:54:46,400

to get a lot of information on that

1487

00:54:49,910 --> 00:54:48,079

that's why the sensor data is so

1488

00:54:53,030 --> 00:54:49,920

important because things do happen very

1489

00:54:54,309 --> 00:54:53,040

quickly as you see there and sometimes

1490

00:54:56,150 --> 00:54:54,319

things that happen very quickly

1491

00:54:58,630 --> 00:54:56,160

something may be moving very slow that

1492

00:55:00,789 --> 00:54:58,640

aircraft is moving quite fast how fast

1493

00:55:03,349 --> 00:55:00,799

that object is moving that goes by is

1494

00:55:05,510 --> 00:55:03,359

probably very slow

1495

00:55:07,829 --> 00:55:05,520

so i guess my point is that an

1496

00:55:09,589 --> 00:55:07,839

observation either a visual observation

1497

00:55:12,230 --> 00:55:09,599

or a uh

1498

00:55:13,270 --> 00:55:12,240

a electronic observation infrared or

1499

00:55:15,430 --> 00:55:13,280

whatever

1500

00:55:17,510 --> 00:55:15,440

looks radically different than it does

1501  
00:55:19,430 --> 00:55:17,520  
to most people

1502  
00:55:21,670 --> 00:55:19,440  
even instruments

1503  
00:55:23,750 --> 00:55:21,680  
instruments are on gimbals and that sort

1504  
00:55:25,270 --> 00:55:23,760  
of thing so that creates a

1505  
00:55:27,349 --> 00:55:25,280  
very unusual

1506  
00:55:29,030 --> 00:55:27,359  
uh view to again those of us who are

1507  
00:55:32,230 --> 00:55:29,040  
used to seeing things on in two

1508  
00:55:36,309 --> 00:55:34,789  
second question um

1509  
00:55:38,470 --> 00:55:36,319  
i think mr bray you said something that

1510  
00:55:41,910 --> 00:55:38,480  
i want to unpack a little bit uh

1511  
00:55:43,670 --> 00:55:41,920  
uh a number of these uaps you said we

1512  
00:55:46,230 --> 00:55:43,680  
can't explain

1513  
00:55:49,109 --> 00:55:46,240

again in the service of sort of reducing

1514

00:55:50,870 --> 00:55:49,119

uh speculation and conspiracy theories

1515

00:55:52,710 --> 00:55:50,880

we can't explain

1516

00:55:54,950 --> 00:55:52,720

can range from

1517

00:55:56,630 --> 00:55:54,960

a visual observation that was distant on

1518

00:55:58,309 --> 00:55:56,640

a foggy night we don't know what it is

1519

00:56:00,549 --> 00:55:58,319

to

1520

00:56:02,630 --> 00:56:00,559

we've found an organic material that we

1521

00:56:05,349 --> 00:56:02,640

can identify right those are radically

1522

00:56:07,349 --> 00:56:05,359

different world worlds so when you say

1523

00:56:08,470 --> 00:56:07,359

we can't explain give the public a

1524

00:56:10,950 --> 00:56:08,480

little bit

1525

00:56:13,190 --> 00:56:10,960

better sense of where on that spectrum

1526

00:56:15,670 --> 00:56:13,200

of we can't explain we are are we

1527

00:56:17,670 --> 00:56:15,680

holding materials organic or inorganic

1528

00:56:19,430 --> 00:56:17,680

that we don't know about are we

1529

00:56:21,670 --> 00:56:19,440

you know picking up emanations that are

1530

00:56:22,950 --> 00:56:21,680

something other than light or infrared

1531

00:56:24,630 --> 00:56:22,960

that could be

1532

00:56:26,950 --> 00:56:24,640

communications give us a sense for what

1533

00:56:29,270 --> 00:56:26,960

you mean when you say we can't explain

1534

00:56:31,190 --> 00:56:29,280

sure when i say we can't explain i i

1535

00:56:33,270 --> 00:56:31,200

mean exactly as you described there that

1536

00:56:34,789 --> 00:56:33,280

there is a lot of information like the

1537

00:56:36,789 --> 00:56:34,799

video that we showed in which there's

1538

00:56:39,190 --> 00:56:36,799

simply too little data

1539

00:56:40,870 --> 00:56:39,200

to to create a reasonable explanation

1540

00:56:43,190 --> 00:56:40,880

there are a small handful of cases in

1541

00:56:45,109 --> 00:56:43,200

which we have more data

1542

00:56:47,910 --> 00:56:45,119

that our analysis simply hasn't been

1543

00:56:51,430 --> 00:56:47,920

able to uh to fully pull together a

1544

00:56:52,789 --> 00:56:51,440

picture of what happened um the um

1545

00:56:55,349 --> 00:56:52,799

and those are the cases where we talk

1546

00:56:56,789 --> 00:56:55,359

about where we see some indications of

1547

00:56:57,829 --> 00:56:56,799

flight characteristics or signature

1548

00:57:00,470 --> 00:56:57,839

management

1549

00:57:02,069 --> 00:57:00,480

that are not what we had expected

1550

00:57:03,990 --> 00:57:02,079

when it comes to material that we have

1551

00:57:06,549 --> 00:57:04,000

we have no material

1552

00:57:09,990 --> 00:57:06,559

we have detected no emanations

1553

00:57:11,870 --> 00:57:10,000

within the uap task force that that is

1554

00:57:15,829 --> 00:57:11,880

that would suggest it's anything

1555

00:57:17,670 --> 00:57:15,839

non-terrestrial uh in origin so

1556

00:57:18,470 --> 00:57:17,680

when i say unexplained i mean everything

1557

00:57:20,470 --> 00:57:18,480

from

1558

00:57:22,710 --> 00:57:20,480

too little too little data

1559

00:57:25,030 --> 00:57:22,720

to we simply the data that we have

1560

00:57:26,549 --> 00:57:25,040

doesn't point us towards an explanation

1561

00:57:27,829 --> 00:57:26,559

but we'll go wherever the data takes us

1562

00:57:29,829 --> 00:57:27,839

again we've made no assumptions about

1563

00:57:31,910 --> 00:57:29,839

what this is or isn't uh we're committed

1564

00:57:33,750 --> 00:57:31,920

to understanding these and so we'll go

1565

00:57:35,190 --> 00:57:33,760

wherever that data takes us

1566

00:57:37,349 --> 00:57:35,200

thank you that's that's very helpful and

1567

00:57:39,910 --> 00:57:37,359

so i think it bears emphasis

1568

00:57:41,750 --> 00:57:39,920

when you say we can't explain everything

1569

00:57:44,390 --> 00:57:41,760

that you can't explain

1570

00:57:47,109 --> 00:57:44,400

is in a bucket called data

1571

00:57:49,349 --> 00:57:47,119

is that correct and that would mean

1572

00:57:51,670 --> 00:57:49,359

data collected by sensors visual

1573

00:57:53,910 --> 00:57:51,680

observations everything that we can't

1574

00:57:56,870 --> 00:57:53,920

explain quote-unquote is in a bucket

1575

00:57:59,349 --> 00:57:56,880

called data right a narrative report uh

1576

00:58:01,030 --> 00:57:59,359

from uh from the early 2000s if it just

1577

00:58:02,789 --> 00:58:01,040

had a little bit of information on it

1578

00:58:04,789 --> 00:58:02,799

would be in our database and it would be

1579

00:58:06,470 --> 00:58:04,799

unresolved i would add to that it's

1580

00:58:08,710 --> 00:58:06,480

insufficient data i mean that's one of

1581

00:58:11,750 --> 00:58:08,720

the challenges we have insufficient data

1582

00:58:14,630 --> 00:58:11,760

either on the event itself the object

1583

00:58:17,270 --> 00:58:14,640

itself or insufficient data or plug-in

1584

00:58:18,710 --> 00:58:17,280

with some other organization or agency

1585

00:58:21,270 --> 00:58:18,720

that may have had something in that

1586

00:58:22,789 --> 00:58:21,280

space at that time so it's a data issue

1587

00:58:23,430 --> 00:58:22,799

that we're that we're facing in many of

1588

00:58:24,950 --> 00:58:23,440

these

1589

00:58:27,430 --> 00:58:24,960

congressmen understood thank you very

1590

00:58:29,109 --> 00:58:27,440

much yield back yeah but not all of them

1591

00:58:30,710 --> 00:58:29,119

just said there are some cases they have

1592

00:58:31,750 --> 00:58:30,720

plenty of data thank you mr chairman

1593

00:58:33,589 --> 00:58:31,760

thank you for allowing me to join this

1594

00:58:35,750 --> 00:58:33,599

hearing um i really appreciate the

1595

00:58:38,390 --> 00:58:35,760

witnesses testimony

1596

00:58:40,710 --> 00:58:38,400

mr moultrie as the chairman uh mentioned

1597

00:58:42,470 --> 00:58:40,720

uh dod had an initiative to study ufos

1598

00:58:43,910 --> 00:58:42,480

in the 1960s called

1599

00:58:45,829 --> 00:58:43,920

project blue book

1600

00:58:48,309 --> 00:58:45,839

it's also been well reported in our

1601  
00:58:49,910 --> 00:58:48,319  
briefing and in other places that we

1602  
00:58:53,270 --> 00:58:49,920  
have more have more recent projects

1603  
00:58:55,910 --> 00:58:53,280  
specifically atip could you describe any

1604  
00:58:58,710 --> 00:58:55,920  
other initiatives that the dod or dod

1605  
00:59:01,430 --> 00:58:58,720  
contractors have managed after project

1606  
00:59:03,910 --> 00:59:01,440  
blue book ended and prior to atip

1607  
00:59:05,510 --> 00:59:03,920  
beginning did anything also predate

1608  
00:59:07,510 --> 00:59:05,520  
project blue book

1609  
00:59:08,789 --> 00:59:07,520  
so i i can't speak to what may have

1610  
00:59:10,710 --> 00:59:08,799  
predated

1611  
00:59:12,069 --> 00:59:10,720  
project blue book i mean of course

1612  
00:59:13,190 --> 00:59:12,079  
here's roswell and all these other

1613  
00:59:14,789 --> 00:59:13,200

things that people have talked about

1614

00:59:16,549 --> 00:59:14,799

over the years

1615

00:59:19,990 --> 00:59:16,559

i'm familiar with blue book i'm familiar

1616

00:59:22,630 --> 00:59:20,000

with uh with atip uh i haven't seen

1617

00:59:24,870 --> 00:59:22,640

other documented uh studies that have

1618

00:59:25,990 --> 00:59:24,880

been done by dod in that regard

1619

00:59:28,549 --> 00:59:26,000

so you're not aware of anything in

1620

00:59:30,069 --> 00:59:28,559

between project bluebook and atip not

1621

00:59:33,349 --> 00:59:30,079

aware of anything that's

1622

00:59:34,789 --> 00:59:33,359

official that was done in between

1623

00:59:36,710 --> 00:59:34,799

brought to my attention

1624

00:59:40,950 --> 00:59:36,720

okay uh additionally are you aware of

1625

00:59:43,030 --> 00:59:40,960

any other dod or dod contract programs

1626  
00:59:44,950 --> 00:59:43,040  
from a technological engineering

1627  
00:59:46,789 --> 00:59:44,960  
perspective and by that i mean are you

1628  
00:59:48,950 --> 00:59:46,799  
aware of any technology initiatives

1629  
00:59:50,950 --> 00:59:48,960  
focused on this topic other than

1630  
00:59:51,750 --> 00:59:50,960  
initiatives focused on the individual

1631  
00:59:53,829 --> 00:59:51,760  
case

1632  
00:59:56,710 --> 00:59:53,839  
investigations i am not aware of any

1633  
00:59:57,670 --> 00:59:56,720  
contractual programs that are focused on

1634  
01:00:00,789 --> 00:59:57,680  
uh

1635  
01:00:03,030 --> 01:00:00,799  
any anything related to this other than

1636  
01:00:04,870 --> 01:00:03,040  
what we are doing in the navy task force

1637  
01:00:06,069 --> 01:00:04,880  
and what we are about to launch in terms

1638  
01:00:08,069 --> 01:00:06,079

of our effort

1639

01:00:09,750 --> 01:00:08,079

same question for you mr brown

1640

01:00:11,750 --> 01:00:09,760

uh same answer not aware of anything

1641

01:00:13,349 --> 01:00:11,760

outside what we uh are doing in the uap

1642

01:00:15,270 --> 01:00:13,359

task force so just confirm you're not

1643

01:00:17,349 --> 01:00:15,280

aware of any technology or engineering

1644

01:00:18,710 --> 01:00:17,359

resources that have been focused on

1645

01:00:20,150 --> 01:00:18,720

these efforts besides what we've

1646

01:00:23,190 --> 01:00:20,160

mentioned today

1647

01:00:24,549 --> 01:00:23,200

once again i'll say no contractual uh

1648

01:00:25,589 --> 01:00:24,559

there's so much wiggle room in that

1649

01:00:27,510 --> 01:00:25,599

answer

1650

01:00:30,470 --> 01:00:27,520

programmatically uh efforts that are

1651  
01:00:32,309 --> 01:00:30,480  
involved the reason why i i qualified

1652  
01:00:34,309 --> 01:00:32,319  
yeah let me qualify it that way

1653  
01:00:35,750 --> 01:00:34,319  
i can't speak to what people may be

1654  
01:00:37,109 --> 01:00:35,760  
looking at in the department somebody

1655  
01:00:38,470 --> 01:00:37,119  
says i'm looking at something i'm

1656  
01:00:40,710 --> 01:00:38,480  
looking at something that may be

1657  
01:00:42,549 --> 01:00:40,720  
unidentified and i can't speak to that

1658  
01:00:43,829 --> 01:00:42,559  
speak to official programs we have on

1659  
01:00:45,510 --> 01:00:43,839  
the record

1660  
01:00:48,230 --> 01:00:45,520  
it's also been reported that there have

1661  
01:00:49,750 --> 01:00:48,240  
been uap observed and interacting with

1662  
01:00:51,510 --> 01:00:49,760  
and flying over sensitive military

1663  
01:00:52,390 --> 01:00:51,520

facilities particularly not just ranges

1664

01:00:53,910 --> 01:00:52,400

but

1665

01:00:55,829 --> 01:00:53,920

some facilities housing are strategic

1666

01:00:58,230 --> 01:00:55,839

nuclear forces one such incident

1667

01:01:00,230 --> 01:00:58,240

allegedly occurred

1668

01:01:01,829 --> 01:01:00,240

at malmstrom air force base in which 10

1669

01:01:04,069 --> 01:01:01,839

of our nuclear icbms were rendered

1670

01:01:05,829 --> 01:01:04,079

inoperable at the same time a glowing

1671

01:01:07,270 --> 01:01:05,839

red orb was observed overhead i'm not

1672

01:01:09,510 --> 01:01:07,280

commenting on the accuracy of this i'm

1673

01:01:10,870 --> 01:01:09,520

simply asking you whether you're aware

1674

01:01:12,390 --> 01:01:10,880

of it and whether you have any comment

1675

01:01:14,150 --> 01:01:12,400

on the accuracy of that report we passed

1676

01:01:16,069 --> 01:01:14,160

that to mr brave you've been looking at

1677

01:01:17,990 --> 01:01:16,079

uap's overview last three years uh that

1678

01:01:20,470 --> 01:01:18,000

data is not uh within the holdings of

1679

01:01:23,589 --> 01:01:20,480

the uap task force

1680

01:01:25,030 --> 01:01:23,599

okay but are you aware of the the report

1681

01:01:26,950 --> 01:01:25,040

or that the data

1682

01:01:28,789 --> 01:01:26,960

exists somewhere

1683

01:01:30,630 --> 01:01:28,799

i i have uh

1684

01:01:31,910 --> 01:01:30,640

i have heard stories i have not seen the

1685

01:01:34,630 --> 01:01:31,920

official data on that so you've just

1686

01:01:37,109 --> 01:01:34,640

seen informal stories no official

1687

01:01:39,589 --> 01:01:37,119

assessment that you've done or exists

1688

01:01:42,710 --> 01:01:39,599

within dod that you're aware of uh

1689

01:01:44,230 --> 01:01:42,720

regarding the malmstrom incident

1690

01:01:45,990 --> 01:01:44,240

uh all i can speak to is you know what's

1691

01:01:48,309 --> 01:01:46,000

within my cognizance the uap task force

1692

01:01:49,829 --> 01:01:48,319

and we have not looked at that incident

1693

01:01:51,910 --> 01:01:49,839

well i was it's a pretty high profile

1694

01:01:54,470 --> 01:01:51,920

incident i don't claim to be an expert

1695

01:01:56,309 --> 01:01:54,480

on this but that's out there in the

1696

01:01:58,230 --> 01:01:56,319

ether

1697

01:02:00,150 --> 01:01:58,240

you're you're the guy's investigating it

1698

01:02:01,910 --> 01:02:00,160

i mean who else is doing it if something

1699

01:02:03,589 --> 01:02:01,920

was officially brought to our attention

1700

01:02:04,710 --> 01:02:03,599

we would look at it there are many

1701

01:02:06,230 --> 01:02:04,720

things that are out there in the ether

1702

01:02:07,190 --> 01:02:06,240

that aren't officially brought to our

1703

01:02:09,190 --> 01:02:07,200

attention how would it have to be

1704

01:02:10,309 --> 01:02:09,200

officially brought to you i'm bringing

1705

01:02:12,309 --> 01:02:10,319

it to you

1706

01:02:13,910 --> 01:02:12,319

this is pretty official sure so we'll go

1707

01:02:16,710 --> 01:02:13,920

back and take a look at it but generally

1708

01:02:18,069 --> 01:02:16,720

there is some um authoritative figure

1709

01:02:19,990 --> 01:02:18,079

that says there is an incident that

1710

01:02:21,829 --> 01:02:20,000

occurred we'd like you to look at this

1711

01:02:23,190 --> 01:02:21,839

uh but in terms of just tracking what

1712

01:02:24,630 --> 01:02:23,200

may be in the media that says that

1713

01:02:27,349 --> 01:02:24,640

something occurred at this time at this

1714

01:02:28,470 --> 01:02:27,359

place uh there probably a lot of leads

1715

01:02:29,750 --> 01:02:28,480

that we would have to follow up on i

1716

01:02:32,470 --> 01:02:29,760

don't think we were resourced to do that

1717

01:02:34,870 --> 01:02:32,480

right there's actually documentation

1718

01:02:36,230 --> 01:02:34,880

for westworth

1719

01:02:38,470 --> 01:02:36,240

for another reason you could dismiss it

1720

01:02:40,870 --> 01:02:38,480

and say this is not worth wasting

1721

01:02:42,390 --> 01:02:40,880

resources on um and then finally are you

1722

01:02:44,630 --> 01:02:42,400

aware of a document that appeared around

1723

01:02:48,950 --> 01:02:44,640

2019 uh sometimes called the admiral

1724

01:02:51,190 --> 01:02:48,960

wilson memo or ew notes memo

1725

01:02:53,190 --> 01:02:51,200

i am i'm not

1726

01:02:55,589 --> 01:02:53,200

i'm not personally aware of that okay

1727

01:02:57,510 --> 01:02:55,599

this is a document

1728

01:02:59,990 --> 01:02:57,520

veracity i was hoping you would help me

1729

01:03:01,349 --> 01:03:00,000

with that not expecting that head of dia

1730

01:03:03,670 --> 01:03:01,359

claims to have had a conversation with

1731

01:03:05,349 --> 01:03:03,680

the doctor eric wilson and claims to

1732

01:03:06,230 --> 01:03:05,359

have uh sort of been made aware of

1733

01:03:09,430 --> 01:03:06,240

certain

1734

01:03:11,670 --> 01:03:09,440

um contractors or dod programs

1735

01:03:13,270 --> 01:03:11,680

that he tried to get fuller access to

1736

01:03:16,309 --> 01:03:13,280

and was denied

1737

01:03:18,309 --> 01:03:16,319

access to um so you're not aware of that

1738

01:03:19,750 --> 01:03:18,319

i'm not aware of congressman uh in my 10

1739

01:03:21,430 --> 01:03:19,760

seconds remaining then i guess i just

1740

01:03:25,670 --> 01:03:21,440

would ask mr chairman unanimous consent

1741

01:03:29,829 --> 01:03:27,510

without objection thank you mr chairman

1742

01:03:32,230 --> 01:03:29,839

appreciate it

1743

01:03:33,829 --> 01:03:32,240

christie murthy

1744

01:03:35,670 --> 01:03:33,839

thank you mr chair and thank you to both

1745

01:03:38,789 --> 01:03:35,680

of you for appearing today and for your

1746

01:03:41,270 --> 01:03:38,799

public service first question is uh

1747

01:03:44,549 --> 01:03:41,280

there have been no collisions between

1748

01:03:45,750 --> 01:03:44,559

any u.s assets in one of these uaps

1749

01:03:47,190 --> 01:03:45,760

correct

1750

01:03:49,349 --> 01:03:47,200

we have not had a collision we've had at

1751

01:03:51,349 --> 01:03:49,359

least 11 near misses though

1752

01:03:52,950 --> 01:03:51,359

and

1753

01:03:54,710 --> 01:03:52,960

maybe we'll talk about those 11 near

1754

01:03:55,910 --> 01:03:54,720

misses or any place where there's close

1755

01:03:56,710 --> 01:03:55,920

proximity

1756

01:04:02,549 --> 01:03:56,720

um

1757

01:04:05,349 --> 01:04:02,559

been no uh attempt

1758

01:04:07,589 --> 01:04:05,359

there's no communications

1759

01:04:09,750 --> 01:04:07,599

or any kind of

1760

01:04:12,470 --> 01:04:09,760

communication signals that emanate from

1761

01:04:13,829 --> 01:04:12,480

those objects uh that we've detected

1762

01:04:19,430 --> 01:04:13,839

correct

1763

01:04:23,589 --> 01:04:20,870

no

1764

01:04:26,870 --> 01:04:23,599

so we don't we don't even put out a

1765

01:04:27,910 --> 01:04:26,880

alert saying you know uh us

1766

01:04:30,470 --> 01:04:27,920

um

1767

01:04:32,470 --> 01:04:30,480

identi you know identify yourself

1768

01:04:33,990 --> 01:04:32,480

uh you are you know within our flight

1769

01:04:36,390 --> 01:04:34,000

path or something like that we haven't

1770

01:04:38,230 --> 01:04:36,400

said anything like that

1771

01:04:40,950 --> 01:04:38,240

we've not put anything out like that

1772

01:04:42,150 --> 01:04:40,960

generally speaking uh what you know for

1773

01:04:44,470 --> 01:04:42,160

example in the video that we showed

1774

01:04:47,109 --> 01:04:44,480

earlier uh it appears to be something

1775

01:04:48,710 --> 01:04:47,119

that is uh you know unmanned uh appears

1776

01:04:51,109 --> 01:04:48,720

to be something that

1777

01:04:53,349 --> 01:04:51,119

may or may not be in controlled flight

1778

01:04:54,470 --> 01:04:53,359

uh and so we've not attempted any

1779

01:04:55,990 --> 01:04:54,480

communication

1780

01:04:58,230 --> 01:04:56,000

with that

1781

01:05:00,710 --> 01:04:58,240

okay so um

1782

01:05:04,230 --> 01:05:00,720

and i assume we've never discharged any

1783

01:05:05,430 --> 01:05:04,240

armaments against a uap correct

1784

01:05:08,309 --> 01:05:05,440

that's correct

1785

01:05:10,309 --> 01:05:08,319

um how about wreckage have we come

1786

01:05:12,069 --> 01:05:10,319

across any wreckage

1787

01:05:14,870 --> 01:05:12,079

of any kind of

1788

01:05:18,230 --> 01:05:14,880

um object that

1789

01:05:19,589 --> 01:05:18,240  
has now been examined by you

1790

01:05:21,029 --> 01:05:19,599  
the uap task force doesn't have any

1791

01:05:23,270 --> 01:05:21,039  
wreckage that isn't

1792

01:05:24,950 --> 01:05:23,280  
explainable that isn't consistent with

1793

01:05:29,589 --> 01:05:24,960  
being of terrestrial origin

1794

01:05:33,430 --> 01:05:29,599  
do we have any sensors underwater uh to

1795

01:05:35,510 --> 01:05:33,440  
detect on submerged uaps uh anything

1796

01:05:37,190 --> 01:05:35,520  
that is in the ocean or in the seas so i

1797

01:05:39,750 --> 01:05:37,200  
think that would be more appropriately

1798

01:05:41,670 --> 01:05:39,760  
addressed in closed session sir okay

1799

01:05:43,109 --> 01:05:41,680  
um

1800

01:05:44,630 --> 01:05:43,119  
i think one of the biggest questions

1801

01:05:47,510 --> 01:05:44,640

that yes that

1802

01:05:49,829 --> 01:05:47,520

that i have is

1803

01:05:50,870 --> 01:05:49,839

we say with a lot of probability we say

1804

01:05:52,950 --> 01:05:50,880

they

1805

01:05:54,549 --> 01:05:52,960

quote unquote probably do represent

1806

01:05:57,109 --> 01:05:54,559

physical objects

1807

01:05:59,109 --> 01:05:57,119

close quote

1808

01:06:02,309 --> 01:05:59,119

when we say probably

1809

01:06:05,430 --> 01:06:02,319

is that because we cannot conclusively

1810

01:06:08,390 --> 01:06:05,440

say that they are physical objects

1811

01:06:10,230 --> 01:06:08,400

in the task force uh report uh when when

1812

01:06:12,470 --> 01:06:10,240

i say probably uh represent physical

1813

01:06:13,990 --> 01:06:12,480

objects uh most of them represent

1814

01:06:15,990 --> 01:06:14,000

physical objects there could be some

1815

01:06:17,270 --> 01:06:16,000

that are more of a uh

1816

01:06:18,870 --> 01:06:17,280

of a

1817

01:06:20,390 --> 01:06:18,880

meteorological phenomena something like

1818

01:06:23,430 --> 01:06:20,400

that that may not

1819

01:06:24,630 --> 01:06:23,440

uh be a physical object in the

1820

01:06:26,390 --> 01:06:24,640

in the sense that most people think of

1821

01:06:28,950 --> 01:06:26,400

something you go up and touch but the

1822

01:06:31,190 --> 01:06:28,960

ones where you say most of them

1823

01:06:34,069 --> 01:06:31,200

represent physical objects can you say

1824

01:06:36,789 --> 01:06:34,079

that they are definitely like with 100

1825

01:06:38,549 --> 01:06:36,799

certainty that they are physical objects

1826

01:06:40,710 --> 01:06:38,559

i can say with certainty that uh a

1827

01:06:43,109 --> 01:06:40,720

number of these are physical objects

1828

01:06:44,950 --> 01:06:43,119

okay so there we can't rule out that

1829

01:06:47,270 --> 01:06:44,960

some of them may not be physical objects

1830

01:06:49,670 --> 01:06:47,280

so some certainly could be a sensor

1831

01:06:50,549 --> 01:06:49,680

anomaly or something like that some

1832

01:06:53,910 --> 01:06:50,559

could be

1833

01:06:56,390 --> 01:06:53,920

now how about uh with regard to uaps

1834

01:06:57,430 --> 01:06:56,400

we've talked about uaps on training

1835

01:06:59,430 --> 01:06:57,440

areas

1836

01:07:01,349 --> 01:06:59,440

but obviously

1837

01:07:04,789 --> 01:07:01,359

there's some sensor bias i would think

1838

01:07:06,789 --> 01:07:04,799

we we put sensors in training areas

1839

01:07:10,470 --> 01:07:06,799

how about with regards to non-training

1840

01:07:13,990 --> 01:07:10,480

areas do we track what's an open source

1841

01:07:16,950 --> 01:07:14,000

um and what civilians and others have

1842

01:07:18,230 --> 01:07:16,960

tracked and have we found similarities

1843

01:07:20,390 --> 01:07:18,240

to

1844

01:07:22,789 --> 01:07:20,400

what they've observed in terms of uaps

1845

01:07:24,950 --> 01:07:22,799

and non-training areas to the ones that

1846

01:07:26,789 --> 01:07:24,960

are in training areas

1847

01:07:28,230 --> 01:07:26,799

the uap task force has

1848

01:07:30,230 --> 01:07:28,240

worked very hard to to make sure the

1849

01:07:32,870 --> 01:07:30,240

data set that we're working with is a

1850

01:07:34,230 --> 01:07:32,880

data set that we have very good control

1851  
01:07:36,470 --> 01:07:34,240  
over that data

1852  
01:07:38,069 --> 01:07:36,480  
so we have some partnerships with faa so

1853  
01:07:40,549 --> 01:07:38,079  
that we get some of that so we get that

1854  
01:07:42,630 --> 01:07:40,559  
reporting in um but if it comes to just

1855  
01:07:43,910 --> 01:07:42,640  
you know open source reports or someone

1856  
01:07:45,190 --> 01:07:43,920  
says that they saw something that

1857  
01:07:47,910 --> 01:07:45,200  
generally does not make it into our

1858  
01:07:51,029 --> 01:07:47,920  
database so basically it sounds like we

1859  
01:07:52,950 --> 01:07:51,039  
have a good partnership with faa

1860  
01:07:55,109 --> 01:07:52,960  
but apart from faa we don't have

1861  
01:07:58,630 --> 01:07:55,119  
partnerships with other agencies or

1862  
01:07:59,829 --> 01:07:58,640  
other entities that might be tracking so

1863  
01:08:02,710 --> 01:07:59,839

that we could

1864

01:08:04,630 --> 01:08:02,720

enlarge our data set to make comparisons

1865

01:08:06,549 --> 01:08:04,640

we will so that's the goal of this next

1866

01:08:08,549 --> 01:08:06,559

effort will be to expand that

1867

01:08:10,309 --> 01:08:08,559

relationship with the

1868

01:08:12,069 --> 01:08:10,319

rest of government and the interagency

1869

01:08:14,470 --> 01:08:12,079

so we can understand what they're seeing

1870

01:08:16,789 --> 01:08:14,480

what we're seeing we can correlate on uh

1871

01:08:18,309 --> 01:08:16,799

each other's holdings because i think

1872

01:08:20,550 --> 01:08:18,319

sorry to interrupt but i think that

1873

01:08:22,390 --> 01:08:20,560

we're we might have a bias right now

1874

01:08:24,309 --> 01:08:22,400

going on with regards to just reporting

1875

01:08:26,070 --> 01:08:24,319

on uaps being in training areas when we

1876

01:08:28,149 --> 01:08:26,080

don't really track what's happening

1877

01:08:30,070 --> 01:08:28,159

elsewhere last question have our

1878

01:08:32,870 --> 01:08:30,080

encounters with uaps alter the

1879

01:08:34,950 --> 01:08:32,880

development of our either our offense or

1880

01:08:37,829 --> 01:08:34,960

offensive or defensive capabilities or

1881

01:08:39,669 --> 01:08:37,839

even our sensor capabilities

1882

01:08:42,950 --> 01:08:39,679

take that for the closed session

1883

01:08:45,349 --> 01:08:42,960

okay great thank you

1884

01:08:47,110 --> 01:08:45,359

mr lahood

1885

01:08:50,390 --> 01:08:47,120

thank you mr chairman and i want to

1886

01:08:53,349 --> 01:08:50,400

thank the witnesses for being here today

1887

01:08:55,590 --> 01:08:53,359

obviously this topic of uaps uh has

1888

01:08:56,470 --> 01:08:55,600

attracted a lot of interest in in people

1889

01:08:57,749 --> 01:08:56,480

that are

1890

01:09:01,669 --> 01:08:57,759

um

1891

01:09:03,910 --> 01:09:01,679

curious about uh this this hearing today

1892

01:09:05,829 --> 01:09:03,920

as we talk about um

1893

01:09:08,789 --> 01:09:05,839

and i would say there's a lot of what i

1894

01:09:11,669 --> 01:09:08,799

would call amateur interest groups uh

1895

01:09:15,070 --> 01:09:11,679

that are involved in the uap field

1896

01:09:17,590 --> 01:09:15,080

mike my question is when um there are

1897

01:09:19,749 --> 01:09:17,600

unsubstantiated claims or manufactured

1898

01:09:21,669 --> 01:09:19,759

claims of uaps or

1899

01:09:23,269 --> 01:09:21,679

kind of false information that's put out

1900

01:09:25,510 --> 01:09:23,279

there

1901

01:09:27,269 --> 01:09:25,520

what are the consequences for people

1902

01:09:32,070 --> 01:09:27,279

that are involved with that or groups

1903

01:09:34,630 --> 01:09:33,829

so one of the concerns that we have is

1904

01:09:47,030 --> 01:09:34,640

that

1905

01:09:48,550 --> 01:09:47,040

self-serving

1906

01:09:50,550 --> 01:09:48,560

we're trying to do what's in the what's

1907

01:09:52,630 --> 01:09:50,560

in the best interest of one the

1908

01:09:53,829 --> 01:09:52,640

department of defense and then two

1909

01:09:54,709 --> 01:09:53,839

what's in the best interest of the

1910

01:09:57,430 --> 01:09:54,719

public

1911

01:10:00,070 --> 01:09:57,440

to ensure that we can put factual based

1912

01:10:02,550 --> 01:10:00,080

information back into the mainstream and

1913

01:10:03,750 --> 01:10:02,560

back into the bloodstream of the

1914

01:10:05,830 --> 01:10:03,760

reporting

1915

01:10:07,030 --> 01:10:05,840

media that we have so people understand

1916

01:10:10,470 --> 01:10:07,040

what's there

1917

01:10:12,550 --> 01:10:10,480

it's important because we are attempting

1918

01:10:13,910 --> 01:10:12,560

as this hearing as drawn out to

1919

01:10:16,470 --> 01:10:13,920

understand

1920

01:10:19,669 --> 01:10:16,480

one what may just be natural phenomenon

1921

01:10:21,270 --> 01:10:19,679

to what may be sensor phenomenology or

1922

01:10:22,229 --> 01:10:21,280

things that were happening with sensors

1923

01:10:23,990 --> 01:10:22,239

three

1924

01:10:26,470 --> 01:10:24,000

what may be legitimate counter

1925

01:10:27,990 --> 01:10:26,480

intelligence threats to

1926

01:10:30,470 --> 01:10:28,000

places that we have or bases or

1927

01:10:33,510 --> 01:10:30,480

installations or security threats to our

1928

01:10:35,910 --> 01:10:33,520

platforms and anything that diverts us

1929

01:10:38,149 --> 01:10:35,920

off of what we have with the resources

1930

01:10:39,910 --> 01:10:38,159

that have been allocated to us send us

1931

01:10:41,669 --> 01:10:39,920

off in these spurious

1932

01:10:43,430 --> 01:10:41,679

chases and hunts that are just not

1933

01:10:45,430 --> 01:10:43,440

helpful and they also help well they

1934

01:10:48,310 --> 01:10:45,440

also contribute to the undermining of

1935

01:10:50,709 --> 01:10:48,320

the confidence that the congress and the

1936

01:10:51,510 --> 01:10:50,719

american people have that we are trying

1937

01:10:55,430 --> 01:10:51,520

to

1938

01:10:56,950 --> 01:10:55,440

happening here report on that and then

1939

01:10:59,350 --> 01:10:56,960

feed that back into our national

1940

01:11:01,110 --> 01:10:59,360

security apparatus so we are able to

1941

01:11:03,990 --> 01:11:01,120

protect the american people and our

1942

01:11:05,750 --> 01:11:04,000

allies so it is harmful it is hurtful

1943

01:11:07,830 --> 01:11:05,760

but hopefully if we get more information

1944

01:11:09,750 --> 01:11:07,840

out there we'll start to lessen the

1945

01:11:12,709 --> 01:11:09,760

impact of some of those spurious reports

1946

01:11:14,709 --> 01:11:12,719

so so just taking that a step further so

1947

01:11:16,709 --> 01:11:14,719

though that misinformation false

1948

01:11:18,229 --> 01:11:16,719

narratives manufactured so what are the

1949

01:11:19,910 --> 01:11:18,239

consequences are there legal

1950

01:11:21,430 --> 01:11:19,920

consequences are there examples that you

1951

01:11:23,669 --> 01:11:21,440

can give us where people have been held

1952

01:11:26,070 --> 01:11:23,679

accountable by this misinformation or

1953

01:11:27,910 --> 01:11:26,080

disinformation i i can't give you you

1954

01:11:30,630 --> 01:11:27,920

know any examples where somebody's been

1955

01:11:32,630 --> 01:11:30,640

legally held liable for putting

1956

01:11:34,229 --> 01:11:32,640

something out there but well i guess

1957

01:11:37,189 --> 01:11:34,239

what's the deterrent from people

1958

01:11:39,270 --> 01:11:37,199

engaging in this activity yeah

1959

01:11:41,669 --> 01:11:39,280

i don't i don't know i i don't have that

1960

01:11:44,070 --> 01:11:41,679

answer that's something that uh you know

1961

01:11:46,070 --> 01:11:44,080

welcome to dialogue with congress to

1962

01:11:47,830 --> 01:11:46,080

talk about that with the members who uh

1963

01:11:50,390 --> 01:11:47,840

you know helped legislate those laws to

1964

01:11:52,550 --> 01:11:50,400

say what should be the uh the legal

1965

01:11:54,709 --> 01:11:52,560

ramifications that we could use to

1966

01:11:56,070 --> 01:11:54,719

potentially hold individuals accountable

1967

01:11:57,590 --> 01:11:56,080

whether it be

1968

01:12:00,709 --> 01:11:57,600

citizens or

1969

01:12:03,910 --> 01:12:00,719

information that might be injected into

1970

01:12:05,590 --> 01:12:03,920

our media by other uh other forces or

1971

01:12:07,910 --> 01:12:05,600

other countries if you will

1972

01:12:09,990 --> 01:12:07,920

and in terms of dods and uh you know

1973

01:12:12,470 --> 01:12:10,000

review and analysis in this field i mean

1974

01:12:14,149 --> 01:12:12,480

is there is there a standard in place

1975

01:12:16,229 --> 01:12:14,159

when it comes to uaps i mean is there

1976

01:12:19,430 --> 01:12:16,239

any guidance you look to that's codified

1977

01:12:21,830 --> 01:12:19,440

in law or otherwise within dod that kind

1978

01:12:23,510 --> 01:12:21,840

of sets out the standards for uaps and

1979

01:12:25,270 --> 01:12:23,520

what to look for i think that's part of

1980

01:12:27,430 --> 01:12:25,280

what the the the group that we're uh

1981

01:12:29,350 --> 01:12:27,440

standing up now will be uh charted to do

1982

01:12:31,270 --> 01:12:29,360

we're actually from my organization

1983

01:12:33,590 --> 01:12:31,280

we'll be looking at policy and standards

1984

01:12:35,590 --> 01:12:33,600

that we have uh to uh

1985

01:12:37,590 --> 01:12:35,600

come to you and work with you to

1986

01:12:39,350 --> 01:12:37,600

actually put in place and promulgate

1987

01:12:41,189 --> 01:12:39,360

across our government

1988

01:12:44,310 --> 01:12:41,199

thank you i yield back

1989

01:12:45,750 --> 01:12:44,320

gentleman yields back mr welch

1990

01:12:47,110 --> 01:12:45,760

uh thank you i'm going to file i'm going

1991

01:12:49,750 --> 01:12:47,120

to follow on

1992

01:12:51,669 --> 01:12:49,760

the line of questions from mr lahood

1993

01:12:53,990 --> 01:12:51,679

gentlemen what seems incredibly

1994

01:12:56,310 --> 01:12:54,000

difficult for you is that there's two

1995

01:12:57,830 --> 01:12:56,320

almost competing but different uh

1996

01:13:00,390 --> 01:12:57,840

narratives one is

1997

01:13:01,669 --> 01:13:00,400

uh it's

1998

01:13:03,350 --> 01:13:01,679

no one knows whether there's

1999

01:13:05,990 --> 01:13:03,360

extraterrestrial life it's a big

2000

01:13:07,590 --> 01:13:06,000

universe and it would be

2001  
01:13:10,470 --> 01:13:07,600  
pretty presumptuous to have a hard and

2002  
01:13:12,870 --> 01:13:10,480  
fast conclusion and then if there is

2003  
01:13:14,870 --> 01:13:12,880  
it's not beyond the realm of possibility

2004  
01:13:16,149 --> 01:13:14,880  
that there is some exploration coming

2005  
01:13:17,990 --> 01:13:16,159  
here

2006  
01:13:20,070 --> 01:13:18,000  
and that underlies a lot of the reports

2007  
01:13:21,910 --> 01:13:20,080  
you get i think mr lahood was asking

2008  
01:13:24,070 --> 01:13:21,920  
about that people think there must be

2009  
01:13:24,790 --> 01:13:24,080  
extraterrestrial life and it's not at

2010  
01:13:26,950 --> 01:13:24,800  
all

2011  
01:13:28,390 --> 01:13:26,960  
uh beyond the pale that uh there would

2012  
01:13:30,470 --> 01:13:28,400  
be a visit here

2013  
01:13:33,030 --> 01:13:30,480

the other hand you as the dod you have

2014

01:13:35,430 --> 01:13:33,040

the responsibility to make sure

2015

01:13:37,430 --> 01:13:35,440

that our national security is protected

2016

01:13:38,950 --> 01:13:37,440

and that if there are surveillance

2017

01:13:41,189 --> 01:13:38,960

drones or

2018

01:13:44,550 --> 01:13:41,199

uh active drones that can disable our

2019

01:13:45,590 --> 01:13:44,560

systems uh that has to be analyzed and

2020

01:13:48,149 --> 01:13:45,600

stopped

2021

01:13:49,669 --> 01:13:48,159

so how do you divide the

2022

01:13:52,550 --> 01:13:49,679

these how do you separate your

2023

01:13:53,350 --> 01:13:52,560

responsibilities where uh you get all

2024

01:13:54,550 --> 01:13:53,360

these

2025

01:13:56,390 --> 01:13:54,560

reports

2026

01:13:58,550 --> 01:13:56,400

uh from folks who

2027

01:14:00,470 --> 01:13:58,560

may be in good faith maybe not

2028

01:14:03,430 --> 01:14:00,480

uh believe that you should be

2029

01:14:04,709 --> 01:14:03,440

investigating every possible uh

2030

01:14:10,149 --> 01:14:04,719

uh

2031

01:14:12,310 --> 01:14:10,159

incident i'll start with you mr moultrie

2032

01:14:14,390 --> 01:14:12,320

sure indeed congressman and and thank

2033

01:14:17,189 --> 01:14:14,400

you for the question um

2034

01:14:19,669 --> 01:14:17,199

it's important that we um

2035

01:14:21,189 --> 01:14:19,679

as a part of this effort uh

2036

01:14:22,709 --> 01:14:21,199

really uh

2037

01:14:24,790 --> 01:14:22,719

build out the relationship that we have

2038

01:14:26,790 --> 01:14:24,800

with others including nasa and for the

2039

01:14:28,870 --> 01:14:26,800

reasons that you just pointed out

2040

01:14:31,750 --> 01:14:28,880

so there are elements in our government

2041

01:14:34,630 --> 01:14:31,760

that are engaged in

2042

01:14:36,390 --> 01:14:34,640

uh looking for life in other places and

2043

01:14:37,110 --> 01:14:36,400

they have been doing that for decades

2044

01:14:38,790 --> 01:14:37,120

they've been searching for

2045

01:14:40,790 --> 01:14:38,800

extraterrestrial life

2046

01:14:42,550 --> 01:14:40,800

uh there are astro biologists who have

2047

01:14:45,270 --> 01:14:42,560

been doing this too we're a part of that

2048

01:14:47,270 --> 01:14:45,280

same government and so our goal is not

2049

01:14:49,030 --> 01:14:47,280

to

2050

01:14:50,310 --> 01:14:49,040

potentially cover up something if we

2051

01:14:54,149 --> 01:14:50,320

were to find something it's to

2052

01:14:56,390 --> 01:14:54,159

understand what may be out there

2053

01:14:58,870 --> 01:14:56,400

examine what um

2054

01:15:00,709 --> 01:14:58,880

what it may mean for us if there are any

2055

01:15:03,350 --> 01:15:00,719

from a defense perspective any national

2056

01:15:05,830 --> 01:15:03,360

security implications or ramifications

2057

01:15:06,950 --> 01:15:05,840

but then to work with organizations as

2058

01:15:10,149 --> 01:15:06,960

appropriate if it's a weather

2059

01:15:12,390 --> 01:15:10,159

phenomenology with noaa if it's a

2060

01:15:14,229 --> 01:15:12,400

potential for extraterrestrial life or

2061

01:15:15,990 --> 01:15:14,239

an indication of extraordinary life with

2062

01:15:17,750 --> 01:15:16,000

someone like nasa so

2063

01:15:20,149 --> 01:15:17,760

the transparency actually is very

2064

01:15:21,910 --> 01:15:20,159

important completely for public uh

2065

01:15:23,510 --> 01:15:21,920

consumption completely

2066

01:15:26,470 --> 01:15:23,520

we're gonna have a classified briefing

2067

01:15:28,149 --> 01:15:26,480

and without going into the details uh of

2068

01:15:30,870 --> 01:15:28,159

what kinds of secrets

2069

01:15:31,990 --> 01:15:30,880

uh that we can't share here

2070

01:15:34,149 --> 01:15:32,000

uh

2071

01:15:35,590 --> 01:15:34,159

what is it what are we

2072

01:15:38,229 --> 01:15:35,600

protecting i don't know if you can

2073

01:15:40,070 --> 01:15:38,239

answer this question

2074

01:15:42,470 --> 01:15:40,080

in this open forum

2075

01:15:44,229 --> 01:15:42,480

but in fact

2076

01:15:46,070 --> 01:15:44,239

your perception of what it is we have to

2077

01:15:48,630 --> 01:15:46,080

quote so i think right now what's really

2078

01:15:50,390 --> 01:15:48,640

important for us to protect is uh how we

2079

01:15:52,070 --> 01:15:50,400

know certain things so there are a lot

2080

01:15:54,790 --> 01:15:52,080

of things that we know whether it be

2081

01:15:57,189 --> 01:15:54,800

about um

2082

01:15:58,630 --> 01:15:57,199

the thinking of other leaders around the

2083

01:16:00,630 --> 01:15:58,640

world the weapon systems that are being

2084

01:16:02,470 --> 01:16:00,640

developed or how we detect things that

2085

01:16:04,149 --> 01:16:02,480

may be threats to us

2086

01:16:05,830 --> 01:16:04,159

many of those things are

2087

01:16:07,510 --> 01:16:05,840

the result of some of our most sensitive

2088

01:16:09,590 --> 01:16:07,520

sources and methods and we'll use those

2089

01:16:11,910 --> 01:16:09,600

things not just for this effort but

2090

01:16:14,790 --> 01:16:11,920

those same sources and methods are used

2091

01:16:16,630 --> 01:16:14,800

to help protect us from adversaries and

2092

01:16:18,470 --> 01:16:16,640

from others who might mean to do us harm

2093

01:16:21,430 --> 01:16:18,480

there aren't separate

2094

01:16:23,669 --> 01:16:21,440

uap sensors there's not a a separate uap

2095

01:16:26,149 --> 01:16:23,679

processing computer it is not a separate

2096

01:16:28,070 --> 01:16:26,159

uap dissemination chain or whatever so

2097

01:16:29,750 --> 01:16:28,080

it's the same process it's the same

2098

01:16:32,790 --> 01:16:29,760

system that we have that helps us do all

2099

01:16:34,870 --> 01:16:32,800

that we need to protect that because

2100

01:16:36,390 --> 01:16:34,880

this is something that uh that we're

2101  
01:16:37,510 --> 01:16:36,400  
looking at but we're sure there's going

2102  
01:16:39,189 --> 01:16:37,520  
to be other things that we'll look at in

2103  
01:16:40,950 --> 01:16:39,199  
the future that will need those same

2104  
01:16:42,550 --> 01:16:40,960  
sensors we'll need those same sources

2105  
01:16:44,550 --> 01:16:42,560  
and methods to help us do so we're

2106  
01:16:46,390 --> 01:16:44,560  
protecting the fact of the that this

2107  
01:16:49,350 --> 01:16:46,400  
nation has developed capabilities that

2108  
01:16:51,350 --> 01:16:49,360  
enable us to know what may be

2109  
01:16:54,149 --> 01:16:51,360  
threats to us and to counter those

2110  
01:16:56,470 --> 01:16:54,159  
threats before they uh become something

2111  
01:16:58,470 --> 01:16:56,480  
of a a national issue thank you very

2112  
01:17:00,390 --> 01:16:58,480  
much i want to thank both you mr brand

2113  
01:17:02,790 --> 01:17:00,400

you mr multry for your appearance today

2114

01:17:05,189 --> 01:17:02,800

i yield back

2115

01:17:07,350 --> 01:17:05,199

goodman yields back

2116

01:17:10,550 --> 01:17:07,360

gentlemen beyond videos

2117

01:17:12,470 --> 01:17:10,560

is there a range of other information

2118

01:17:14,149 --> 01:17:12,480

that the executive branch has that would

2119

01:17:16,550 --> 01:17:14,159

be valuable to the american people

2120

01:17:19,030 --> 01:17:16,560

sources and methods obviously

2121

01:17:20,950 --> 01:17:19,040

the details of individual encounters

2122

01:17:24,310 --> 01:17:20,960

including the time place and details of

2123

01:17:28,310 --> 01:17:24,320

an encounter and does the aim sog have

2124

01:17:30,870 --> 01:17:28,320

a clear and repeatable process

2125

01:17:33,189 --> 01:17:30,880

for considering public release

2126

01:17:35,110 --> 01:17:33,199

uh as part of the process

2127

01:17:36,470 --> 01:17:35,120

chairman carson the um do you commit to

2128

01:17:39,270 --> 01:17:36,480

building that process if it's not in

2129

01:17:41,350 --> 01:17:39,280

place uh the uap task force uh you know

2130

01:17:43,350 --> 01:17:41,360

the the security classification guide uh

2131

01:17:45,910 --> 01:17:43,360

that the uap task force has been

2132

01:17:47,270 --> 01:17:45,920

operating under that i approved um

2133

01:17:48,950 --> 01:17:47,280

really was meant to protect those

2134

01:17:52,470 --> 01:17:48,960

sources and methods and meant to protect

2135

01:17:53,750 --> 01:17:52,480

um uh any knowledge uh that an adversary

2136

01:17:55,189 --> 01:17:53,760

intelligence

2137

01:17:57,430 --> 01:17:55,199

entity may gain

2138

01:18:00,149 --> 01:17:57,440

from under from understanding what we're

2139

01:18:02,790 --> 01:18:00,159

tracking how we track it or

2140

01:18:05,110 --> 01:18:02,800

when we're tracking it or if we're not

2141

01:18:07,110 --> 01:18:05,120

um and so that has been an important

2142

01:18:09,910 --> 01:18:07,120

piece uh in the balance between

2143

01:18:12,310 --> 01:18:09,920

transparency uh and preserving our

2144

01:18:15,669 --> 01:18:12,320

warfighting advantage because the u.s

2145

01:18:16,630 --> 01:18:15,679

military does train as it would fight

2146

01:18:17,990 --> 01:18:16,640

what i

2147

01:18:19,910 --> 01:18:18,000

will commit to

2148

01:18:21,990 --> 01:18:19,920

is at least for that material that's

2149

01:18:23,110 --> 01:18:22,000

under my authority

2150

01:18:25,030 --> 01:18:23,120

as the deputy director of naval

2151  
01:18:27,030 --> 01:18:25,040  
intelligence

2152  
01:18:28,950 --> 01:18:27,040  
for uh

2153  
01:18:32,390 --> 01:18:28,960  
information that we have when it does

2154  
01:18:33,750 --> 01:18:32,400  
not involve sources of methods uh or and

2155  
01:18:35,830 --> 01:18:33,760  
when we can

2156  
01:18:37,510 --> 01:18:35,840  
with a reasonable uh degree of

2157  
01:18:39,430 --> 01:18:37,520  
confidence determine that it does not

2158  
01:18:40,790 --> 01:18:39,440  
pose a foreign intelligence or national

2159  
01:18:42,550 --> 01:18:40,800  
security threat

2160  
01:18:44,950 --> 01:18:42,560  
and it's within my authority to do so i

2161  
01:18:46,630 --> 01:18:44,960  
commit to declassifying that so i i

2162  
01:18:49,189 --> 01:18:46,640  
believe very much in the transparency of

2163  
01:18:51,270 --> 01:18:49,199

this uh and we work very hard to balance

2164

01:18:53,430 --> 01:18:51,280

that with our national security needs

2165

01:18:55,990 --> 01:18:53,440

and i'll just add congressman

2166

01:18:58,149 --> 01:18:56,000

just over the last three four months i

2167

01:19:00,470 --> 01:18:58,159

think that the

2168

01:19:02,149 --> 01:19:00,480

the intelligence community and the

2169

01:19:04,149 --> 01:19:02,159

national defense apparatus have

2170

01:19:06,390 --> 01:19:04,159

disclosed more information on various

2171

01:19:09,189 --> 01:19:06,400

events than it has and

2172

01:19:11,110 --> 01:19:09,199

probably see the previous 10 years

2173

01:19:12,550 --> 01:19:11,120

um you have our commitment to work

2174

01:19:15,830 --> 01:19:12,560

closely with the director of national

2175

01:19:17,910 --> 01:19:15,840

intelligence and uh others in the

2176  
01:19:19,110 --> 01:19:17,920  
declassification and downgrading of

2177  
01:19:20,630 --> 01:19:19,120  
intel

2178  
01:19:22,229 --> 01:19:20,640  
apparatus to ensure that we can get

2179  
01:19:24,229 --> 01:19:22,239  
whatever information that we can out to

2180  
01:19:25,830 --> 01:19:24,239  
the american people and to the public at

2181  
01:19:27,750 --> 01:19:25,840  
large

2182  
01:19:30,149 --> 01:19:27,760  
greatly appreciate it sir ranking member

2183  
01:19:32,790 --> 01:19:30,159  
crawford thank you mr chairman um

2184  
01:19:34,149 --> 01:19:32,800  
representative stefanik is in route i

2185  
01:19:36,070 --> 01:19:34,159  
believe just real quickly but in the

2186  
01:19:38,390 --> 01:19:36,080  
interim if i could if you'll indulge me

2187  
01:19:40,790 --> 01:19:38,400  
i just have one a couple of real small

2188  
01:19:42,950 --> 01:19:40,800

questions one is uh

2189

01:19:45,510 --> 01:19:42,960

do we have an example can you decide a

2190

01:19:48,149 --> 01:19:45,520

specific example of an object that can't

2191

01:19:52,390 --> 01:19:48,159

be explained as having been human-made

2192

01:19:54,870 --> 01:19:53,630

i mean the the um

2193

01:19:56,790 --> 01:19:54,880

[Music]

2194

01:19:58,149 --> 01:19:56,800

the example that

2195

01:20:00,229 --> 01:19:58,159

that i would say that is still

2196

01:20:02,790 --> 01:20:00,239

unresolved uh that i think everyone

2197

01:20:06,390 --> 01:20:02,800

understands quite well is the 2004 uh

2198

01:20:08,709 --> 01:20:06,400

incident from from nimitz uh we have

2199

01:20:11,350 --> 01:20:08,719

data on that and that simply remains

2200

01:20:13,669 --> 01:20:11,360

unresolved uh does not mean it resolves

2201

01:20:15,990 --> 01:20:13,679

to being something right that is easily

2202

01:20:17,189 --> 01:20:16,000

explainable or uh difficulty or well

2203

01:20:19,270 --> 01:20:17,199

obviously it resolves being something

2204

01:20:21,430 --> 01:20:19,280

that is difficult to explain

2205

01:20:23,510 --> 01:20:21,440

but i i can't point to something that

2206

01:20:24,950 --> 01:20:23,520

definitively was not

2207

01:20:27,030 --> 01:20:24,960

man-made but i can point to a number of

2208

01:20:29,430 --> 01:20:27,040

examples in which remain unresolved

2209

01:20:31,270 --> 01:20:29,440

gotcha uh with regard to videos that

2210

01:20:33,270 --> 01:20:31,280

have appeared in open source channels

2211

01:20:35,270 --> 01:20:33,280

for example the tic tac video

2212

01:20:36,950 --> 01:20:35,280

does aimsog maintain control of videos

2213

01:20:39,030 --> 01:20:36,960

and how do you prevent

2214

01:20:41,430 --> 01:20:39,040

leaks of potentially classified videos

2215

01:20:44,229 --> 01:20:41,440

or other material

2216

01:20:46,870 --> 01:20:44,239

so the aims log as we establish an

2217

01:20:49,830 --> 01:20:46,880

organization we will have a

2218

01:20:51,430 --> 01:20:49,840

a process for classified and compartment

2219

01:20:53,350 --> 01:20:51,440

holdings and we will find a way of

2220

01:20:54,790 --> 01:20:53,360

getting positive control over those we

2221

01:20:56,390 --> 01:20:54,800

have

2222

01:20:58,149 --> 01:20:56,400

our sensitive access programs and

2223

01:20:59,910 --> 01:20:58,159

special access programs that allow us to

2224

01:21:01,910 --> 01:20:59,920

put what we call saps around things and

2225

01:21:04,070 --> 01:21:01,920

then there's controlled access programs

2226  
01:21:05,510 --> 01:21:04,080  
that allow us put caps around things so

2227  
01:21:06,870 --> 01:21:05,520  
we'll have that

2228  
01:21:08,870 --> 01:21:06,880  
in place

2229  
01:21:10,470 --> 01:21:08,880  
our goal will be

2230  
01:21:11,910 --> 01:21:10,480  
ensuring that we're sharing that with

2231  
01:21:14,070 --> 01:21:11,920  
the appropriate analysts and the

2232  
01:21:15,510 --> 01:21:14,080  
appropriate exploiters if you will who

2233  
01:21:17,830 --> 01:21:15,520  
can look at that data too what we don't

2234  
01:21:20,310 --> 01:21:17,840  
want to do is bring something into a dod

2235  
01:21:21,590 --> 01:21:20,320  
database or a dod holding and then have

2236  
01:21:23,830 --> 01:21:21,600  
so many wrappers around it's not

2237  
01:21:25,590 --> 01:21:23,840  
available to those who really need to

2238  
01:21:27,270 --> 01:21:25,600

look at it and to exploit it and that's

2239

01:21:29,110 --> 01:21:27,280

one of the reasons we're establishing

2240

01:21:30,629 --> 01:21:29,120

relationships with the interagency with

2241

01:21:33,030 --> 01:21:30,639

the ic and others to be able to do that

2242

01:21:34,790 --> 01:21:33,040

sir but we will do our best to maintain

2243

01:21:36,470 --> 01:21:34,800

positive control over the materials that

2244

01:21:38,390 --> 01:21:36,480

we have within our holdings

2245

01:21:40,550 --> 01:21:38,400

thank you

2246

01:21:42,310 --> 01:21:40,560

chairmanship

2247

01:21:45,430 --> 01:21:42,320

thank you mr chairman just going back to

2248

01:21:47,350 --> 01:21:45,440

the 2021 report um

2249

01:21:49,350 --> 01:21:47,360

you know under the category of

2250

01:21:51,750 --> 01:21:49,360

uap appear to demonstrate advanced

2251

01:21:53,189 --> 01:21:51,760

technology uh those 18

2252

01:21:56,709 --> 01:21:53,199

incidents

2253

01:21:58,070 --> 01:21:56,719

uh in which uh some of the uap

2254

01:21:59,830 --> 01:21:58,080

appeared to remain stationary winds

2255

01:22:02,390 --> 01:21:59,840

aloft move against the wind maneuver

2256

01:22:04,870 --> 01:22:02,400

abruptly or move at considerable speed

2257

01:22:06,390 --> 01:22:04,880

without discernible means of propulsion

2258

01:22:08,950 --> 01:22:06,400

it goes on to say in a small number of

2259

01:22:11,590 --> 01:22:08,960

cases military aircraft systems

2260

01:22:15,189 --> 01:22:11,600

processed radio frequency energy

2261

01:22:16,709 --> 01:22:15,199

associated with uap sightings

2262

01:22:18,629 --> 01:22:16,719

i couldn't tell from that whether that

2263

01:22:22,870 --> 01:22:18,639

small number of cases

2264

01:22:25,910 --> 01:22:22,880

was a part of the subset of 18 that is

2265

01:22:27,350 --> 01:22:25,920

among the 18 which appeared to move uh

2266

01:22:28,790 --> 01:22:27,360

with unusual pattern or flight

2267

01:22:31,030 --> 01:22:28,800

characteristics

2268

01:22:36,790 --> 01:22:31,040

did some of those

2269

01:22:41,830 --> 01:22:39,030

i would have to check with our uap task

2270

01:22:43,750 --> 01:22:41,840

force on that i uh

2271

01:22:45,110 --> 01:22:43,760

i believe without getting into specifics

2272

01:22:47,910 --> 01:22:45,120

that we can do in the in the closed

2273

01:22:51,189 --> 01:22:47,920

session uh at least some that we have

2274

01:22:52,790 --> 01:22:51,199

detected uh rf uh emissions from were

2275

01:22:55,590 --> 01:22:52,800

not uh

2276

01:22:58,310 --> 01:22:55,600

behaving uh oddly otherwise

2277

01:23:02,470 --> 01:22:58,320

uh and and the significance of

2278

01:23:05,030 --> 01:23:02,480

uh measuring that radiofrequency energy

2279

01:23:07,270 --> 01:23:05,040

is what that uh we suspect that this was

2280

01:23:09,669 --> 01:23:07,280

a some form of aircraft in which there

2281

01:23:11,030 --> 01:23:09,679

were radio transmissions

2282

01:23:12,950 --> 01:23:11,040

the biggest thing that you're looking

2283

01:23:15,510 --> 01:23:12,960

for there is any indication of of an

2284

01:23:17,590 --> 01:23:15,520

effort to jam uh whatever sensors that

2285

01:23:20,550 --> 01:23:17,600

we may have looking at it but i would

2286

01:23:22,310 --> 01:23:20,560

also also add to that that the radio

2287

01:23:23,590 --> 01:23:22,320

frequency as you know congressman is

2288

01:23:27,189 --> 01:23:23,600

used to control

2289

01:23:30,229 --> 01:23:27,199

uh various platforms too so the fact of

2290

01:23:33,669 --> 01:23:30,239

uh emanations coming off of any platform

2291

01:23:34,709 --> 01:23:33,679

whether it be a uav or another platform

2292

01:23:36,470 --> 01:23:34,719

could be

2293

01:23:40,070 --> 01:23:36,480

uh radio frequency

2294

01:23:41,990 --> 01:23:40,080

activity related to that entity

2295

01:23:44,149 --> 01:23:42,000

transmitting out or

2296

01:23:46,229 --> 01:23:44,159

something transmitting to that platform

2297

01:23:47,910 --> 01:23:46,239

and of course we have a sensitivity with

2298

01:23:49,350 --> 01:23:47,920

our airborne platforms are picking it up

2299

01:23:50,790 --> 01:23:49,360

which is one of the reasons that we uh

2300

01:23:52,550 --> 01:23:50,800

try to prevent people from using their

2301  
01:23:54,550 --> 01:23:52,560  
cell phones on airplanes and things like

2302  
01:23:56,790 --> 01:23:54,560  
that it's very sensitive to rf

2303  
01:23:58,390 --> 01:23:56,800  
emanations so that's a part of what

2304  
01:24:00,149 --> 01:23:58,400  
we'll be looking at in the aim so what

2305  
01:24:01,669 --> 01:24:00,159  
is this is this something that we can

2306  
01:24:03,830 --> 01:24:01,679  
collect on and can we start to

2307  
01:24:05,830 --> 01:24:03,840  
characterize the signaling environment

2308  
01:24:07,669 --> 01:24:05,840  
around the emanations that may be coming

2309  
01:24:10,550 --> 01:24:07,679  
off of some of these uaps

2310  
01:24:13,750 --> 01:24:10,560  
so they admit radio frequency

2311  
01:24:15,189 --> 01:24:13,760  
that was recorded could be either

2312  
01:24:20,070 --> 01:24:15,199  
an effort to jam or it could be an

2313  
01:24:23,430 --> 01:24:20,790

or

2314

01:24:25,669 --> 01:24:23,440

any other communication with that

2315

01:24:28,149 --> 01:24:25,679

craft i would say that's accurate

2316

01:24:31,189 --> 01:24:28,159

right thank you mr chairman

2317

01:24:33,990 --> 01:24:31,199

thank you chairman um

2318

01:24:37,430 --> 01:24:34,000

as the odni report makes clear one

2319

01:24:40,229 --> 01:24:37,440

possible explanation for uaps is that we

2320

01:24:44,149 --> 01:24:40,239

are detecting u.s aircraft either secret

2321

01:24:45,590 --> 01:24:44,159

air programs or even test prototypes

2322

01:24:48,229 --> 01:24:45,600

i won't ask you in this setting

2323

01:24:51,110 --> 01:24:48,239

obviously to describe any secret dod

2324

01:24:53,189 --> 01:24:51,120

programs that said i do want to make

2325

01:24:55,510 --> 01:24:53,199

sure the u.s government isn't chasing

2326

01:24:57,350 --> 01:24:55,520

its own tail

2327

01:24:59,590 --> 01:24:57,360

firstly do you have a clear and

2328

01:25:01,270 --> 01:24:59,600

repeatable process to check with

2329

01:25:02,790 --> 01:25:01,280

compartmented programs about whether a

2330

01:25:06,149 --> 01:25:02,800

uap sighting

2331

01:25:07,430 --> 01:25:06,159

is attributable to a u.s aircraft

2332

01:25:09,910 --> 01:25:07,440

secondly do

2333

01:25:11,189 --> 01:25:09,920

does the aimsaw staff have the

2334

01:25:12,709 --> 01:25:11,199

clearances

2335

01:25:14,629 --> 01:25:12,719

and read-ons

2336

01:25:17,350 --> 01:25:14,639

that they need to investigate all of

2337

01:25:20,390 --> 01:25:17,360

these incidents and and and thirdly

2338

01:25:21,270 --> 01:25:20,400

when your staff cannot be read on

2339

01:25:23,510 --> 01:25:21,280

uh

2340

01:25:25,590 --> 01:25:23,520

are your questions to those who are read

2341

01:25:27,910 --> 01:25:25,600

on even being answered

2342

01:25:30,629 --> 01:25:27,920

so i'll start and then uh i'll pass that

2343

01:25:33,830 --> 01:25:30,639

to uh to mr bray so we're very conscious

2344

01:25:35,910 --> 01:25:33,840

of the potential blue on blue issue or

2345

01:25:37,590 --> 01:25:35,920

us on u.s and so

2346

01:25:40,950 --> 01:25:37,600

we've established relationships with

2347

01:25:44,149 --> 01:25:40,960

organizations and entities that that are

2348

01:25:46,790 --> 01:25:44,159

uh potentially uh flying or developing

2349

01:25:49,189 --> 01:25:46,800

platforms for their own interests if you

2350

01:25:50,790 --> 01:25:49,199

will and our goal is to continue and we

2351  
01:25:52,950 --> 01:25:50,800  
have a repeatable process i think we've

2352  
01:25:56,229 --> 01:25:52,960  
had that process for some time

2353  
01:25:57,990 --> 01:25:56,239  
to deconflict uh activities that we may

2354  
01:25:59,830 --> 01:25:58,000  
have to ensure that we are not

2355  
01:26:00,950 --> 01:25:59,840  
potentially reporting on something that

2356  
01:26:03,910 --> 01:26:00,960  
may be

2357  
01:26:06,629 --> 01:26:03,920  
a developmental platform or a us

2358  
01:26:08,229 --> 01:26:06,639  
operational platform that is performing

2359  
01:26:11,110 --> 01:26:08,239  
uh either testing or performing a

2360  
01:26:13,110 --> 01:26:11,120  
mission so we will have that uh in place

2361  
01:26:16,390 --> 01:26:13,120  
we've already had those discussions with

2362  
01:26:18,629 --> 01:26:16,400  
organizations and entities we want to

2363  
01:26:19,990 --> 01:26:18,639

ensure that we're protecting their

2364

01:26:21,590 --> 01:26:20,000

equities we want to ensure that we're

2365

01:26:23,910 --> 01:26:21,600

protecting their sources and methods

2366

01:26:26,390 --> 01:26:23,920

while also getting at what we have here

2367

01:26:28,870 --> 01:26:26,400

we want to be able to deconflict those

2368

01:26:31,430 --> 01:26:28,880

absolutely the uap task force has uh had

2369

01:26:32,310 --> 01:26:31,440

a a process in place to work uh with

2370

01:26:33,350 --> 01:26:32,320

other elements of the department of

2371

01:26:35,510 --> 01:26:33,360

defense and other elements of the

2372

01:26:38,070 --> 01:26:35,520

government to ensure that

2373

01:26:40,390 --> 01:26:38,080

that there's an uh as simple a way as

2374

01:26:42,310 --> 01:26:40,400

possible to deconflict those and when we

2375

01:26:45,030 --> 01:26:42,320

reference that in the uh in the report

2376

01:26:47,590 --> 01:26:45,040

uh i should say that we were um simply

2377

01:26:49,830 --> 01:26:47,600

accounting for the fact that there could

2378

01:26:51,590 --> 01:26:49,840

possibly be one or two

2379

01:26:53,110 --> 01:26:51,600

data points that had that it leaked

2380

01:26:56,709 --> 01:26:53,120

through but we were quite confident that

2381

01:27:01,350 --> 01:26:59,830

um how how are you all liaisoning with

2382

01:27:03,189 --> 01:27:01,360

um

2383

01:27:05,350 --> 01:27:03,199

space command

2384

01:27:07,510 --> 01:27:05,360

specifically how are you

2385

01:27:09,110 --> 01:27:07,520

partnering with the parts

2386

01:27:11,110 --> 01:27:09,120

of the u.s based

2387

01:27:12,149 --> 01:27:11,120

command responsible for space domain

2388

01:27:14,229 --> 01:27:12,159

awareness

2389

01:27:16,470 --> 01:27:14,239

and how if at all are you

2390

01:27:19,830 --> 01:27:16,480

partnering with the space force to

2391

01:27:23,350 --> 01:27:19,840

analyze uaps

2392

01:27:25,590 --> 01:27:23,360

the uap task force uh has um uh

2393

01:27:26,629 --> 01:27:25,600

has a very good relationship with space

2394

01:27:29,110 --> 01:27:26,639

force as it does with the rest of the

2395

01:27:31,189 --> 01:27:29,120

department of defense uh we have uh

2396

01:27:32,709 --> 01:27:31,199

pulled analysts in from space force to

2397

01:27:34,470 --> 01:27:32,719

ensure that uh

2398

01:27:37,350 --> 01:27:34,480

that we're availing ourselves of that

2399

01:27:39,830 --> 01:27:37,360

expertise as well as

2400

01:27:41,669 --> 01:27:39,840

any um any other material they may have

2401

01:27:43,750 --> 01:27:41,679

that would be helpful and the

2402

01:27:45,990 --> 01:27:43,760

congressman as you know

2403

01:27:47,750 --> 01:27:46,000

space force and space command they have

2404

01:27:49,350 --> 01:27:47,760

responsibility for space domain

2405

01:27:51,669 --> 01:27:49,360

awareness so what we've done we

2406

01:27:54,550 --> 01:27:51,679

coordinated with uh with space force we

2407

01:27:56,550 --> 01:27:54,560

coordinated with your j2 and

2408

01:27:57,910 --> 01:27:56,560

she is on board in terms of helping us

2409

01:28:00,229 --> 01:27:57,920

plug into

2410

01:28:02,229 --> 01:28:00,239

what they have and for us to have this

2411

01:28:03,750 --> 01:28:02,239

interactive exchange of information and

2412

01:28:05,430 --> 01:28:03,760

data and we're doing that with all the

2413

01:28:07,350 --> 01:28:05,440

services not just with space force or

2414

01:28:09,110 --> 01:28:07,360

space committee

2415

01:28:10,470 --> 01:28:09,120

thank you sir thank you member any

2416

01:28:12,790 --> 01:28:10,480

additional questions all right

2417

01:28:14,550 --> 01:28:12,800

chairmanship

2418

01:28:16,310 --> 01:28:14,560

all right uh with that i want to thank

2419

01:28:18,229 --> 01:28:16,320

you all for for taking the time out i

2420

01:28:19,910 --> 01:28:18,239

also want to thank my colleagues on both

2421

01:28:22,390 --> 01:28:19,920

sides of the aisle for

2422

01:28:25,910 --> 01:28:22,400

participating in this very

2423

01:28:27,830 --> 01:28:25,920

historical and important uh hearing i

2424

01:28:29,110 --> 01:28:27,840

think it's one of the few times we can

2425

01:28:32,310 --> 01:28:29,120

demonstrate some degree of

2426  
01:28:34,390 --> 01:28:32,320  
bipartisanship around uaps and ufos so i

2427  
01:28:36,390 --> 01:28:34,400  
love it i appreciate it thank you and we

2428  
01:28:38,149 --> 01:28:36,400  
will see you all we will recess this

2429  
01:28:47,270 --> 01:28:38,159  
hearing for the moment and return in a

2430  
01:28:52,870 --> 01:28:49,990  
oh my gosh so wilson documents are in

2431  
01:28:56,229 --> 01:28:52,880  
the record hey wow right right right

2432  
01:28:57,669 --> 01:28:56,239  
and maelstrom and moleskine yeah i

2433  
01:28:59,350 --> 01:28:57,679  
appreciated his staff when he did that

2434  
01:29:00,790 --> 01:28:59,360  
he's like well they're in the record so

2435  
01:29:02,470 --> 01:29:00,800  
like

2436  
01:29:04,550 --> 01:29:02,480  
i think that the people questioning did

2437  
01:29:06,470 --> 01:29:04,560  
well i think that yep

2438  
01:29:08,830 --> 01:29:06,480

you know um i wasn't expecting that some

2439

01:29:14,790 --> 01:29:12,870

questions pressure started building

2440

01:29:16,310 --> 01:29:14,800

can i just say katie

2441

01:29:17,990 --> 01:29:16,320

broke the ice right and then they got

2442

01:29:19,189 --> 01:29:18,000

braver or

2443

01:29:21,110 --> 01:29:19,199

yeah i think that's exactly what

2444

01:29:22,470 --> 01:29:21,120

happened yeah i just wanted to say katie

2445

01:29:25,430 --> 01:29:22,480

it's nice to actually finally meet you

2446

01:29:26,950 --> 01:29:25,440

by the way yeah hello

2447

01:29:28,070 --> 01:29:26,960

i feel like i met you but i probably

2448

01:29:29,830 --> 01:29:28,080

because i've just been messaging you

2449

01:29:32,870 --> 01:29:29,840

like a crazy person i was like i feel

2450

01:29:38,229 --> 01:29:35,110

yeah it's interesting i think the the

2451  
01:29:40,870 --> 01:29:38,239  
main takeaway for me is that they could

2452  
01:29:42,709 --> 01:29:40,880  
only answer so much because they could

2453  
01:29:44,950 --> 01:29:42,719  
only answer what was in

2454  
01:29:47,030 --> 01:29:44,960  
within the uap task force

2455  
01:29:49,270 --> 01:29:47,040  
and i think there's a lot that's uh

2456  
01:29:50,390 --> 01:29:49,280  
outside of the uap task force so to

2457  
01:29:51,430 --> 01:29:50,400  
speak

2458  
01:29:53,750 --> 01:29:51,440  
um

2459  
01:29:55,270 --> 01:29:53,760  
and that's unfortunate and

2460  
01:29:56,870 --> 01:29:55,280  
um

2461  
01:29:57,990 --> 01:29:56,880  
i think they could have asked a couple

2462  
01:30:01,030 --> 01:29:58,000  
better

2463  
01:30:03,189 --> 01:30:01,040

questions possibly too but you only have

2464

01:30:04,790 --> 01:30:03,199

so much time it seems like it also

2465

01:30:05,990 --> 01:30:04,800

seemed like they were trying to give the

2466

01:30:08,070 --> 01:30:06,000

impression that they were on top of the

2467

01:30:10,229 --> 01:30:08,080

situation they did it wasn't like we

2468

01:30:12,310 --> 01:30:10,239

don't have a clue what's going on that

2469

01:30:14,149 --> 01:30:12,320

they showed that video deliberately the

2470

01:30:16,310 --> 01:30:14,159

one with the bokeh to show that there

2471

01:30:19,669 --> 01:30:16,320

was something they could explain

2472

01:30:21,750 --> 01:30:19,679

um and also then they show that which is

2473

01:30:24,149 --> 01:30:21,760

that the the batman balloon one that's

2474

01:30:26,390 --> 01:30:24,159

the still from that that video they just

2475

01:30:28,229 --> 01:30:26,400

showed right now so the batman balloon i

2476

01:30:30,229 --> 01:30:28,239

don't know yeah because it's definitely

2477

01:30:32,070 --> 01:30:30,239

that looks different but then again it's

2478

01:30:34,390 --> 01:30:32,080

a it's a it's a screen grab isn't it

2479

01:30:35,350 --> 01:30:34,400

certainly yeah it's a lower quality so

2480

01:30:37,350 --> 01:30:35,360

but

2481

01:30:38,870 --> 01:30:37,360

they didn't show the gimbal video

2482

01:30:40,310 --> 01:30:38,880

which i think that's quite telling

2483

01:30:43,110 --> 01:30:40,320

because that's the one that would have

2484

01:30:45,189 --> 01:30:43,120

got that one look we can't necessarily

2485

01:30:46,950 --> 01:30:45,199

directly explain what that is or if they

2486

01:30:49,750 --> 01:30:46,960

can that must be in the classified

2487

01:30:52,390 --> 01:30:49,760

briefing so well did

2488

01:30:53,830 --> 01:30:52,400

mention about uh equipment and gimbling

2489

01:30:55,990 --> 01:30:53,840

and and i thought that he was maybe

2490

01:30:57,430 --> 01:30:56,000

nudging at that yeah

2491

01:30:58,149 --> 01:30:57,440

me too

2492

01:31:00,629 --> 01:30:58,159

but

2493

01:31:02,709 --> 01:31:00,639

it just seems though bray and moultrie

2494

01:31:04,390 --> 01:31:02,719

were it was okay it wasn't necessarily a

2495

01:31:06,790 --> 01:31:04,400

case of look there's nothing to see here

2496

01:31:08,550 --> 01:31:06,800

but it was getting to that point where

2497

01:31:10,149 --> 01:31:08,560

and it's almost the rob

2498

01:31:11,669 --> 01:31:10,159

katie you mentioned the robinson panel

2499

01:31:14,070 --> 01:31:11,679

in the in the quote in the in the

2500

01:31:15,590 --> 01:31:14,080

comments in 1953 when the robertson

2501  
01:31:17,430 --> 01:31:15,600  
panel made the recommendations they

2502  
01:31:19,669 --> 01:31:17,440  
effectively said look it's just a

2503  
01:31:21,350 --> 01:31:19,679  
question of resources it's a question of

2504  
01:31:23,910 --> 01:31:21,360  
we haven't gotten information enough

2505  
01:31:25,350 --> 01:31:23,920  
information when we do we'll tell you

2506  
01:31:26,870 --> 01:31:25,360  
what these are and they'll be something

2507  
01:31:29,350 --> 01:31:26,880  
mundane

2508  
01:31:32,149 --> 01:31:29,360  
and that's what that it looked like what

2509  
01:31:33,990 --> 01:31:32,159  
they were getting at this session was we

2510  
01:31:35,830 --> 01:31:34,000  
just don't have the resources these

2511  
01:31:38,470 --> 01:31:35,840  
things in the catch-all of the bin

2512  
01:31:40,870 --> 01:31:38,480  
will be able to explain them away

2513  
01:31:42,070 --> 01:31:40,880

after they get enough thrown at it to

2514

01:31:44,790 --> 01:31:42,080

jump off

2515

01:31:47,350 --> 01:31:44,800

the robertson panel aspect is the

2516

01:31:49,669 --> 01:31:47,360

education campaign which they were also

2517

01:31:51,990 --> 01:31:49,679

pretty much hinting at you know to get

2518

01:31:53,990 --> 01:31:52,000

or we'll get only

2519

01:31:57,030 --> 01:31:54,000

you know particular information so that

2520

01:31:58,470 --> 01:31:57,040

we can put it back out into the public

2521

01:32:00,629 --> 01:31:58,480

well what does that sound like that's

2522

01:32:03,510 --> 01:32:00,639

exactly what the robertson panel did it

2523

01:32:06,070 --> 01:32:03,520

was their education was to take hard

2524

01:32:08,629 --> 01:32:06,080

cases and explain them publicly as

2525

01:32:10,070 --> 01:32:08,639

prosaic yeah bray i don't know if it was

2526  
01:32:11,430 --> 01:32:10,080  
braille moultrie but one of them early

2527  
01:32:13,510 --> 01:32:11,440  
on mentioned

2528  
01:32:16,870 --> 01:32:13,520  
scientific analysis well

2529  
01:32:19,990 --> 01:32:16,880  
as it sits aimsog i hate the name

2530  
01:32:22,149 --> 01:32:20,000  
as it sits now under usdi they can't

2531  
01:32:24,629 --> 01:32:22,159  
outsource they can't contract out to

2532  
01:32:26,629 --> 01:32:24,639  
scientific organizations to get it

2533  
01:32:29,110 --> 01:32:26,639  
studied so have they got some internal

2534  
01:32:30,550 --> 01:32:29,120  
way of studying it scientifically

2535  
01:32:32,629 --> 01:32:30,560  
it just seems like it's not going to

2536  
01:32:33,750 --> 01:32:32,639  
meet the needs of congress and it showed

2537  
01:32:36,390 --> 01:32:33,760  
there that they're not fully

2538  
01:32:39,669 --> 01:32:36,400

implementing the law yet um as required

2539

01:32:42,870 --> 01:32:39,679

through ndaa 2022. it's not in place yet

2540

01:32:44,870 --> 01:32:42,880

it should be it's just like it's just

2541

01:32:46,390 --> 01:32:44,880

that shocked me as well that they kept

2542

01:32:48,229 --> 01:32:46,400

saying you know this is coming this is

2543

01:32:50,629 --> 01:32:48,239

coming this is coming how long have you

2544

01:32:52,550 --> 01:32:50,639

had guys and let's just

2545

01:32:54,950 --> 01:32:52,560

say we're not talking about when the ua

2546

01:32:56,709 --> 01:32:54,960

ptf was announced they said that they

2547

01:33:00,149 --> 01:32:56,719

knew about atip what's up steven

2548

01:33:03,510 --> 01:33:00,950

so

2549

01:33:05,270 --> 01:33:03,520

boom then that that previous effort

2550

01:33:07,110 --> 01:33:05,280

should be feeding into these efforts

2551  
01:33:07,990 --> 01:33:07,120  
they also kept calling at uaptf so maybe

2552  
01:33:10,950 --> 01:33:08,000  
they're just going to change the name

2553  
01:33:12,709 --> 01:33:10,960  
for that from it yeah i prefer it

2554  
01:33:14,229 --> 01:33:12,719  
results they can't be using that

2555  
01:33:15,510 --> 01:33:14,239  
it was also interesting that they only

2556  
01:33:17,750 --> 01:33:15,520  
they said that this is the third

2557  
01:33:19,990 --> 01:33:17,760  
iteration program so i think that clears

2558  
01:33:22,870 --> 01:33:20,000  
up some of the awesome

2559  
01:33:24,070 --> 01:33:22,880  
uh drama there um or at least how they

2560  
01:33:25,510 --> 01:33:24,080  
consider it

2561  
01:33:27,030 --> 01:33:25,520  
um but yeah i thought it was really

2562  
01:33:29,990 --> 01:33:27,040  
interesting um you know we've always

2563  
01:33:32,070 --> 01:33:30,000

wondered why the uapf

2564

01:33:34,310 --> 01:33:32,080

only looked at cases from a certain year

2565

01:33:36,629 --> 01:33:34,320

forward and i think it was pretty clear

2566

01:33:38,629 --> 01:33:36,639

that they want to only look at cases

2567

01:33:40,229 --> 01:33:38,639

they wanted to look at

2568

01:33:42,390 --> 01:33:40,239

sure it's a bit of that but also it's a

2569

01:33:44,790 --> 01:33:42,400

little bit of um how much data they can

2570

01:33:46,629 --> 01:33:44,800

get out of the cases as well because

2571

01:33:47,830 --> 01:33:46,639

this stuff much you know much further

2572

01:33:49,669 --> 01:33:47,840

back

2573

01:33:51,830 --> 01:33:49,679

it's just testimony they haven't really

2574

01:33:54,229 --> 01:33:51,840

got the extra bits you know extra

2575

01:33:56,390 --> 01:33:54,239

dimensions such as flear and and other

2576

01:33:57,830 --> 01:33:56,400

things to actually go on so i think

2577

01:34:00,709 --> 01:33:57,840

there's another reason but yeah you're

2578

01:34:03,750 --> 01:34:00,719

right you know they're cherry-picking in

2579

01:34:05,910 --> 01:34:03,760

regards the maelstrom case uh

2580

01:34:08,470 --> 01:34:05,920

they they threw complete shade at that

2581

01:34:10,229 --> 01:34:08,480

and used that as an example to say if we

2582

01:34:11,830 --> 01:34:10,239

you know followed up on everything that

2583

01:34:13,669 --> 01:34:11,840

reached the media or whatever it

2584

01:34:15,590 --> 01:34:13,679

wouldn't be possible

2585

01:34:19,270 --> 01:34:15,600

like without documentation it's like

2586

01:34:21,030 --> 01:34:19,280

there are so many documents right

2587

01:34:24,229 --> 01:34:21,040

absolutely friend

2588

01:34:25,350 --> 01:34:24,239

you sean could currently do a better job

2589

01:34:26,870 --> 01:34:25,360

that's what somebody said in the chat

2590

01:34:27,669 --> 01:34:26,880

and i'm not like you know i'm throwing

2591

01:34:29,350 --> 01:34:27,679

to them as well but i'm

2592

01:34:30,870 --> 01:34:29,360

complimenting you like this is what

2593

01:34:32,149 --> 01:34:30,880

needs to be done like why aren't they

2594

01:34:33,910 --> 01:34:32,159

digging for those documents it's more

2595

01:34:35,430 --> 01:34:33,920

the internal documents isn't it they do

2596

01:34:37,270 --> 01:34:35,440

have the information it's just why

2597

01:34:38,870 --> 01:34:37,280

they're looking at it um you know that

2598

01:34:40,470 --> 01:34:38,880

that's the question they should have

2599

01:34:42,550 --> 01:34:40,480

been better briefed because if you're

2600

01:34:44,390 --> 01:34:42,560

going to look at the the phenomenon they

2601  
01:34:45,830 --> 01:34:44,400  
know it goes back i mean they say the

2602  
01:34:48,390 --> 01:34:45,840  
blue book start in the 60s actually it

2603  
01:34:50,310 --> 01:34:48,400  
started in 1952 so it's not as if they

2604  
01:34:51,350 --> 01:34:50,320  
had the dates right either and there was

2605  
01:34:53,350 --> 01:34:51,360  
two

2606  
01:34:55,590 --> 01:34:53,360  
iterations of it beforehand sign and

2607  
01:34:58,709 --> 01:34:55,600  
grudge which again they get forgotten

2608  
01:35:00,550 --> 01:34:58,719  
about so it's not as if you know

2609  
01:35:02,229 --> 01:35:00,560  
we haven't looked at it for ages

2610  
01:35:03,990 --> 01:35:02,239  
officially and yet there's all the

2611  
01:35:05,830 --> 01:35:04,000  
documentation like that why aren't they

2612  
01:35:07,830 --> 01:35:05,840  
looking at that even just superficially

2613  
01:35:09,270 --> 01:35:07,840

to see what has been done before and

2614

01:35:11,030 --> 01:35:09,280

then maybe learn from the mistakes of

2615

01:35:12,950 --> 01:35:11,040

that they would then find out about

2616

01:35:15,270 --> 01:35:12,960

things like maelstrom and other cases

2617

01:35:17,590 --> 01:35:15,280

which are documented within the official

2618

01:35:20,709 --> 01:35:17,600

records it's not just like some somebody

2619

01:35:22,149 --> 01:35:20,719

like nycap or apro doing it or us it's

2620

01:35:24,070 --> 01:35:22,159

actually thing that the us air force

2621

01:35:26,390 --> 01:35:24,080

were doing themselves why is that

2622

01:35:28,390 --> 01:35:26,400

happening and you'll you'll find

2623

01:35:30,310 --> 01:35:28,400

documents that i've posted somewhat

2624

01:35:31,750 --> 01:35:30,320

recently that state that some of the

2625

01:35:34,390 --> 01:35:31,760

things they see

2626  
01:35:36,790 --> 01:35:34,400  
move against prevailing winds just to

2627  
01:35:38,470 --> 01:35:36,800  
like is described in in some of these

2628  
01:35:40,070 --> 01:35:38,480  
reports even the one

2629  
01:35:41,669 --> 01:35:40,080  
you know the one dude it's moving

2630  
01:35:44,629 --> 01:35:41,679  
against the wind like that's a

2631  
01:35:47,270 --> 01:35:44,639  
similarity that could be useful here no

2632  
01:35:49,430 --> 01:35:47,280  
no visible that means propulsion you see

2633  
01:35:51,510 --> 01:35:49,440  
that so many times in the reports from

2634  
01:35:53,910 --> 01:35:51,520  
the 50s and you'll see it again if you

2635  
01:35:55,669 --> 01:35:53,920  
look up you know 60 70s 80s 90s you'll

2636  
01:35:57,030 --> 01:35:55,679  
see it again no doubt but that's not

2637  
01:35:57,830 --> 01:35:57,040  
they haven't done their homework it's

2638  
01:35:59,750 --> 01:35:57,840

like

2639

01:36:00,950 --> 01:35:59,760

we've all read so much about this and

2640

01:36:02,149 --> 01:36:00,960

they're going to be in charge of this

2641

01:36:03,590 --> 01:36:02,159

yet they haven't just they haven't

2642

01:36:05,030 --> 01:36:03,600

studied the history

2643

01:36:07,109 --> 01:36:05,040

they're only studying what they have in

2644

01:36:09,350 --> 01:36:07,119

their own little pile or whatever you

2645

01:36:11,350 --> 01:36:09,360

know yeah but is that true i mean you

2646

01:36:13,350 --> 01:36:11,360

know that we're talking about we're

2647

01:36:15,270 --> 01:36:13,360

talking about an office that that has

2648

01:36:17,510 --> 01:36:15,280

been under the umbrella of counter

2649

01:36:19,830 --> 01:36:17,520

intelligence right and we're talking to

2650

01:36:21,270 --> 01:36:19,840

the counter intelligence subcommittee so

2651  
01:36:22,310 --> 01:36:21,280  
how much transparency are we going to

2652  
01:36:23,669 --> 01:36:22,320  
get here

2653  
01:36:25,109 --> 01:36:23,679  
how much deflection are we going to get

2654  
01:36:27,030 --> 01:36:25,119  
and how much you're going to accept i

2655  
01:36:29,590 --> 01:36:27,040  
mean so much of the chat has been was

2656  
01:36:31,669 --> 01:36:29,600  
like when bray lies we can tell and when

2657  
01:36:33,030 --> 01:36:31,679  
moultrie does it it sounds reasonable

2658  
01:36:34,790 --> 01:36:33,040  
yeah but they're both deflecting the

2659  
01:36:37,109 --> 01:36:34,800  
whole entire time graham was just

2660  
01:36:39,270 --> 01:36:37,119  
talking about you know like you know we

2661  
01:36:41,350 --> 01:36:39,280  
we saw one video in there and it's from

2662  
01:36:42,709 --> 01:36:41,360  
like a smartphone you know they're

2663  
01:36:44,629 --> 01:36:42,719

talking about all these different

2664

01:36:46,870 --> 01:36:44,639

detection devices and we get a cell

2665

01:36:49,590 --> 01:36:46,880

phone video from like a samsung galaxy

2666

01:36:51,910 --> 01:36:49,600

or some that's not even

2667

01:36:54,709 --> 01:36:51,920

like it's ridiculous i mean it's

2668

01:36:55,590 --> 01:36:54,719

obviously calculated to to

2669

01:36:56,950 --> 01:36:55,600

to

2670

01:36:58,629 --> 01:36:56,960

diminish this

2671

01:36:59,830 --> 01:36:58,639

and not only that but we're talking

2672

01:37:01,430 --> 01:36:59,840

about itself

2673

01:37:04,310 --> 01:37:01,440

yeah i kept thinking that too sean i'm

2674

01:37:06,149 --> 01:37:04,320

like what about the tic-tac-toe

2675

01:37:08,470 --> 01:37:06,159

when we're talking about you know the

2676

01:37:11,750 --> 01:37:08,480

maelstrom case graham like

2677

01:37:14,629 --> 01:37:11,760

that was used it it immediately pivoted

2678

01:37:16,310 --> 01:37:14,639

from oh you know if we if we followed up

2679

01:37:18,310 --> 01:37:16,320

on everything that was commented on the

2680

01:37:20,310 --> 01:37:18,320

press it's like right well and then that

2681

01:37:21,750 --> 01:37:20,320

went to some weird pivot where it seemed

2682

01:37:24,310 --> 01:37:21,760

like there was some kind of like

2683

01:37:26,629 --> 01:37:24,320

softball threat that people that

2684

01:37:28,629 --> 01:37:26,639

civilian reporting would somehow would

2685

01:37:31,750 --> 01:37:28,639

somehow be punished super strange i was

2686

01:37:37,510 --> 01:37:34,629

to shutting down nukes so we can't talk

2687

01:37:41,590 --> 01:37:37,520

about that well i would say every time

2688

01:37:44,070 --> 01:37:41,600

uap go over nuclear facilities it is

2689

01:37:46,830 --> 01:37:44,080

just going to flood their airwaves and

2690

01:37:47,430 --> 01:37:46,840

they don't want to talk about it too

2691

01:37:49,510 --> 01:37:47,440

data enough resources they don't have

2692

01:37:53,750 --> 01:37:51,109

enough time i'm being sarcastic if you

2693

01:37:56,990 --> 01:37:53,760

can't tell you know

2694

01:38:00,709 --> 01:37:57,000

like nuclear entering you know

2695

01:38:02,310 --> 01:38:00,719

intrusions would be of interest um

2696

01:38:04,390 --> 01:38:02,320

to our defense officials but i mean

2697

01:38:05,910 --> 01:38:04,400

let's be real they know about muslim

2698

01:38:07,270 --> 01:38:05,920

right they know about all of these they

2699

01:38:09,270 --> 01:38:07,280

just don't want to talk about it on the

2700

01:38:10,629 --> 01:38:09,280

stand i mean i i don't think anyone

2701

01:38:13,750 --> 01:38:10,639

believes that they have not been

2702

01:38:16,070 --> 01:38:13,760

properly briefed or educated um or if

2703

01:38:18,629 --> 01:38:16,080

they haven't they have been specifically

2704

01:38:21,109 --> 01:38:18,639

told not to look into these cases

2705

01:38:23,350 --> 01:38:21,119

because then they can be asked and would

2706

01:38:25,030 --> 01:38:23,360

have to perjure themselves that's what i

2707

01:38:26,629 --> 01:38:25,040

was about to say did they say anything

2708

01:38:28,629 --> 01:38:26,639

that was illegal in terms of being in

2709

01:38:30,629 --> 01:38:28,639

front of congress when they said they

2710

01:38:32,550 --> 01:38:30,639

were just when they said well i can't

2711

01:38:34,149 --> 01:38:32,560

remember the exact wording what was it

2712

01:38:35,910 --> 01:38:34,159

i'm not aware of it

2713

01:38:37,270 --> 01:38:35,920

is that enough from to get them off the

2714

01:38:39,430 --> 01:38:37,280

hook in terms of

2715

01:38:41,270 --> 01:38:39,440

right it is okay right

2716

01:38:42,709 --> 01:38:41,280

well and i would say a couple things so

2717

01:38:44,390 --> 01:38:42,719

one i was very impressed with the

2718

01:38:45,990 --> 01:38:44,400

knowledge of the representatives and the

2719

01:38:47,910 --> 01:38:46,000

kinds of questions that they asked they

2720

01:38:51,270 --> 01:38:47,920

clearly have done some homework not

2721

01:38:52,950 --> 01:38:51,280

necessarily all of them but they have

2722

01:38:55,270 --> 01:38:52,960

some knowledge of the history of this

2723

01:38:57,189 --> 01:38:55,280

topic and to me that there were a couple

2724

01:38:58,550 --> 01:38:57,199

of instances at least that i think where

2725

01:39:00,790 --> 01:38:58,560

they're entering into the record

2726

01:39:02,070 --> 01:39:00,800

specifically wilson davis but that's the

2727

01:39:03,910 --> 01:39:02,080

one that stands out the most but they're

2728

01:39:06,070 --> 01:39:03,920

entering into the record

2729

01:39:08,790 --> 01:39:06,080

these these moments where

2730

01:39:10,950 --> 01:39:08,800

they can later go back and say you said

2731

01:39:12,550 --> 01:39:10,960

you didn't know this

2732

01:39:15,189 --> 01:39:12,560

we asked you and you said you didn't

2733

01:39:17,510 --> 01:39:15,199

know this and you now you're telling us

2734

01:39:18,709 --> 01:39:17,520

that you did know this so i i think that

2735

01:39:20,470 --> 01:39:18,719

they're painting

2736

01:39:22,229 --> 01:39:20,480

some of these folks into a corner and

2737

01:39:24,149 --> 01:39:22,239

eventual corner that they really won't

2738

01:39:25,990 --> 01:39:24,159

be able to get out of that that you know

2739

01:39:28,470 --> 01:39:26,000

they can only squirm a little bit so

2740

01:39:30,390 --> 01:39:28,480

much by using you know officially we

2741

01:39:33,189 --> 01:39:30,400

didn't know this or not to my knowledge

2742

01:39:35,350 --> 01:39:33,199

or no contract whatever was like no

2743

01:39:36,149 --> 01:39:35,360

contractual uh

2744

01:39:37,830 --> 01:39:36,159

you know

2745

01:39:39,510 --> 01:39:37,840

i forget that i think it was moultrie

2746

01:39:40,950 --> 01:39:39,520

who's using that that phrase

2747

01:39:43,830 --> 01:39:40,960

so they are

2748

01:39:46,470 --> 01:39:43,840

uh you know positioning themselves in a

2749

01:39:49,109 --> 01:39:46,480

way the representatives are to again

2750

01:39:51,910 --> 01:39:49,119

kind of set this topic up so that there

2751

01:39:54,709 --> 01:39:51,920

will be follow-on conversations that

2752

01:39:56,470 --> 01:39:54,719

make it harder and harder for the those

2753

01:39:59,270 --> 01:39:56,480

who are officially representing the

2754

01:40:01,270 --> 01:39:59,280

subject to kind of get out of it

2755

01:40:03,189 --> 01:40:01,280

i also think that this from just

2756

01:40:04,790 --> 01:40:03,199

stepping back into taking taking a look

2757

01:40:06,790 --> 01:40:04,800

at this from what we thought was going

2758

01:40:08,709 --> 01:40:06,800

to be happening yesterday

2759

01:40:10,950 --> 01:40:08,719

i was very encouraged by some of the

2760

01:40:12,709 --> 01:40:10,960

questions um you know and we had we had

2761

01:40:14,950 --> 01:40:12,719

a couple shockers too i think that we

2762

01:40:16,550 --> 01:40:14,960

weren't expecting so to me and just as

2763

01:40:19,990 --> 01:40:16,560

far as entering this into the public

2764

01:40:21,750 --> 01:40:20,000

conversation this is a very strong start

2765

01:40:23,350 --> 01:40:21,760

from my perspective yeah it's been

2766

01:40:25,590 --> 01:40:23,360

mentioned a lot recently about excessive

2767

01:40:27,270 --> 01:40:25,600

secrecy as well and that almost came out

2768

01:40:28,709 --> 01:40:27,280

there that there is excessive secrecy

2769

01:40:29,990 --> 01:40:28,719

they were talking about sources and

2770

01:40:32,229 --> 01:40:30,000

methods and why they can't tell us

2771

01:40:34,790 --> 01:40:32,239

certain things well what about shapes

2772

01:40:36,790 --> 01:40:34,800

you redacted the shapes from the report

2773

01:40:39,590 --> 01:40:36,800

there's no sources and methods there

2774

01:40:41,189 --> 01:40:39,600

it's simply shapes it doesn't tell us

2775

01:40:42,870 --> 01:40:41,199

anything about recording or sensor

2776

01:40:45,030 --> 01:40:42,880

equipment except

2777

01:40:47,830 --> 01:40:45,040

the only possibility with that would be

2778

01:40:50,070 --> 01:40:47,840

is if it was a recognizable object say a

2779

01:40:52,790 --> 01:40:50,080

russian or a chinese origin and they

2780

01:40:55,270 --> 01:40:52,800

didn't want the other side as it were to

2781

01:40:56,790 --> 01:40:55,280

know that they know what they are

2782

01:40:58,790 --> 01:40:56,800

that would be the only

2783

01:41:00,709 --> 01:40:58,800

method i would have think the reason why

2784

01:41:02,470 --> 01:41:00,719

i think they might want that secret

2785

01:41:04,470 --> 01:41:02,480

however the rest of it yeah you're right

2786

01:41:05,830 --> 01:41:04,480

um i can't see that that that speaks

2787

01:41:06,950 --> 01:41:05,840

towards what they were saying at the end

2788

01:41:09,590 --> 01:41:06,960

but they were saying that there's kind

2789

01:41:11,590 --> 01:41:09,600

of two competing goals here the one is

2790

01:41:13,350 --> 01:41:11,600

you know the wow what could this be even

2791

01:41:14,870 --> 01:41:13,360

if one of these things are what we think

2792

01:41:17,430 --> 01:41:14,880

they could be this is a paradigm shift

2793

01:41:19,750 --> 01:41:17,440

for everybody versus national security

2794

01:41:21,510 --> 01:41:19,760

and it's almost a reason for it not

2795

01:41:23,590 --> 01:41:21,520

being conducted by the people we just

2796

01:41:25,030 --> 01:41:23,600

saw like they should have a hand in it

2797

01:41:27,109 --> 01:41:25,040

they should be able to say we can't talk

2798

01:41:28,229 --> 01:41:27,119

about these specific shapes here but

2799

01:41:29,750 --> 01:41:28,239

there should be a different office

2800

01:41:31,270 --> 01:41:29,760

handling and saying well i'm gonna you

2801  
01:41:32,870 --> 01:41:31,280  
know tell people there was a source of

2802  
01:41:34,470 --> 01:41:32,880  
shape or there was a triangle shape like

2803  
01:41:36,709 --> 01:41:34,480  
that's nonsense if you want me to keep

2804  
01:41:38,629 --> 01:41:36,719  
that from them um you know they're just

2805  
01:41:40,390 --> 01:41:38,639  
burning up ahead the the rf transmission

2806  
01:41:42,310 --> 01:41:40,400  
thing really tickled me as well when

2807  
01:41:43,830 --> 01:41:42,320  
they were talking about no no possible

2808  
01:41:45,590 --> 01:41:43,840  
way to tell if they were comms and then

2809  
01:41:47,270 --> 01:41:45,600  
they say that they were rf transmissions

2810  
01:41:49,270 --> 01:41:47,280  
detected there's a lot of that double

2811  
01:41:51,510 --> 01:41:49,280  
speak dan or exactly what the point that

2812  
01:41:53,189 --> 01:41:51,520  
you're making is like we're we're

2813  
01:41:54,709 --> 01:41:53,199

aware that we were collecting this yeah

2814

01:41:56,229 --> 01:41:54,719

we weren't communicating with them our

2815

01:41:57,750 --> 01:41:56,239

sensors are actually very good and we

2816

01:41:59,590 --> 01:41:57,760

have a lot of detail yeah actually we

2817

01:42:01,030 --> 01:41:59,600

don't have a lot of detail so you know

2818

01:42:02,390 --> 01:42:01,040

they really are trying to have it both

2819

01:42:03,510 --> 01:42:02,400

ways and i think that that's pretty

2820

01:42:05,189 --> 01:42:03,520

clear if those are paying close

2821

01:42:07,189 --> 01:42:05,199

attention

2822

01:42:09,510 --> 01:42:07,199

when we interviewed um lou

2823

01:42:12,470 --> 01:42:09,520

i i asked him about whether

2824

01:42:14,550 --> 01:42:12,480

sensor systems were being re-tasked um

2825

01:42:16,149 --> 01:42:14,560

and and you know informed by uap

2826

01:42:18,390 --> 01:42:16,159

encounters and he said he can talk about

2827

01:42:20,550 --> 01:42:18,400

it and that came up here and it's a yes

2828

01:42:22,950 --> 01:42:20,560

so uh maybe maybe ask him about it again

2829

01:42:24,310 --> 01:42:22,960

nathan yeah write that down um also

2830

01:42:26,149 --> 01:42:24,320

let's not forget they asked about the

2831

01:42:28,709 --> 01:42:26,159

underwater stuff yeah we'll have to talk

2832

01:42:30,310 --> 01:42:28,719

about that in the closed session okay um

2833

01:42:31,830 --> 01:42:30,320

yeah nathan you also mentioned about the

2834

01:42:33,830 --> 01:42:31,840

double speaker they also went asked

2835

01:42:36,149 --> 01:42:33,840

about uh crash retrievals in a

2836

01:42:38,629 --> 01:42:36,159

roundabout way asking about it without

2837

01:42:39,830 --> 01:42:38,639

not asking directly mentioned about was

2838

01:42:43,270 --> 01:42:39,840

it um

2839

01:42:45,750 --> 01:42:43,280

organic or non-organic material

2840

01:42:47,350 --> 01:42:45,760

not within the uap test for us that's

2841

01:42:50,790 --> 01:42:47,360

right yeah

2842

01:42:53,030 --> 01:42:50,800

that's huge about a wiggle room there

2843

01:42:54,870 --> 01:42:53,040

did anyone else get a sense that

2844

01:42:56,709 --> 01:42:54,880

they may be kind of making the argument

2845

01:42:58,149 --> 01:42:56,719

that it should be an sap

2846

01:43:00,390 --> 01:42:58,159

oh yeah big time they're obviously

2847

01:43:02,629 --> 01:43:00,400

trying to make it one yeah and this is

2848

01:43:04,629 --> 01:43:02,639

what osap wanted right and exactly

2849

01:43:06,709 --> 01:43:04,639

and i wonder like is it is it there has

2850

01:43:08,149 --> 01:43:06,719

to be a purpose you know is this is this

2851  
01:43:09,590 --> 01:43:08,159  
how we get to those pearly gates and

2852  
01:43:11,270 --> 01:43:09,600  
start knocking that door and going oi

2853  
01:43:12,709 --> 01:43:11,280  
give us your data

2854  
01:43:14,550 --> 01:43:12,719  
but the big thing as well was the data

2855  
01:43:16,629 --> 01:43:14,560  
sharing with uh other countries and

2856  
01:43:17,830 --> 01:43:16,639  
stuff now they said they were doing it

2857  
01:43:19,990 --> 01:43:17,840  
they were going to take it to the closed

2858  
01:43:21,430 --> 01:43:20,000  
hearings to discuss in detail

2859  
01:43:24,390 --> 01:43:21,440  
but if you look at this we've got open

2860  
01:43:26,390 --> 01:43:24,400  
hearings here in the us today the uk are

2861  
01:43:28,629 --> 01:43:26,400  
still saying nothing to see here that

2862  
01:43:29,910 --> 01:43:28,639  
doesn't add up if data is being shared

2863  
01:43:33,270 --> 01:43:29,920

and it's going to be five eyes it's

2864

01:43:35,430 --> 01:43:33,280

going to be australia new zealand

2865

01:43:38,310 --> 01:43:35,440

what they said about what the

2866

01:43:39,910 --> 01:43:38,320

data they share and is it reliable and

2867

01:43:42,310 --> 01:43:39,920

how reliable are the people they share

2868

01:43:45,590 --> 01:43:42,320

with so i think they're being cagey in

2869

01:43:47,830 --> 01:43:45,600

terms of what they send out and also

2870

01:43:49,350 --> 01:43:47,840

quite maybe not entirely trusting of

2871

01:43:50,390 --> 01:43:49,360

what they get back in

2872

01:43:52,229 --> 01:43:50,400

so

2873

01:43:54,629 --> 01:43:52,239

yes why they might you know say they're

2874

01:43:56,310 --> 01:43:54,639

sharing you just don't know how much the

2875

01:43:58,629 --> 01:43:56,320

share in there how often and who with

2876

01:44:01,109 --> 01:43:58,639

scale the lowest well maybe yeah this

2877

01:44:03,350 --> 01:44:01,119

low hanging fruit yes they might send

2878

01:44:05,990 --> 01:44:03,360

they might have shared the the the stuff

2879

01:44:07,750 --> 01:44:06,000

that jeremy corbell has said and the the

2880

01:44:10,070 --> 01:44:07,760

thing that was in on the presentation

2881

01:44:12,149 --> 01:44:10,080

there uh but just to say well look this

2882

01:44:14,149 --> 01:44:12,159

is what that's why saying we know it's

2883

01:44:15,669 --> 01:44:14,159

nothing this is really what it is so

2884

01:44:17,830 --> 01:44:15,679

that's not anything of defense

2885

01:44:20,070 --> 01:44:17,840

significance so in that respect it could

2886

01:44:21,350 --> 01:44:20,080

be right what the mod is saying but then

2887

01:44:22,870 --> 01:44:21,360

again we don't know what else has been

2888

01:44:25,510 --> 01:44:22,880

going on the last 50 years because don't

2889

01:44:27,109 --> 01:44:25,520

they have shared servers i don't know is

2890

01:44:28,790 --> 01:44:27,119

it jaywix servers that a lot of

2891

01:44:30,310 --> 01:44:28,800

different agencies and groups can access

2892

01:44:32,070 --> 01:44:30,320

where they find

2893

01:44:34,310 --> 01:44:32,080

classified information whether it be

2894

01:44:36,149 --> 01:44:34,320

videos and materials of that respect or

2895

01:44:37,669 --> 01:44:36,159

reports

2896

01:44:38,550 --> 01:44:37,679

i don't know if anybody knows that is

2897

01:44:42,229 --> 01:44:38,560

anyone

2898

01:44:44,790 --> 01:44:42,239

that you are correct websites

2899

01:44:46,790 --> 01:44:44,800

did they publicly debunk the pyramid

2900

01:44:48,870 --> 01:44:46,800

video by the way well that was weird

2901  
01:44:50,550 --> 01:44:48,880  
right the first video we don't know what

2902  
01:44:52,229 --> 01:44:50,560  
it is the second one which looks a lot

2903  
01:44:53,430 --> 01:44:52,239  
like it we do know what it is and it's

2904  
01:44:55,590 --> 01:44:53,440  
bokeh

2905  
01:44:57,430 --> 01:44:55,600  
that's kind of what that

2906  
01:44:59,189 --> 01:44:57,440  
how i took it but they didn't say book

2907  
01:45:00,629 --> 01:44:59,199  
they just said that that's like with

2908  
01:45:02,790 --> 01:45:00,639  
this camera

2909  
01:45:05,510 --> 01:45:02,800  
outside they said something like outside

2910  
01:45:06,790 --> 01:45:05,520  
experts or outside analysis right are

2911  
01:45:07,990 --> 01:45:06,800  
they just

2912  
01:45:09,910 --> 01:45:08,000  
when they're saying

2913  
01:45:12,550 --> 01:45:09,920

they're saying an slr camera it has an

2914

01:45:14,310 --> 01:45:12,560

aperture and that aperture creates that

2915

01:45:15,590 --> 01:45:14,320

you know that that triangular bokeh

2916

01:45:16,629 --> 01:45:15,600

effect that's that's the mick west

2917

01:45:18,390 --> 01:45:16,639

argument

2918

01:45:20,709 --> 01:45:18,400

it is but then we've got jeremy corbell

2919

01:45:23,590 --> 01:45:20,719

stating it's definitely not more will

2920

01:45:25,830 --> 01:45:23,600

come out like okay i guess we need that

2921

01:45:28,709 --> 01:45:25,840

now jared witness is saying it's their

2922

01:45:32,870 --> 01:45:28,719

pyramids yeah so

2923

01:45:34,629 --> 01:45:32,880

um but that that to me is a little

2924

01:45:37,350 --> 01:45:34,639

i don't know what's happening there i

2925

01:45:39,109 --> 01:45:37,360

think mick west will take those away

2926

01:45:40,950 --> 01:45:39,119

um there's a comment here and i just

2927

01:45:42,470 --> 01:45:40,960

want to address it because somebody says

2928

01:45:44,390 --> 01:45:42,480

so lou is lying then because he said

2929

01:45:45,669 --> 01:45:44,400

that we they do have wreckage it's

2930

01:45:48,390 --> 01:45:45,679

important to state that they kept saying

2931

01:45:49,910 --> 01:45:48,400

within the ua within their task force

2932

01:45:52,149 --> 01:45:49,920

there's other data from other

2933

01:45:54,149 --> 01:45:52,159

organizations so no um lou is not

2934

01:45:56,310 --> 01:45:54,159

necessarily lying they might be the ones

2935

01:45:59,350 --> 01:45:56,320

just compartmentalizing what they have

2936

01:46:01,189 --> 01:45:59,360

no i mean for for instance um like those

2937

01:46:03,669 --> 01:46:01,199

of you who know like the history of this

2938

01:46:05,270 --> 01:46:03,679

like um during blue book and all that

2939

01:46:07,669 --> 01:46:05,280

when you know

2940

01:46:10,390 --> 01:46:07,679

pieces of of whatever

2941

01:46:12,629 --> 01:46:10,400

ufo would crash or or they'd get a piece

2942

01:46:14,470 --> 01:46:12,639

of it or whatever for analysis that

2943

01:46:16,229 --> 01:46:14,480

would go to battelle

2944

01:46:17,990 --> 01:46:16,239

i mean and i've shown the documents over

2945

01:46:19,430 --> 01:46:18,000

and over again that would go to patella

2946

01:46:21,430 --> 01:46:19,440

who worked something called project

2947

01:46:23,990 --> 01:46:21,440

stork who would analyze it and check it

2948

01:46:26,390 --> 01:46:24,000

for radiation including soil samples and

2949

01:46:27,750 --> 01:46:26,400

all that stuff so but the patel

2950

01:46:30,310 --> 01:46:27,760

is uh

2951

01:46:32,229 --> 01:46:30,320

you know not the uap task force for

2952

01:46:34,550 --> 01:46:32,239

instance you know just answer a question

2953

01:46:36,870 --> 01:46:34,560

that um e.t persons just put on you said

2954

01:46:39,990 --> 01:46:36,880

am i suggesting that the the triangles

2955

01:46:42,229 --> 01:46:40,000

are bouquet as um you know as um

2956

01:46:43,510 --> 01:46:42,239

suggested no i'm not i don't know enough

2957

01:46:45,750 --> 01:46:43,520

about the case and i'm not a

2958

01:46:47,430 --> 01:46:45,760

photographic expert i've got no idea

2959

01:46:49,109 --> 01:46:47,440

what they are still and it still hasn't

2960

01:46:51,430 --> 01:46:49,119

been categorically proven one way or

2961

01:46:53,030 --> 01:46:51,440

another what they are but according to

2962

01:46:55,350 --> 01:46:53,040

what was said in the hearings they

2963

01:46:58,229 --> 01:46:55,360

certainly suggesting thus i think that's

2964

01:47:00,790 --> 01:46:59,510

you should be a politician i love the

2965

01:47:02,390 --> 01:47:00,800

way i mean

2966

01:47:03,430 --> 01:47:02,400

along those lines one thing that's

2967

01:47:05,590 --> 01:47:03,440

really important here is that you know

2968

01:47:07,590 --> 01:47:05,600

it's been 56 years is that right since

2969

01:47:10,629 --> 01:47:07,600

the last congressional hearing on ufos

2970

01:47:12,310 --> 01:47:10,639

and uips and you know we in that time as

2971

01:47:15,270 --> 01:47:12,320

was mentioned before you know we have

2972

01:47:17,590 --> 01:47:15,280

the cockpit videos we have we have more

2973

01:47:19,910 --> 01:47:17,600

hardcore data but what we've been shown

2974

01:47:21,990 --> 01:47:19,920

in this hearing or what was referenced

2975

01:47:24,470 --> 01:47:22,000

are like that like the bokeh like the

2976

01:47:25,510 --> 01:47:24,480

quote-unquote bokeh case right or that

2977

01:47:27,910 --> 01:47:25,520

or that

2978

01:47:29,430 --> 01:47:27,920

that smartphone video that lasted a half

2979

01:47:31,430 --> 01:47:29,440

a second that only showed us that these

2980

01:47:33,350 --> 01:47:31,440

pilots are able to opt that are able to

2981

01:47:36,470 --> 01:47:33,360

like text and fly at the same time or

2982

01:47:39,270 --> 01:47:36,480

whatever and then you know and then

2983

01:47:41,750 --> 01:47:39,280

and and and the wilson davis docks and

2984

01:47:43,270 --> 01:47:41,760

like you know i i i know that the wilson

2985

01:47:45,030 --> 01:47:43,280

davis stocks came from like

2986

01:47:46,950 --> 01:47:45,040

exceptionally good sources but you know

2987

01:47:49,750 --> 01:47:46,960

that is there's a lot of plausible

2988

01:47:52,390 --> 01:47:49,760

deniability that that are put into the

2989

01:47:55,189 --> 01:47:52,400

docks that they have in this particular

2990

01:47:57,270 --> 01:47:55,199

hearing and i have to wonder whether

2991

01:47:59,430 --> 01:47:57,280

some of that was intentional you know we

2992

01:48:01,350 --> 01:47:59,440

didn't see that we didn't see the gimbal

2993

01:48:03,430 --> 01:48:01,360

video we didn't see the video why

2994

01:48:05,590 --> 01:48:03,440

wouldn't you use the three videos that's

2995

01:48:07,430 --> 01:48:05,600

what i was starting in 2017 to begin

2996

01:48:09,189 --> 01:48:07,440

with unless there's some sort of crazy

2997

01:48:10,149 --> 01:48:09,199

sensor crap they don't want us to know

2998

01:48:12,229 --> 01:48:10,159

about that they're saying they didn't

2999

01:48:15,350 --> 01:48:12,239

have but they actually had um the tic

3000

01:48:17,590 --> 01:48:15,360

tac immediately is a bizarre case

3001  
01:48:20,070 --> 01:48:17,600  
to them and we have a video of that so

3002  
01:48:21,990 --> 01:48:20,080  
why aren't we discussing that more since

3003  
01:48:22,870 --> 01:48:22,000  
come on let's get real that's why we're

3004  
01:48:24,470 --> 01:48:22,880  
here

3005  
01:48:26,310 --> 01:48:24,480  
so they're also questioning about the

3006  
01:48:27,510 --> 01:48:26,320  
the videos themselves about you know the

3007  
01:48:29,350 --> 01:48:27,520  
you know really

3008  
01:48:30,629 --> 01:48:29,360  
wasn't that right towards the end there

3009  
01:48:32,390 --> 01:48:30,639  
was a question about have you got

3010  
01:48:34,070 --> 01:48:32,400  
procedures where you'll be able to stop

3011  
01:48:35,910 --> 01:48:34,080  
i think it was towards the the

3012  
01:48:37,830 --> 01:48:35,920  
questioning the line was step jeremy

3013  
01:48:39,510 --> 01:48:37,840

stop that happening again so they're

3014

01:48:42,070 --> 01:48:39,520

clearly conscious of the fact that

3015

01:48:44,229 --> 01:48:42,080

things are leaking out into the media uh

3016

01:48:45,669 --> 01:48:44,239

and to interest groups and they clearly

3017

01:48:47,270 --> 01:48:45,679

don't want that to happen before they've

3018

01:48:49,109 --> 01:48:47,280

had a chance to analyze it and get their

3019

01:48:50,629 --> 01:48:49,119

ducks in the row beforehand well they

3020

01:48:52,470 --> 01:48:50,639

mentioned that

3021

01:48:54,629 --> 01:48:52,480

these reports they're getting in now are

3022

01:48:56,550 --> 01:48:54,639

going into a database well what database

3023

01:48:57,990 --> 01:48:56,560

is this coming into the task force and

3024

01:48:59,830 --> 01:48:58,000

it's their database or is it a

3025

01:49:02,149 --> 01:48:59,840

multi-agency database where it all gets

3026

01:49:03,990 --> 01:49:02,159

put in separately and then gets analyzed

3027

01:49:05,990 --> 01:49:04,000

so many questions are now arising from

3028

01:49:07,910 --> 01:49:06,000

these briefings so i'll take away the

3029

01:49:09,669 --> 01:49:07,920

positives where we can then look

3030

01:49:10,950 --> 01:49:09,679

going forward i know a lot of people are

3031

01:49:11,990 --> 01:49:10,960

going to say it was a nothing burger it

3032

01:49:16,390 --> 01:49:12,000

was just

3033

01:49:19,990 --> 01:49:17,830

and then it gives you a new direction

3034

01:49:21,510 --> 01:49:20,000

going forward follow his instagram

3035

01:49:24,550 --> 01:49:21,520

because they're going to be up there

3036

01:49:26,149 --> 01:49:24,560

guaranteed what was katie about to say

3037

01:49:28,709 --> 01:49:26,159

what what katie were you about to say

3038

01:49:29,910 --> 01:49:28,719

something yeah thanks um so the one

3039

01:49:32,149 --> 01:49:29,920

thing that i

3040

01:49:34,229 --> 01:49:32,159

found really interesting was if you guys

3041

01:49:35,830 --> 01:49:34,239

were the brian bender's

3042

01:49:38,229 --> 01:49:35,840

political article

3043

01:49:41,189 --> 01:49:38,239

they mentioned that there were

3044

01:49:44,790 --> 01:49:41,199

oral conversations about other off-book

3045

01:49:47,510 --> 01:49:44,800

programs that preceded asap and you know

3046

01:49:49,990 --> 01:49:47,520

came after project blue book if that's

3047

01:49:52,390 --> 01:49:50,000

the case and those sources that brian

3048

01:49:54,629 --> 01:49:52,400

news were legitimate which i respect

3049

01:49:57,270 --> 01:49:54,639

brian as a journalist and i you know

3050

01:50:00,149 --> 01:49:57,280

would assume they are legitimate then

3051

01:50:02,550 --> 01:50:00,159

there's a possibility that they misled

3052

01:50:04,229 --> 01:50:02,560

on the stand um because they explicitly

3053

01:50:07,589 --> 01:50:04,239

said that they were unaware of any

3054

01:50:09,030 --> 01:50:07,599

interim programs so i think that's a

3055

01:50:10,950 --> 01:50:09,040

subtle thing but i think we should pay

3056

01:50:12,870 --> 01:50:10,960

attention to that because

3057

01:50:15,270 --> 01:50:12,880

um i'm sure brian will have something to

3058

01:50:18,149 --> 01:50:15,280

say about that uh in the coming year i

3059

01:50:20,550 --> 01:50:18,159

mean i mean you can say already like nsa

3060

01:50:24,470 --> 01:50:20,560

has gotten ufo reports after that you

3061

01:50:27,350 --> 01:50:24,480

know i have them like 360 some reports

3062

01:50:28,790 --> 01:50:27,360

that they say it's probably a balloon on

3063

01:50:31,910 --> 01:50:28,800

each and every one of them

3064

01:50:34,470 --> 01:50:31,920

but that was after project blue book and

3065

01:50:37,109 --> 01:50:34,480

a ufo was reported so

3066

01:50:39,669 --> 01:50:37,119

so you know that's not entirely accurate

3067

01:50:43,109 --> 01:50:39,679

but aware of programs specifically like

3068

01:50:44,310 --> 01:50:43,119

uaptf and the aim song you know so there

3069

01:50:46,870 --> 01:50:44,320

is a lot of

3070

01:50:49,750 --> 01:50:46,880

legalese and you can hide behind that

3071

01:50:51,030 --> 01:50:49,760

sort of definition the the video i know

3072

01:50:53,510 --> 01:50:51,040

where there's some talk there what was

3073

01:50:54,390 --> 01:50:53,520

it the acorn or but to me it was one of

3074

01:50:56,629 --> 01:50:54,400

those

3075

01:50:59,589 --> 01:50:56,639

mystery wire images right from george

3076

01:51:01,109 --> 01:50:59,599

knapp it seemed like a still from one of

3077

01:51:02,709 --> 01:51:01,119

the mystery wires were still from the

3078

01:51:03,830 --> 01:51:02,719

video that we saw today and also i

3079

01:51:10,870 --> 01:51:03,840

thought it was interesting that video

3080

01:51:15,189 --> 01:51:12,790

yeah the object they showed just looked

3081

01:51:17,030 --> 01:51:15,199

like a kind of a like a tick like a deer

3082

01:51:17,910 --> 01:51:17,040

tick it didn't look like the party

3083

01:51:32,550 --> 01:51:17,920

balloon

3084

01:51:37,750 --> 01:51:33,669

right one

3085

01:51:37,760 --> 01:51:40,149

there we go

3086

01:51:43,270 --> 01:51:42,070

that doesn't quite look like the blimp

3087

01:51:45,750 --> 01:51:43,280

or the a chord

3088

01:51:48,149 --> 01:51:45,760

or the other one that's obviously

3089

01:51:49,270 --> 01:51:48,159

somebody dropped a ping-pong ball out of

3090

01:51:51,189 --> 01:51:49,280

that plane

3091

01:51:53,109 --> 01:51:51,199

and they photographed it

3092

01:51:54,390 --> 01:51:53,119

but you kind of see it

3093

01:51:56,950 --> 01:51:54,400

you see a

3094

01:51:58,550 --> 01:51:56,960

yeah like a triangular shape around it

3095

01:51:59,990 --> 01:51:58,560

it's weird all of this

3096

01:52:01,830 --> 01:52:00,000

pieces down here

3097

01:52:03,830 --> 01:52:01,840

it looks like there's some fuzziness but

3098

01:52:04,200 --> 01:52:03,840

here we are relegated to this blurry

3099

01:52:07,589 --> 01:52:04,210

crap

3100

01:52:11,830 --> 01:52:07,599

[Laughter]

3101  
01:52:15,270 --> 01:52:13,510  
crazy about it and mick west is going to

3102  
01:52:16,790 --> 01:52:15,280  
say it's a seagull

3103  
01:52:18,709 --> 01:52:16,800  
oh obviously a single with its wings

3104  
01:52:21,270 --> 01:52:18,719  
tucked in right yep yeah it's just

3105  
01:52:22,629 --> 01:52:21,280  
diving so that means that's et right

3106  
01:52:26,310 --> 01:52:22,639  
oh absolutely it's clutter it's

3107  
01:52:30,390 --> 01:52:26,320  
definitely air clutter airborne clutter

3108  
01:52:32,229 --> 01:52:30,400  
they kind of deferred a little bit to um

3109  
01:52:34,310 --> 01:52:32,239  
nasa did you notice that when it comes

3110  
01:52:37,270 --> 01:52:34,320  
to intelligent life so

3111  
01:52:40,229 --> 01:52:37,280  
um that that could be you know reading

3112  
01:52:42,070 --> 01:52:40,239  
into it too much maybe i am but um they

3113  
01:52:44,470 --> 01:52:42,080

could be deferring to

3114

01:52:45,750 --> 01:52:44,480

the fact that if uh intelligent life was

3115

01:52:49,189 --> 01:52:45,760

discovered

3116

01:52:52,070 --> 01:52:49,199

um or they decided to disclose that

3117

01:52:53,910 --> 01:52:52,080

um it would be by way of nasa

3118

01:52:55,350 --> 01:52:53,920

i mean lou mentioned nasa again when his

3119

01:52:57,030 --> 01:52:55,360

interview with howard hughes something

3120

01:52:59,430 --> 01:52:57,040

coming up possibly in the near future

3121

01:53:01,350 --> 01:52:59,440

regarding uab and nasa so

3122

01:53:03,109 --> 01:53:01,360

something to look out for but the one

3123

01:53:07,030 --> 01:53:03,119

thing to think about or remember about

3124

01:53:09,589 --> 01:53:07,040

nasa is nasa is very in tune and in step

3125

01:53:11,669 --> 01:53:09,599

with the dod on

3126

01:53:12,790 --> 01:53:11,679

just about everything so

3127

01:53:15,030 --> 01:53:12,800

you know whatever there's so many

3128

01:53:17,510 --> 01:53:15,040

deflections you know like deflecting

3129

01:53:19,430 --> 01:53:17,520

like oh not in our agency oh well nasa

3130

01:53:20,550 --> 01:53:19,440

might you know it's just uh

3131

01:53:21,990 --> 01:53:20,560

right it's kind of i think they're

3132

01:53:23,750 --> 01:53:22,000

testing the waters guys to see what they

3133

01:53:25,990 --> 01:53:23,760

could kind of like well there's like a

3134

01:53:27,750 --> 01:53:26,000

convergence of to me like

3135

01:53:30,310 --> 01:53:27,760

there are ways to think about this right

3136

01:53:32,229 --> 01:53:30,320

and from a public and worldwide i mean

3137

01:53:34,070 --> 01:53:32,239

the us is obviously front and center in

3138

01:53:35,270 --> 01:53:34,080

many ways and when it comes to the

3139

01:53:36,550 --> 01:53:35,280

attention

3140

01:53:38,229 --> 01:53:36,560

on this topic

3141

01:53:40,950 --> 01:53:38,239

there are avenues by which this

3142

01:53:43,910 --> 01:53:40,960

information needs to come forward that

3143

01:53:45,830 --> 01:53:43,920

make it more trustworthy and more

3144

01:53:47,669 --> 01:53:45,840

reliable relatable when people go oh

3145

01:53:50,070 --> 01:53:47,679

well you know that organization you know

3146

01:53:51,589 --> 01:53:50,080

they do space and so that makes if

3147

01:53:53,669 --> 01:53:51,599

they're saying it then i get it you know

3148

01:53:56,229 --> 01:53:53,679

so they're kind of like roles to play

3149

01:53:57,750 --> 01:53:56,239

here in my mind in the political theater

3150

01:53:59,750 --> 01:53:57,760

uh you know as much as it can be

3151

01:54:01,830 --> 01:53:59,760

orchestrated obviously it can't all be

3152

01:54:03,669 --> 01:54:01,840

but to me there are certain specific

3153

01:54:06,310 --> 01:54:03,679

things that have to come from specific

3154

01:54:08,629 --> 01:54:06,320

agencies as they really kind of converge

3155

01:54:10,310 --> 01:54:08,639

together on whatever this happens to be

3156

01:54:12,470 --> 01:54:10,320

i don't think it's going to be a

3157

01:54:14,229 --> 01:54:12,480

haphazard you know oopsie you know yeah

3158

01:54:15,990 --> 01:54:14,239

here it is and we you know we didn't

3159

01:54:17,990 --> 01:54:16,000

talk to nasa about this before we just

3160

01:54:19,750 --> 01:54:18,000

decided to tell everybody today what

3161

01:54:22,709 --> 01:54:19,760

this also could be is

3162

01:54:26,149 --> 01:54:22,719

is a segway to try to get beyond

3163

01:54:28,870 --> 01:54:26,159

uh the the fence so to speak of the uap

3164

01:54:30,870 --> 01:54:28,880

task force you know you couldn't answer

3165

01:54:32,950 --> 01:54:30,880

these specific questions so now we have

3166

01:54:35,669 --> 01:54:32,960

to talk to the people who can which are

3167

01:54:37,350 --> 01:54:35,679

outside of this task force it's a good

3168

01:54:39,270 --> 01:54:37,360

point they name-dropped the department

3169

01:54:41,510 --> 01:54:39,280

of energy they named john

3170

01:54:44,470 --> 01:54:41,520

the national labs you know a lot

3171

01:54:46,149 --> 01:54:44,480

a lot noah a lot came up that that could

3172

01:54:47,350 --> 01:54:46,159

be followed up on if they were to choose

3173

01:54:49,910 --> 01:54:47,360

to do so

3174

01:54:51,750 --> 01:54:49,920

um rather than you know take a take a

3175

01:54:53,270 --> 01:54:51,760

long hour and a half lunch break because

3176

01:54:55,589 --> 01:54:53,280

it seemed opportune before the closed

3177

01:54:57,270 --> 01:54:55,599

door hearing i want to get folks to

3178

01:54:59,430 --> 01:54:57,280

sorry go ahead no i was gonna ask did

3179

01:55:01,430 --> 01:54:59,440

anyone else catch the the biology

3180

01:55:03,109 --> 01:55:01,440

mention though um so they made the

3181

01:55:04,390 --> 01:55:03,119

comment that nasa would handle any

3182

01:55:05,910 --> 01:55:04,400

discussions about

3183

01:55:07,350 --> 01:55:05,920

you know extraterrestrial life and then

3184

01:55:08,629 --> 01:55:07,360

they said and someone else would handle

3185

01:55:10,470 --> 01:55:08,639

biology

3186

01:55:12,790 --> 01:55:10,480

and it was just like this throwaway line

3187

01:55:14,950 --> 01:55:12,800

and i don't know what they meant by that

3188

01:55:16,070 --> 01:55:14,960

they don't have any biological

3189

01:55:18,709 --> 01:55:16,080

um

3190

01:55:20,629 --> 01:55:18,719

samples if they meant biological effects

3191

01:55:22,310 --> 01:55:20,639

um but that would be interesting to know

3192

01:55:24,709 --> 01:55:22,320

who's working on that because they

3193

01:55:27,189 --> 01:55:24,719

weren't clear and i assumed that you

3194

01:55:29,910 --> 01:55:27,199

know based on the ndaa that that would

3195

01:55:31,910 --> 01:55:29,920

be housed within amesog uh so i thought

3196

01:55:34,229 --> 01:55:31,920

that was interesting i didn't hear them

3197

01:55:35,189 --> 01:55:34,239

say astrobiology which i know nasa has

3198

01:55:37,430 --> 01:55:35,199

like a

3199

01:55:39,669 --> 01:55:37,440

group that does look at that stuff um i

3200

01:55:41,750 --> 01:55:39,679

wanted to give folks thoughts on the the

3201

01:55:43,270 --> 01:55:41,760

moultrie sort of uh

3202

01:55:44,470 --> 01:55:43,280

off the cuff you know i'm a science

3203

01:55:46,149 --> 01:55:44,480

fiction guy

3204

01:55:47,030 --> 01:55:46,159

you know i actually think that was kind

3205

01:55:49,189 --> 01:55:47,040

of

3206

01:55:51,109 --> 01:55:49,199

healthy and helpful because it to me it

3207

01:55:54,229 --> 01:55:51,119

actually personalizes

3208

01:55:56,870 --> 01:55:54,239

the topic a lot more it personalizes the

3209

01:55:58,790 --> 01:55:56,880

department of defense i think that

3210

01:56:00,870 --> 01:55:58,800

was intentional to ask him to kind of

3211

01:56:02,229 --> 01:56:00,880

like just share a little bit about his

3212

01:56:03,990 --> 01:56:02,239

interest there

3213

01:56:06,390 --> 01:56:04,000

what do you guys think about that i'm a

3214

01:56:08,709 --> 01:56:06,400

bit dubious about that actually sure

3215

01:56:09,910 --> 01:56:08,719

sorry because in what way what do you

3216

01:56:11,990 --> 01:56:09,920

mean

3217

01:56:13,830 --> 01:56:12,000

because he it was easy for him to say

3218

01:56:14,870 --> 01:56:13,840

yeah i've been to conferences i'm into

3219

01:56:17,030 --> 01:56:14,880

sci-fi

3220

01:56:18,870 --> 01:56:17,040

does that doesn't simply mean that he

3221

01:56:20,310 --> 01:56:18,880

that means he's going to be open and

3222

01:56:22,070 --> 01:56:20,320

transparent when he comes to this

3223

01:56:23,430 --> 01:56:22,080

subject yeah and i don't think that's

3224

01:56:25,189 --> 01:56:23,440

what i'm saying i'm saying if you're

3225

01:56:26,950 --> 01:56:25,199

thinking about entering this into the

3226  
01:56:29,830 --> 01:56:26,960  
public consciousness right and you're

3227  
01:56:31,910 --> 01:56:29,840  
trying to make a cognitive connection

3228  
01:56:34,550 --> 01:56:31,920  
with the viewership on what this topic

3229  
01:56:36,790 --> 01:56:34,560  
is not just moultrie but many of the the

3230  
01:56:38,790 --> 01:56:36,800  
representatives are saying you know i'm

3231  
01:56:40,629 --> 01:56:38,800  
interested in this that our constituents

3232  
01:56:42,470 --> 01:56:40,639  
are interested in this we as human

3233  
01:56:44,870 --> 01:56:42,480  
beings are interested in this we we've

3234  
01:56:46,950 --> 01:56:44,880  
always been interested you know and so i

3235  
01:56:49,109 --> 01:56:46,960  
think that to me says that there is a

3236  
01:56:52,550 --> 01:56:49,119  
willingness and a desire

3237  
01:56:54,709 --> 01:56:52,560  
to be accepting of whatever this may be

3238  
01:56:57,270 --> 01:56:54,719

and the fact that he is able to say you

3239

01:56:59,189 --> 01:56:57,280

know i'm not just a military guy you

3240

01:57:00,709 --> 01:56:59,199

know i'm a person who also has these

3241

01:57:02,709 --> 01:57:00,719

curiosities

3242

01:57:04,310 --> 01:57:02,719

that to me you know opens that up a

3243

01:57:06,070 --> 01:57:04,320

little bit more that's what i got from

3244

01:57:07,629 --> 01:57:06,080

it nathan and i thought the difference

3245

01:57:10,870 --> 01:57:07,639

between that and if you look back at

3246

01:57:12,310 --> 01:57:10,880

1952 he um press conference shortly

3247

01:57:14,709 --> 01:57:12,320

after the washington weekends when

3248

01:57:15,830 --> 01:57:14,719

general major general stanford sanford

3249

01:57:18,229 --> 01:57:15,840

sat you know

3250

01:57:20,070 --> 01:57:18,239

sat in front of the press and was like a

3251  
01:57:22,390 --> 01:57:20,080  
rabbit in the headlights you know kind

3252  
01:57:23,750 --> 01:57:22,400  
of thing um it's totally different from

3253  
01:57:25,669 --> 01:57:23,760  
that he was trying to establish like

3254  
01:57:27,669 --> 01:57:25,679  
look i'm one of the guys you know i i

3255  
01:57:29,669 --> 01:57:27,679  
know about sci-fi i'm interested i also

3256  
01:57:31,990 --> 01:57:29,679  
thought he was going to name check e.t

3257  
01:57:33,350 --> 01:57:32,000  
or close encounters or something able to

3258  
01:57:35,030 --> 01:57:33,360  
try and say look i'm you know i'm

3259  
01:57:36,790 --> 01:57:35,040  
interested in all this stuff so you can

3260  
01:57:39,350 --> 01:57:36,800  
trust me i think that was the inherent

3261  
01:57:40,870 --> 01:57:39,360  
message you can trust what i'm saying

3262  
01:57:42,550 --> 01:57:40,880  
and that was the thing he didn't say but

3263  
01:57:44,470 --> 01:57:42,560

that was what it was meant to be which

3264

01:57:46,629 --> 01:57:44,480

could be a double-edged sword trust me

3265

01:57:48,629 --> 01:57:46,639

as i as i later tell you more about this

3266

01:57:49,910 --> 01:57:48,639

or trust me as i totally later tell you

3267

01:57:51,830 --> 01:57:49,920

there's nothing to see here it depends

3268

01:57:52,870 --> 01:57:51,840

if you already trust him or not yeah

3269

01:57:54,310 --> 01:57:52,880

that's true

3270

01:57:56,149 --> 01:57:54,320

you could be like look at me i'm just

3271

01:57:57,830 --> 01:57:56,159

like you but i'm not you know or you

3272

01:57:59,270 --> 01:57:57,840

don't trust someone breaking the ice

3273

01:58:01,270 --> 01:57:59,280

just i don't trust someone and they say

3274

01:58:03,430 --> 01:58:01,280

trust me that makes it worse does

3275

01:58:05,510 --> 01:58:03,440

anybody want to hear a quote from a

3276

01:58:06,790 --> 01:58:05,520

tweet from christopher mellon

3277

01:58:08,870 --> 01:58:06,800

yes

3278

01:58:11,270 --> 01:58:08,880

that was a frustrating hearing as well

3279

01:58:13,830 --> 01:58:11,280

as a reminder both of how far we've come

3280

01:58:14,629 --> 01:58:13,840

and how far we still have to go

3281

01:58:16,070 --> 01:58:14,639

yeah

3282

01:58:18,470 --> 01:58:16,080

makes sense i agree i think it's

3283

01:58:20,790 --> 01:58:18,480

frustrating on what you heard you know

3284

01:58:23,430 --> 01:58:20,800

bray and moultrie say

3285

01:58:24,550 --> 01:58:23,440

um and it was it was optimistic from the

3286

01:58:27,669 --> 01:58:24,560

standpoint of the questions that we

3287

01:58:29,350 --> 01:58:27,679

heard so i get that

3288

01:58:30,390 --> 01:58:29,360

yeah i don't think it sets back any

3289

01:58:32,870 --> 01:58:30,400

further

3290

01:58:35,109 --> 01:58:32,880

no i know some people will say that

3291

01:58:36,790 --> 01:58:35,119

it's just a reminder to keep doing what

3292

01:58:37,830 --> 01:58:36,800

we're doing and keep pushing you know

3293

01:58:39,830 --> 01:58:37,840

the people in power to do what they're

3294

01:58:41,189 --> 01:58:39,840

doing because if we just let them keep

3295

01:58:42,470 --> 01:58:41,199

doing this it's going to be another blue

3296

01:58:43,430 --> 01:58:42,480

book you know so

3297

01:58:45,910 --> 01:58:43,440

it this

3298

01:58:48,470 --> 01:58:45,920

doesn't we can't let this kind of like

3299

01:58:49,830 --> 01:58:48,480

satiated us i guess we have to keep going

3300

01:58:51,270 --> 01:58:49,840

um they're kind of getting away with

3301

01:58:54,550 --> 01:58:51,280

bare minimum right now but it is a

3302

01:58:56,709 --> 01:58:54,560

stepping stone as like the big picture

3303

01:58:59,589 --> 01:58:56,719

positives i i mean we can go around and

3304

01:59:01,270 --> 01:58:59,599

do positives negatives i guess um my

3305

01:59:03,750 --> 01:59:01,280

positives

3306

01:59:04,950 --> 01:59:03,760

a-tip further substantiated

3307

01:59:06,470 --> 01:59:04,960

right yes

3308

01:59:07,910 --> 01:59:06,480

i think that's awesome

3309

01:59:09,669 --> 01:59:07,920

um

3310

01:59:12,310 --> 01:59:09,679

other positives

3311

01:59:14,440 --> 01:59:12,320

the wilson docks put in the record

3312

01:59:15,589 --> 01:59:14,450

mel's from putting the record

3313

01:59:17,589 --> 01:59:15,599

[Music]

3314

01:59:19,910 --> 01:59:17,599

and um some great

3315

01:59:22,550 --> 01:59:19,920

some great questions some historical

3316

01:59:26,149 --> 01:59:22,560

and uh the tic tac event

3317

01:59:28,070 --> 01:59:26,159

for their substantiated you know so

3318

01:59:30,310 --> 01:59:28,080

and that helps a lot that helps people

3319

01:59:33,189 --> 01:59:30,320

who are in the mainstream are just

3320

01:59:36,629 --> 01:59:33,199

watching this you know feel okay to

3321

01:59:39,669 --> 01:59:36,639

cling on to these things as substantial

3322

01:59:42,149 --> 01:59:39,679

things to hang on to as far as uh you

3323

01:59:44,310 --> 01:59:42,159

know unidentifieds go and

3324

01:59:47,189 --> 01:59:44,320

the fact that they do have plenty of

3325

01:59:49,750 --> 01:59:47,199

cases that uh where they do have

3326

01:59:51,350 --> 01:59:49,760

multiple forms of sensors on it and they

3327

01:59:53,430 --> 01:59:51,360

couldn't explain it

3328

01:59:56,870 --> 01:59:53,440

you know um yeah

3329

01:59:58,709 --> 01:59:56,880

so i think those are all positives uh

3330

02:00:00,629 --> 01:59:58,719

and also you know the fact that they

3331

02:00:02,149 --> 02:00:00,639

could take this farther into other areas

3332

02:00:03,910 --> 02:00:02,159

of the government when that being

3333

02:00:05,189 --> 02:00:03,920

satisfied with the some of the answers

3334

02:00:06,149 --> 02:00:05,199

that they got

3335

02:00:07,510 --> 02:00:06,159

um

3336

02:00:09,750 --> 02:00:07,520

some

3337

02:00:11,669 --> 02:00:09,760

the only uh

3338

02:00:14,790 --> 02:00:11,679

it's hard for me to think of of any

3339

02:00:17,109 --> 02:00:14,800

negatives that aren't just based in um

3340

02:00:18,950 --> 02:00:17,119

uh bright-eyed bushy tail kind of stuff

3341

02:00:21,910 --> 02:00:18,960

like well they didn't say aliens were

3342

02:00:24,470 --> 02:00:21,920

real or they didn't say crafts they have

3343

02:00:27,270 --> 02:00:24,480

alien crafts you know those are really

3344

02:00:29,830 --> 02:00:27,280

like being realistic about about this

3345

02:00:31,589 --> 02:00:29,840

which i know all of us were were you

3346

02:00:32,629 --> 02:00:31,599

know trying to be

3347

02:00:33,830 --> 02:00:32,639

i think

3348

02:00:36,070 --> 02:00:33,840

you know it's a

3349

02:00:37,430 --> 02:00:36,080

it's a positive thing and i think for

3350

02:00:39,350 --> 02:00:37,440

any progress

3351  
02:00:40,709 --> 02:00:39,360  
it's gonna have to be taken outside of

3352  
02:00:42,870 --> 02:00:40,719  
this group

3353  
02:00:44,870 --> 02:00:42,880  
yeah to be quite honest i agree with all

3354  
02:00:47,270 --> 02:00:44,880  
of those hey guys vinnie i'm so sorry to

3355  
02:00:49,510 --> 02:00:47,280  
interrupt before you guys carry on um i

3356  
02:00:51,510 --> 02:00:49,520  
have to go because i do have a doctor's

3357  
02:00:53,510 --> 02:00:51,520  
appointment um on the phone

3358  
02:00:55,750 --> 02:00:53,520  
anything you want to leave us with yeah

3359  
02:00:57,669 --> 02:00:55,760  
i think that i was surprised at the

3360  
02:00:59,189 --> 02:00:57,679  
questions and i'm excited that they're

3361  
02:01:00,629 --> 02:00:59,199  
going to learn more on the closed part

3362  
02:01:02,310 --> 02:01:00,639  
of it and they're going to have even

3363  
02:01:04,950 --> 02:01:02,320

better questions next time so that's

3364

02:01:06,470 --> 02:01:04,960

like my hope and also this is great for

3365

02:01:09,270 --> 02:01:06,480

people that are just getting into the

3366

02:01:11,430 --> 02:01:09,280

subject to kind of um to make them

3367

02:01:13,669 --> 02:01:11,440

realize that it's a real thing because

3368

02:01:15,589 --> 02:01:13,679

of today because a lot of people don't

3369

02:01:17,510 --> 02:01:15,599

know the history like us

3370

02:01:19,109 --> 02:01:17,520

so it's important to keep that in mind

3371

02:01:27,589 --> 02:01:19,119

but thank you so much for having me it

3372

02:01:30,390 --> 02:01:28,629

all right

3373

02:01:31,669 --> 02:01:30,400

so yeah all i was going to say was that

3374

02:01:33,270 --> 02:01:31,679

the only thing i would take away on top

3375

02:01:34,870 --> 02:01:33,280

of what you already said sean is that

3376

02:01:36,950 --> 02:01:34,880

like i kind of mentioned earlier with

3377

02:01:38,950 --> 02:01:36,960

the fact that the us is having these

3378

02:01:41,270 --> 02:01:38,960

hearings in the uk

3379

02:01:43,030 --> 02:01:41,280

not a pipe out of them nothing we can

3380

02:01:44,629 --> 02:01:43,040

now continue our efforts over here

3381

02:01:46,470 --> 02:01:44,639

speaking to whether it be the government

3382

02:01:48,070 --> 02:01:46,480

the media or even the ministry of

3383

02:01:48,870 --> 02:01:48,080

defense and the intelligence communities

3384

02:01:50,790 --> 02:01:48,880

that

3385

02:01:52,790 --> 02:01:50,800

they need to catch up or at least meet

3386

02:01:54,550 --> 02:01:52,800

somewhere in the middle and and start to

3387

02:01:55,750 --> 02:01:54,560

realize that listen you've got to be

3388

02:01:58,390 --> 02:01:55,760

honest because

3389

02:02:01,270 --> 02:01:58,400

we don't buy the fact that there's no

3390

02:02:03,030 --> 02:02:01,280

nothing nothing you know no security

3391

02:02:05,109 --> 02:02:03,040

issues or anything there's got to be

3392

02:02:07,589 --> 02:02:05,119

they've got to be speaking so it gives

3393

02:02:09,030 --> 02:02:07,599

us more work to do over here for sure

3394

02:02:12,870 --> 02:02:09,040

yeah vinnie

3395

02:02:15,669 --> 02:02:12,880

um dan radio 4 half five just just never

3396

02:02:19,430 --> 02:02:15,679

mind i know yeah yeah yeah okay

3397

02:02:21,589 --> 02:02:19,440

um not me obviously um so yeah my puzzle

3398

02:02:24,070 --> 02:02:21,599

did you eat your fish and chips

3399

02:02:25,270 --> 02:02:24,080

i did yeah i did governor i did oh all

3400

02:02:31,510 --> 02:02:25,280

right

3401

02:02:33,910 --> 02:02:31,520

positives yeah the questions i felt uh

3402

02:02:36,149 --> 02:02:33,920

showed that was actually some research

3403

02:02:38,070 --> 02:02:36,159

or some knowledge of the phenomenon that

3404

02:02:40,310 --> 02:02:38,080

existed and they'd actually done some

3405

02:02:42,550 --> 02:02:40,320

you know background into it to get some

3406

02:02:44,790 --> 02:02:42,560

questions say admiral wilson was name

3407

02:02:46,390 --> 02:02:44,800

check maelstrom was name checked that

3408

02:02:48,149 --> 02:02:46,400

was probably over and above what i

3409

02:02:51,030 --> 02:02:48,159

expected to start with

3410

02:02:53,430 --> 02:02:51,040

i was also pleased

3411

02:02:55,350 --> 02:02:53,440

that i think as already being said they

3412

02:02:57,510 --> 02:02:55,360

were kind of like setting things so it

3413

02:02:59,430 --> 02:02:57,520

paints the two people into a corner for

3414

02:03:01,750 --> 02:02:59,440

future reference so when there is

3415

02:03:03,350 --> 02:03:01,760

another set of hearings which presumably

3416

02:03:05,589 --> 02:03:03,360

there will be if you go back to history

3417

02:03:08,550 --> 02:03:05,599

for the 66 hearings there were hearings

3418

02:03:10,310 --> 02:03:08,560

two years later in 68 um which was a

3419

02:03:12,390 --> 02:03:10,320

scientific panel but nonetheless there

3420

02:03:14,070 --> 02:03:12,400

was still there was still hearings so

3421

02:03:16,149 --> 02:03:14,080

that's a good one because it does pin

3422

02:03:17,990 --> 02:03:16,159

them down into well as we said before

3423

02:03:19,109 --> 02:03:18,000

look you've said this already and now

3424

02:03:20,790 --> 02:03:19,119

you what you're trying to do you're

3425

02:03:22,790 --> 02:03:20,800

trying to wiggle out of it you know have

3426

02:03:26,470 --> 02:03:22,800

you not found this out now this kind of

3427

02:03:28,870 --> 02:03:26,480

stuff the negative i think was that

3428

02:03:31,669 --> 02:03:28,880

they did pick low hanging fruit as andre

3429

02:03:33,510 --> 02:03:31,679

carson mentioned about the videos and i

3430

02:03:35,510 --> 02:03:33,520

think they could have shown the gimbal

3431

02:03:37,990 --> 02:03:35,520

video that one would have been the one

3432

02:03:39,589 --> 02:03:38,000

where it would have the most impact and

3433

02:03:41,189 --> 02:03:39,599

that could have led to a bit more kind

3434

02:03:43,510 --> 02:03:41,199

of information coming out of either

3435

02:03:45,350 --> 02:03:43,520

moultrie or bray or both of them i would

3436

02:03:48,069 --> 02:03:45,360

like to have heard what they might have

3437

02:03:49,669 --> 02:03:48,079

commented on that particular video so

3438

02:03:51,910 --> 02:03:49,679

yeah i'm looking forward to the next set

3439

02:03:53,109 --> 02:03:51,920

and what the fallout from this is and

3440

02:03:56,149 --> 02:03:53,119

looking forward to what the rest of you

3441

02:03:57,669 --> 02:03:56,159

say about this

3442

02:04:00,229 --> 02:03:57,679

yeah i mean i agree with everything that

3443

02:04:02,550 --> 02:04:00,239

everyone has said so far i think for me

3444

02:04:04,709 --> 02:04:02,560

like from a congressional perspective

3445

02:04:07,189 --> 02:04:04,719

i really think this was useful in

3446

02:04:09,270 --> 02:04:07,199

figuring out where the different numbers

3447

02:04:10,950 --> 02:04:09,280

stand um obviously we didn't hear from

3448

02:04:13,030 --> 02:04:10,960

all of the members of the subcommittee

3449

02:04:14,709 --> 02:04:13,040

but i think it became very apparent who

3450

02:04:17,350 --> 02:04:14,719

would be potential allies who would be

3451

02:04:19,910 --> 02:04:17,360

potential blocks um

3452

02:04:22,069 --> 02:04:19,920

and i mean gallagher man like let's just

3453

02:04:23,270 --> 02:04:22,079

give him a big pat on the back there

3454

02:04:25,350 --> 02:04:23,280

um

3455

02:04:27,109 --> 02:04:25,360

and i think also you know

3456

02:04:29,510 --> 02:04:27,119

i'm a little fangirling right now

3457

02:04:31,589 --> 02:04:29,520

because a small group of us submitted

3458

02:04:32,950 --> 02:04:31,599

questions to the offices and

3459

02:04:35,669 --> 02:04:32,960

two of them got either fully or

3460

02:04:37,750 --> 02:04:35,679

partially asked so i think you know not

3461

02:04:39,750 --> 02:04:37,760

just to toot my own horn and

3462

02:04:42,229 --> 02:04:39,760

the porn of the people i worked with who

3463

02:04:43,669 --> 02:04:42,239

i would love to give a shout out to but

3464

02:04:45,589 --> 02:04:43,679

i don't know if they want to be publicly

3465

02:04:47,750 --> 02:04:45,599

identified um

3466

02:04:50,470 --> 02:04:47,760

but i think it goes further to say that

3467

02:04:53,030 --> 02:04:50,480

our advocacy matters right um the

3468

02:04:54,950 --> 02:04:53,040

community has the power to shift the

3469

02:04:57,270 --> 02:04:54,960

narrative and to you know somewhat

3470

02:04:59,510 --> 02:04:57,280

influence what is being discussed so i

3471

02:05:02,770 --> 02:04:59,520

think that's really positive uh in terms

3472

02:05:05,189 --> 02:05:02,780

of negatives i think my only concern is

3473

02:05:09,430 --> 02:05:05,199

[Music]

3474

02:05:11,350 --> 02:05:09,440

is that that's my biggest concern

3475

02:05:14,550 --> 02:05:11,360

just shooting your horn for you sorry

3476

02:05:16,069 --> 02:05:14,560

there we go great um no i i think my

3477

02:05:18,470 --> 02:05:16,079

biggest concern is that there was a lot

3478

02:05:20,950 --> 02:05:18,480

of nuance in what was said for example

3479

02:05:22,550 --> 02:05:20,960

like the we have no evidence of this in

3480

02:05:25,350 --> 02:05:22,560

the uaptf

3481

02:05:27,109 --> 02:05:25,360

and i don't think the media is going to

3482

02:05:29,750 --> 02:05:27,119

reflect that so i think we should all be

3483

02:05:32,550 --> 02:05:29,760

very mindful over the coming days

3484

02:05:34,390 --> 02:05:32,560

as we see articles come out to kind of

3485

02:05:36,069 --> 02:05:34,400

gently correct the record because i

3486

02:05:40,390 --> 02:05:36,079

think it could be misleading to folks

3487

02:05:45,109 --> 02:05:43,430

totally agreed um yeah i think that it's

3488

02:05:46,709 --> 02:05:45,119

important that

3489

02:05:49,270 --> 02:05:46,719

that sean

3490

02:05:51,350 --> 02:05:49,280

what are you doing man come on

3491

02:05:52,950 --> 02:05:51,360

it's a historic day we don't need like

3492

02:05:53,750 --> 02:05:52,960

the uh clown routine

3493

02:05:55,750 --> 02:05:53,760

uh

3494

02:05:56,790 --> 02:05:55,760

i'm just getting a horn bro

3495

02:05:59,109 --> 02:05:56,800

um

3496

02:06:00,470 --> 02:05:59,119

you know i think that the you know

3497

02:06:02,629 --> 02:06:00,480

it's important that this is breaching

3498

02:06:05,430 --> 02:06:02,639

water and and has been said by priscilla

3499

02:06:06,709 --> 02:06:05,440

and others you know and katie it's it's

3500

02:06:07,830 --> 02:06:06,719

great that

3501  
02:06:09,350 --> 02:06:07,840  
we have

3502  
02:06:11,990 --> 02:06:09,360  
you know there's always new people

3503  
02:06:13,910 --> 02:06:12,000  
entering in in to the debate and

3504  
02:06:15,270 --> 02:06:13,920  
entering into the conversation when a

3505  
02:06:17,270 --> 02:06:15,280  
subject like this

3506  
02:06:19,910 --> 02:06:17,280  
and when a hearing like this would

3507  
02:06:21,270 --> 02:06:19,920  
breach water you know if we even get

3508  
02:06:22,229 --> 02:06:21,280  
when we get these

3509  
02:06:24,870 --> 02:06:22,239  
uh

3510  
02:06:26,629 --> 02:06:24,880  
any time that there's kind of one of

3511  
02:06:29,830 --> 02:06:26,639  
these big blaring headlines in the new

3512  
02:06:32,470 --> 02:06:29,840  
york times more people get get turned on

3513  
02:06:34,069 --> 02:06:32,480

to the subject matter and not only that

3514

02:06:36,069 --> 02:06:34,079

people that have had that have seen

3515

02:06:36,950 --> 02:06:36,079

things people that have experienced

3516

02:06:39,430 --> 02:06:36,960

things

3517

02:06:41,589 --> 02:06:39,440

also you know it tends to wake people up

3518

02:06:44,069 --> 02:06:41,599

as well you know it it's there's a

3519

02:06:47,350 --> 02:06:44,079

legitimacy factor i remember you know

3520

02:06:49,109 --> 02:06:47,360

before my grandfather passed um

3521

02:06:52,069 --> 02:06:49,119

you know we were able to have

3522

02:06:53,589 --> 02:06:52,079

uh some straightforward conversations

3523

02:06:56,550 --> 02:06:53,599

about the subject matter with the

3524

02:06:57,910 --> 02:06:56,560

original blumenthal kane helene cooper

3525

02:07:00,709 --> 02:06:57,920

article on the front of the new york

3526

02:07:02,149 --> 02:07:00,719

times you know and i really value that

3527

02:07:04,229 --> 02:07:02,159

you know years later we were able to

3528

02:07:06,229 --> 02:07:04,239

have that conversation before he passed

3529

02:07:08,470 --> 02:07:06,239

and it was totally because it sat there

3530

02:07:10,550 --> 02:07:08,480

on the front of the new york times so

3531

02:07:12,629 --> 02:07:10,560

the fact that this can destigmatize

3532

02:07:14,390 --> 02:07:12,639

these conversations among loved ones i

3533

02:07:17,589 --> 02:07:14,400

think is really important i think it's

3534

02:07:19,669 --> 02:07:17,599

really important that you know that the

3535

02:07:21,830 --> 02:07:19,679

as katie was saying like the grassroots

3536

02:07:24,950 --> 02:07:21,840

effort of what we're doing and what

3537

02:07:27,990 --> 02:07:24,960

others online are doing and that it it

3538

02:07:30,390 --> 02:07:28,000

helps bolster our case as much as even

3539

02:07:32,390 --> 02:07:30,400

within the hearing itself it sounded

3540

02:07:34,069 --> 02:07:32,400

like they would love to be able to

3541

02:07:35,270 --> 02:07:34,079

stifle some of the conversations that

3542

02:07:37,510 --> 02:07:35,280

people have

3543

02:07:39,510 --> 02:07:37,520

um you know as

3544

02:07:41,910 --> 02:07:39,520

like with regards to the maelstrom case

3545

02:07:43,510 --> 02:07:41,920

you know that's one thing to address

3546

02:07:46,629 --> 02:07:43,520

here is that there is so much lip

3547

02:07:49,589 --> 02:07:46,639

service paid to destigmatizing reports

3548

02:07:52,310 --> 02:07:49,599

right but there is very little in terms

3549

02:07:54,790 --> 02:07:52,320

of destigmatizing the reporters the

3550

02:07:57,589 --> 02:07:54,800

people that actually report the cases

3551

02:07:59,270 --> 02:07:57,599

that that is a fundamental you know

3552

02:08:02,470 --> 02:07:59,280

difference there's overlap there but

3553

02:08:04,310 --> 02:08:02,480

it's not absolutely the same thing

3554

02:08:07,589 --> 02:08:04,320

and you know i think that it's really

3555

02:08:09,350 --> 02:08:07,599

important to to recognize that that

3556

02:08:12,629 --> 02:08:09,360

these are people that you know they'll

3557

02:08:15,030 --> 02:08:12,639

constantly valorize the data as much as

3558

02:08:17,270 --> 02:08:15,040

they try to hide it and at the same time

3559

02:08:20,470 --> 02:08:17,280

they'll valorize the data but they'll

3560

02:08:22,870 --> 02:08:20,480

they'll you know there was no mention

3561

02:08:24,709 --> 02:08:22,880

except unless you're a navy pilot

3562

02:08:27,109 --> 02:08:24,719

you know you don't you don't necessarily

3563

02:08:28,950 --> 02:08:27,119

deserve respect for talking about this

3564

02:08:30,950 --> 02:08:28,960

stuff you don't deserve necessarily

3565

02:08:33,589 --> 02:08:30,960

respect for reporting that stuff and i

3566

02:08:35,510 --> 02:08:33,599

think that is absolute bs it needs to

3567

02:08:37,430 --> 02:08:35,520

stop immediately

3568

02:08:39,910 --> 02:08:37,440

and you know and

3569

02:08:41,109 --> 02:08:39,920

we should stop kind of accepting i mean

3570

02:08:43,109 --> 02:08:41,119

i know that you all you know i'm

3571

02:08:46,069 --> 02:08:43,119

preaching to the choir here but like we

3572

02:08:47,910 --> 02:08:46,079

need to stop accepting that the tiny

3573

02:08:49,830 --> 02:08:47,920

little crumb that we get

3574

02:08:52,390 --> 02:08:49,840

in terms of being like you know they did

3575

02:08:54,550 --> 02:08:52,400

give us 12 instances of double speak and

3576

02:08:57,189 --> 02:08:54,560

that's great let's just use that for the

3577

02:09:00,550 --> 02:08:57,199

next 10 years

3578

02:09:09,030 --> 02:09:02,149

um

3579

02:09:10,870 --> 02:09:09,040

standardizing public reporting

3580

02:09:13,189 --> 02:09:10,880

procedures and i thought that was

3581

02:09:15,750 --> 02:09:13,199

encouraging i'd love to see that happen

3582

02:09:17,750 --> 02:09:15,760

asap because like you say jay it's just

3583

02:09:19,189 --> 02:09:17,760

as valuable and sure you know there

3584

02:09:21,270 --> 02:09:19,199

might be some narratives when one's

3585

02:09:23,750 --> 02:09:21,280

mixed in but our

3586

02:09:25,830 --> 02:09:23,760

planet is bathed in sensors now you know

3587

02:09:27,830 --> 02:09:25,840

there's probably no no bit of it that

3588

02:09:29,430 --> 02:09:27,840

has gone untouched so why can't you

3589

02:09:31,189 --> 02:09:29,440

corroborate you know what i saw one

3590

02:09:33,510 --> 02:09:31,199

night or what you guys saw or you know

3591

02:09:34,709 --> 02:09:33,520

something like that

3592

02:09:36,950 --> 02:09:34,719

when when i looked at the hearing

3593

02:09:38,550 --> 02:09:36,960

whether it was successful i asked myself

3594

02:09:40,629 --> 02:09:38,560

what it was for

3595

02:09:42,790 --> 02:09:40,639

and i i think it was for further

3596

02:09:45,589 --> 02:09:42,800

conversation and nothing more to get the

3597

02:09:47,109 --> 02:09:45,599

ball rolling um and and i think it's

3598

02:09:48,069 --> 02:09:47,119

done exactly that the public have now

3599

02:09:50,709 --> 02:09:48,079

seen

3600

02:09:53,350 --> 02:09:50,719

the the kind of i know i can't swear but

3601  
02:09:54,870 --> 02:09:53,360  
i'll say the cluster f with the video um

3602  
02:09:57,430 --> 02:09:54,880  
and they've seen that these people

3603  
02:09:59,910 --> 02:09:57,440  
aren't prepped uh properly they've

3604  
02:10:03,990 --> 02:09:59,920  
there's probably intrigue there and a

3605  
02:10:06,470 --> 02:10:04,000  
desire for for a more robust uh

3606  
02:10:08,310 --> 02:10:06,480  
hearing the next time around so

3607  
02:10:10,390 --> 02:10:08,320  
we're we're probably gonna see in the

3608  
02:10:12,149 --> 02:10:10,400  
future some more legislation coming out

3609  
02:10:14,709 --> 02:10:12,159  
that holds their feet to the fires but

3610  
02:10:16,709 --> 02:10:14,719  
in very very specific ways and like

3611  
02:10:17,990 --> 02:10:16,719  
graham said it'll come back around to

3612  
02:10:19,510 --> 02:10:18,000  
bite him in the ass a lot of the stuff

3613  
02:10:21,830 --> 02:10:19,520

that they said today

3614

02:10:23,430 --> 02:10:21,840

and that's a good thing so i'm pleased

3615

02:10:25,030 --> 02:10:23,440

with it you know there were no alien

3616

02:10:27,750 --> 02:10:25,040

bodies kind of trotted out but i never

3617

02:10:29,990 --> 02:10:27,760

expected that this was as i said

3618

02:10:32,629 --> 02:10:30,000

yesterday this wasn't an ending this is

3619

02:10:34,790 --> 02:10:32,639

finally the beginning

3620

02:10:36,709 --> 02:10:34,800

completely agree uh and echo everything

3621

02:10:39,270 --> 02:10:36,719

that others have said

3622

02:10:41,270 --> 02:10:39,280

uh i think that i was pleasantly

3623

02:10:43,270 --> 02:10:41,280

surprised with what we heard today it

3624

02:10:45,270 --> 02:10:43,280

exceeded my expectations and i set the

3625

02:10:47,430 --> 02:10:45,280

bar very low we got some to me some

3626

02:10:49,669 --> 02:10:47,440

really interesting questions that i was

3627

02:10:52,950 --> 02:10:49,679

not expecting to hear also i think it

3628

02:10:55,750 --> 02:10:52,960

doesn't uh you know we really do need to

3629

02:10:56,870 --> 02:10:55,760

realize how bipartisan this actually is

3630

02:10:59,109 --> 02:10:56,880

yes there were a couple of

3631

02:11:01,350 --> 02:10:59,119

representatives that were really pushing

3632

02:11:03,189 --> 02:11:01,360

the adversarial technology you know we

3633

02:11:04,629 --> 02:11:03,199

don't want to be one-upped by them but i

3634

02:11:06,790 --> 02:11:04,639

think some of those questions actually

3635

02:11:08,790 --> 02:11:06,800

were addressed you know let's not forget

3636

02:11:10,470 --> 02:11:08,800

there was a more a point in the

3637

02:11:12,310 --> 02:11:10,480

conversation where

3638

02:11:14,629 --> 02:11:12,320

they specifically said that china was

3639

02:11:16,149 --> 02:11:14,639

looking at this as well and and there

3640

02:11:18,069 --> 02:11:16,159

was going to be more information about

3641

02:11:19,669 --> 02:11:18,079

that in the closed session so

3642

02:11:21,189 --> 02:11:19,679

uh you know i find it hard to believe

3643

02:11:23,510 --> 02:11:21,199

that the chinese have the technology yet

3644

02:11:26,310 --> 02:11:23,520

they're also really looking at it so

3645

02:11:28,550 --> 02:11:26,320

to me uh it really does say a lot about

3646

02:11:30,790 --> 02:11:28,560

where we are with the topic that most of

3647

02:11:32,870 --> 02:11:30,800

these representatives are on the same

3648

02:11:34,069 --> 02:11:32,880

page here and they're wanting they're

3649

02:11:36,229 --> 02:11:34,079

asking good questions and wanting the

3650

02:11:38,550 --> 02:11:36,239

information i think also you know

3651  
02:11:40,709 --> 02:11:38,560  
remembering that we're in a time where

3652  
02:11:43,189 --> 02:11:40,719  
at least in america there's this sort of

3653  
02:11:45,589 --> 02:11:43,199  
strong distrust of the government and uh

3654  
02:11:47,189 --> 02:11:45,599  
you know to me this was a if you're

3655  
02:11:48,790 --> 02:11:47,199  
taking a kind of meta view of this this

3656  
02:11:50,790 --> 02:11:48,800  
was a situation where the

3657  
02:11:53,350 --> 02:11:50,800  
representatives really in fact do mirror

3658  
02:11:55,189 --> 02:11:53,360  
many ways the population uh and

3659  
02:11:57,430 --> 02:11:55,199  
oftentimes that that's not the case that

3660  
02:11:58,950 --> 02:11:57,440  
uh the representatives don't necessarily

3661  
02:12:01,270 --> 02:11:58,960  
mirror what the constituents really want

3662  
02:12:02,629 --> 02:12:01,280  
to know this is this is this is the

3663  
02:12:04,149 --> 02:12:02,639

opposite of that and that that's very

3664

02:12:06,950 --> 02:12:04,159

encouraging this is an opportunity in my

3665

02:12:09,589 --> 02:12:06,960

mind for the government to really show a

3666

02:12:11,189 --> 02:12:09,599

sign of solidarity and and uh in a way

3667

02:12:13,669 --> 02:12:11,199

that they could repair you know some

3668

02:12:15,510 --> 02:12:13,679

historical damage to the reputation that

3669

02:12:17,990 --> 02:12:15,520

is there uh of not being straight with

3670

02:12:19,669 --> 02:12:18,000

people so to me again i think this is uh

3671

02:12:21,510 --> 02:12:19,679

it's a great first start um we're

3672

02:12:23,350 --> 02:12:21,520

talking with lu tomorrow we are

3673

02:12:25,350 --> 02:12:23,360

absolutely going to ask for his thoughts

3674

02:12:27,109 --> 02:12:25,360

on this hearing uh and going to spend a

3675

02:12:28,709 --> 02:12:27,119

lot of time on that so i'm definitely

3676

02:12:30,550 --> 02:12:28,719

looking forward to look to talking with

3677

02:12:32,470 --> 02:12:30,560

him and also going through this again uh

3678

02:12:34,229 --> 02:12:32,480

just to see what i may have missed and

3679

02:12:36,870 --> 02:12:34,239

maybe cue up some specific questions

3680

02:12:38,470 --> 02:12:36,880

from from what we heard today

3681

02:12:40,390 --> 02:12:38,480

yeah i mean i think all you guys have

3682

02:12:42,550 --> 02:12:40,400

brought up really good points sorry for

3683

02:12:45,430 --> 02:12:42,560

the car horn if that offended anybody if

3684

02:12:47,430 --> 02:12:45,440

i knew how uh intense and emotional what

3685

02:12:48,470 --> 02:12:47,440

jay was going to share was coming i

3686

02:12:50,870 --> 02:12:48,480

wouldn't i wouldn't have did that

3687

02:12:52,870 --> 02:12:50,880

because that was really beautiful and

3688

02:12:56,669 --> 02:12:52,880

um and inspired me to to kind of leave

3689

02:12:59,430 --> 02:12:56,679

you with this it's it's like you know as

3690

02:13:01,830 --> 02:12:59,440

experiencers you know whether you're not

3691

02:13:03,350 --> 02:13:01,840

or you are or whatever i'm not saying

3692

02:13:06,149 --> 02:13:03,360

anything about that but

3693

02:13:08,550 --> 02:13:06,159

you know it in being one um the reality

3694

02:13:10,709 --> 02:13:08,560

of this situation is is highly personal

3695

02:13:12,709 --> 02:13:10,719

and emotional you know

3696

02:13:16,790 --> 02:13:12,719

um when i think about

3697

02:13:20,069 --> 02:13:16,800

the experience that i've been through

3698

02:13:21,910 --> 02:13:20,079

um these these hearings suck

3699

02:13:23,990 --> 02:13:21,920

right these hearings are

3700

02:13:25,990 --> 02:13:24,000

uh a speck of my shoe

3701

02:13:28,229 --> 02:13:26,000

and and they're terrible

3702

02:13:31,750 --> 02:13:28,239

and it doesn't restore

3703

02:13:34,870 --> 02:13:31,760

um the emotional baggage that has been

3704

02:13:36,550 --> 02:13:34,880

added onto my life you know

3705

02:13:38,629 --> 02:13:36,560

um

3706

02:13:40,470 --> 02:13:38,639

and that stinks and you know what i

3707

02:13:42,709 --> 02:13:40,480

really want there are some sort of

3708

02:13:45,030 --> 02:13:42,719

answers for what i've experienced in

3709

02:13:49,189 --> 02:13:45,040

other people who've experienced much

3710

02:13:50,229 --> 02:13:49,199

more severe uh traumatic things

3711

02:13:51,430 --> 02:13:50,239

and

3712

02:13:52,629 --> 02:13:51,440

um

3713

02:13:55,350 --> 02:13:52,639

in that

3714

02:13:56,790 --> 02:13:55,360

aspect you know these hearings were

3715

02:13:58,629 --> 02:13:56,800

unacceptable

3716

02:14:02,069 --> 02:13:58,639

you know because so many people have

3717

02:14:07,270 --> 02:14:04,470

and it didn't even get close

3718

02:14:10,229 --> 02:14:07,280

to touching anything that would even

3719

02:14:11,750 --> 02:14:10,239

restore anything as far as emotional

3720

02:14:16,310 --> 02:14:11,760

damage or

3721

02:14:19,910 --> 02:14:16,320

or um you know just years of intense

3722

02:14:21,189 --> 02:14:19,920

uh inside curiosity and obsession you

3723

02:14:22,870 --> 02:14:21,199

know

3724

02:14:25,910 --> 02:14:22,880

um

3725

02:14:27,750 --> 02:14:25,920

but and then there's also you know where

3726

02:14:29,669 --> 02:14:27,760

i have to play

3727

02:14:32,310 --> 02:14:29,679

and this is really hard for experiencers

3728

02:14:34,870 --> 02:14:32,320

is to play the other side of the line

3729

02:14:37,270 --> 02:14:34,880

and being realistic that

3730

02:14:40,629 --> 02:14:37,280

most people have not

3731

02:14:43,430 --> 02:14:40,639

experienced something dramatic like that

3732

02:14:44,870 --> 02:14:43,440

and you know to even think of ufos as

3733

02:14:47,350 --> 02:14:44,880

being reality

3734

02:14:50,390 --> 02:14:47,360

is extremely difficult

3735

02:14:53,510 --> 02:14:50,400

to accept you know and i understand that

3736

02:14:56,790 --> 02:14:53,520

and i have empathy for people like that

3737

02:14:58,229 --> 02:14:56,800

so on the one hand for me personally

3738

02:14:59,589 --> 02:14:58,239

um

3739

02:15:01,270 --> 02:14:59,599

you know i don't know what would be

3740

02:15:03,350 --> 02:15:01,280

enough to be quite honest with you

3741

02:15:05,350 --> 02:15:03,360

especially if they don't even know what

3742

02:15:08,790 --> 02:15:05,360

screws with your consciousness when you

3743

02:15:10,470 --> 02:15:08,800

have an experience you know

3744

02:15:13,030 --> 02:15:10,480

but i have to put

3745

02:15:15,109 --> 02:15:13,040

that part of me aside as

3746

02:15:17,589 --> 02:15:15,119

hard as that is

3747

02:15:19,669 --> 02:15:17,599

and root for the general public to have

3748

02:15:22,629 --> 02:15:19,679

a general awareness of that

3749

02:15:25,270 --> 02:15:22,639

so in the generations to come

3750

02:15:27,510 --> 02:15:25,280

people like me and other experiencers

3751

02:15:30,229 --> 02:15:27,520

that will have experiences

3752

02:15:32,870 --> 02:15:30,239

uh will have more support groups more

3753

02:15:34,550 --> 02:15:32,880

answers more people to talk to more

3754

02:15:38,390 --> 02:15:34,560

hands to hold

3755

02:15:40,870 --> 02:15:38,400

you know and um more emotional support

3756

02:15:41,990 --> 02:15:40,880

than than what we have currently you

3757

02:15:43,350 --> 02:15:42,000

know

3758

02:15:46,629 --> 02:15:43,360

so

3759

02:15:49,589 --> 02:15:46,639

speak

3760

02:15:52,229 --> 02:15:49,599

and and i hope other people

3761

02:15:55,189 --> 02:15:52,239

who are experiencers can put

3762

02:15:57,750 --> 02:15:55,199

their experience aside sometimes

3763

02:15:59,830 --> 02:15:57,760

in order to you know try to push this

3764

02:16:01,030 --> 02:15:59,840

ball forward for future generations and

3765

02:16:02,950 --> 02:16:01,040

our kids and other people who have

3766

02:16:04,550 --> 02:16:02,960

experiences like this that they can live

3767

02:16:06,069 --> 02:16:04,560

in a better world than we live in right

3768

02:16:14,069 --> 02:16:06,079

now

3769

02:16:16,550 --> 02:16:14,079

forget your experience either as

3770

02:16:19,189 --> 02:16:16,560

unfortunately or for better for worse

3771

02:16:20,870 --> 02:16:19,199

for some people um those completely

3772

02:16:21,750 --> 02:16:20,880

create who we are for the rest of our

3773

02:16:23,030 --> 02:16:21,760

life

3774

02:16:23,830 --> 02:16:23,040

you know

3775

02:16:25,990 --> 02:16:23,840

so

3776

02:16:28,310 --> 02:16:26,000

that's all i have to say

3777

02:16:29,990 --> 02:16:28,320

appreciate that sean very well said very

3778

02:16:30,790 --> 02:16:30,000

well said

3779

02:16:35,030 --> 02:16:30,800

yeah

3780

02:16:37,669 --> 02:16:35,040

baby i love you brother

3781

02:16:41,190 --> 02:16:37,679

yeah um let's see um what else would we

3782

02:16:42,870 --> 02:16:41,200

like to address uh today um before we

3783

02:16:44,469 --> 02:16:42,880

get out of here okay someone had a

3784

02:16:47,349 --> 02:16:44,479

question that i thought was important in

3785

02:16:49,270 --> 02:16:47,359

the chat about whether or not eric davis

3786

02:16:51,429 --> 02:16:49,280

can

3787

02:16:53,669 --> 02:16:51,439

reveal more information now my

3788

02:16:56,070 --> 02:16:53,679

understanding would be no that it would

3789

02:16:58,549 --> 02:16:56,080

still remain classified

3790

02:17:00,469 --> 02:16:58,559

so what would what would be different

3791

02:17:01,910 --> 02:17:00,479

would just be that um

3792

02:17:04,150 --> 02:17:01,920

it would not be

3793

02:17:06,709 --> 02:17:04,160

for example a violation of a security

3794

02:17:08,549 --> 02:17:06,719

clearance to have access to information

3795

02:17:10,469 --> 02:17:08,559

that was classified and was leaked right

3796

02:17:11,910 --> 02:17:10,479

it's now in the public domain

3797

02:17:14,230 --> 02:17:11,920

but that should not change what he's

3798

02:17:17,990 --> 02:17:14,240

able to speak about publicly unless that

3799

02:17:18,000 --> 02:17:21,509

well said

3800

02:17:26,389 --> 02:17:24,230

any anybody else want to

3801  
02:17:28,790 --> 02:17:26,399  
leave on anything else if you know me

3802  
02:17:31,750 --> 02:17:28,800  
i'm hangry as hell

3803  
02:17:34,950 --> 02:17:33,030  
i think it'll just be important to keep

3804  
02:17:36,549 --> 02:17:34,960  
an eye on what the conversation how it

3805  
02:17:38,469 --> 02:17:36,559  
evolves in the next couple of days

3806  
02:17:40,150 --> 02:17:38,479  
because for me i can't speak for anybody

3807  
02:17:42,389 --> 02:17:40,160  
else i'll be going back and re-watching

3808  
02:17:43,990 --> 02:17:42,399  
it probably a numerous times to see what

3809  
02:17:47,270 --> 02:17:44,000  
crops up that i didn't pick up on the

3810  
02:17:49,990 --> 02:17:47,280  
first time and i think that will alter

3811  
02:17:51,270 --> 02:17:50,000  
my outlook on it i will be pulling the

3812  
02:17:53,030 --> 02:17:51,280  
positives

3813  
02:17:55,349 --> 02:17:53,040

not ignoring the negatives because there

3814

02:17:58,709 --> 02:17:55,359

was obfuscation there was negatives in

3815

02:18:00,389 --> 02:17:58,719

there but it will be

3816

02:18:01,270 --> 02:18:00,399

interesting to see how the conversation

3817

02:18:03,429 --> 02:18:01,280

uh

3818

02:18:04,389 --> 02:18:03,439

evolves in the next day or two

3819

02:18:06,150 --> 02:18:04,399

yeah

3820

02:18:07,669 --> 02:18:06,160

totally

3821

02:18:09,750 --> 02:18:07,679

um

3822

02:18:11,270 --> 02:18:09,760

yeah also i mean just that comment right

3823

02:18:12,870 --> 02:18:11,280

there just made me remember something i

3824

02:18:14,389 --> 02:18:12,880

didn't think of why do they need experts

3825

02:18:17,750 --> 02:18:14,399

in metallurgy

3826

02:18:20,469 --> 02:18:17,760

you know exactly exactly

3827

02:18:21,349 --> 02:18:20,479

right so yeah

3828

02:18:24,469 --> 02:18:21,359

but

3829

02:18:27,270 --> 02:18:24,479

yeah anything else for me guys yeah

3830

02:18:28,950 --> 02:18:27,280

oh just i i really appreciate a seeing

3831

02:18:31,030 --> 02:18:28,960

all of you and i really appreciate

3832

02:18:32,950 --> 02:18:31,040

everybody in the chat it's been really

3833

02:18:34,950 --> 02:18:32,960

great to see this

3834

02:18:37,270 --> 02:18:34,960

this conversation develop on such an

3835

02:18:39,750 --> 02:18:37,280

important and historic day and you know

3836

02:18:42,230 --> 02:18:39,760

though i'm sure that we all have varying

3837

02:18:44,309 --> 02:18:42,240

levels you know like put a number on the

3838

02:18:45,910 --> 02:18:44,319

zero to ten amount of frustration that

3839

02:18:48,629 --> 02:18:45,920

you have after watching the hearing you

3840

02:18:51,270 --> 02:18:48,639

know there there was definitely i i mean

3841

02:18:53,030 --> 02:18:51,280

i saw plenty of a positive movement if

3842

02:18:54,870 --> 02:18:53,040

nothing else you know like kids are

3843

02:18:56,870 --> 02:18:54,880

great detectors you know what i

3844

02:18:58,629 --> 02:18:56,880

mean and i feel like this is going to

3845

02:18:59,509 --> 02:18:58,639

pass on to younger generations that can

3846

02:19:01,349 --> 02:18:59,519

really

3847

02:19:03,750 --> 02:19:01,359

speak to these issues as well you know

3848

02:19:05,990 --> 02:19:03,760

that this will be remembered as much for

3849

02:19:08,790 --> 02:19:06,000

what wasn't said as for what was said in

3850

02:19:11,509 --> 02:19:08,800

this hearing yeah at some point

3851

02:19:13,830 --> 02:19:11,519

i'm pleasantly surprised um so i'm

3852

02:19:16,150 --> 02:19:13,840

taking away as much as i can from it i'm

3853

02:19:18,870 --> 02:19:16,160

you know i'm not gonna like concentrate

3854

02:19:20,950 --> 02:19:18,880

too much on what wasn't said and how

3855

02:19:23,349 --> 02:19:20,960

things were maybe hidden away or

3856

02:19:25,509 --> 02:19:23,359

obfuscated but because that's that's the

3857

02:19:27,030 --> 02:19:25,519

ufology anyway you know that's the

3858

02:19:28,950 --> 02:19:27,040

baseline for what the official

3859

02:19:31,990 --> 02:19:28,960

engagement has been over the last 70 odd

3860

02:19:34,070 --> 02:19:32,000

years so anything above that is a plus

3861

02:19:35,830 --> 02:19:34,080

as far as i'm concerned and i meant i

3862

02:19:37,990 --> 02:19:35,840

tweeted earlier this morning to dial

3863

02:19:40,070 --> 02:19:38,000

down your expectations and actually the

3864

02:19:46,830 --> 02:19:40,080

expectations that have been exceeded so

3865

02:19:50,469 --> 02:19:48,710

excellent anybody else

3866

02:19:52,150 --> 02:19:50,479

historic nathan

3867

02:19:53,990 --> 02:19:52,160

uh thank you to chris villan and to

3868

02:19:55,429 --> 02:19:54,000

lozando and everybody else that's been

3869

02:19:56,309 --> 02:19:55,439

working hard behind the scenes to make

3870

02:19:59,510 --> 02:19:56,319

this

3871

02:20:01,110 --> 02:19:59,520

you know day happen um jeez i mean

3872

02:20:03,030 --> 02:20:01,120

i can't just imagine

3873

02:20:04,950 --> 02:20:03,040

a few years ago telling yourself that

3874

02:20:06,309 --> 02:20:04,960

you'd be seeing this right now i think

3875

02:20:07,670 --> 02:20:06,319

this i mean again exceeded my

3876

02:20:09,270 --> 02:20:07,680

expectations

3877

02:20:10,630 --> 02:20:09,280

i'm very pleased and i think this will

3878

02:20:12,070 --> 02:20:10,640

will not be the last this is the

3879

02:20:13,349 --> 02:20:12,080

beginning of a larger public

3880

02:20:16,870 --> 02:20:13,359

conversation that we're about to see

3881

02:20:18,870 --> 02:20:16,880

take place here oh yes i agree we're not

3882

02:20:21,590 --> 02:20:18,880

too far from the first james webb

3883

02:20:22,790 --> 02:20:21,600

uh photos either so who knows

3884

02:20:25,110 --> 02:20:22,800

i mean

3885

02:20:26,950 --> 02:20:25,120

great point with the historic aspect

3886

02:20:28,389 --> 02:20:26,960

just real quick you know i get into that

3887

02:20:31,510 --> 02:20:28,399

stuff um

3888

02:20:34,550 --> 02:20:31,520

bringing up the historical record on

3889

02:20:36,150 --> 02:20:34,560

everything from 1958 when congress was

3890

02:20:39,469 --> 02:20:36,160

trying to get their hands on special

3891

02:20:42,710 --> 02:20:39,479

report blue book number 14 to you know

3892

02:20:45,510 --> 02:20:42,720

1968 like that's all stuff that you know

3893

02:20:47,830 --> 02:20:45,520

we study and look back on right now for

3894

02:20:50,710 --> 02:20:47,840

for little bits of information so

3895

02:20:53,910 --> 02:20:50,720

um and none of that was like televised

3896

02:20:54,870 --> 02:20:53,920

and live streamed on youtube like so

3897

02:20:57,030 --> 02:20:54,880

just

3898

02:20:58,870 --> 02:20:57,040

all that together that here we go is

3899

02:21:01,750 --> 02:20:58,880

something right now that other people

3900

02:21:03,590 --> 02:21:01,760

can get into and use to you know further

3901  
02:21:06,469 --> 02:21:03,600  
their studies or whatever and it's on

3902  
02:21:08,550 --> 02:21:06,479  
video like we would kill to see those

3903  
02:21:10,309 --> 02:21:08,560  
hearings on video you know and be able

3904  
02:21:11,750 --> 02:21:10,319  
to fast forward and

3905  
02:21:13,030 --> 02:21:11,760  
you know all that kind of stuff and look

3906  
02:21:15,190 --> 02:21:13,040  
how they move their mouths when they

3907  
02:21:16,309 --> 02:21:15,200  
said something but we can't do that but

3908  
02:21:17,190 --> 02:21:16,319  
you know

3909  
02:21:18,790 --> 02:21:17,200  
so

3910  
02:21:20,150 --> 02:21:18,800  
we're better for worse

3911  
02:21:22,630 --> 02:21:20,160  
like people can do that with these

3912  
02:21:24,550 --> 02:21:22,640  
hearings and you know if all the talk is

3913  
02:21:27,110 --> 02:21:24,560

correct i think this is going to be the

3914

02:21:29,349 --> 02:21:27,120

first of many which is great and

3915

02:21:31,670 --> 02:21:29,359

last thing i said i want to say is i i

3916

02:21:33,910 --> 02:21:31,680

couldn't uh imagine a better group to

3917

02:21:35,590 --> 02:21:33,920

have done this with like i do care about

3918

02:21:37,510 --> 02:21:35,600

each and every one of you and i'm so

3919

02:21:40,790 --> 02:21:37,520

grateful that you're able to share this

3920

02:21:41,590 --> 02:21:40,800

moment uh together you know uh with me

3921

02:21:43,349 --> 02:21:41,600

so

3922

02:21:45,270 --> 02:21:43,359

and everybody loves chat obviously i

3923

02:21:45,990 --> 02:21:45,280

catch you man totally great for loving

3924

02:21:46,870 --> 02:21:46,000

us

3925

02:21:49,349 --> 02:21:46,880

yeah

3926

02:21:55,429 --> 02:21:49,359

this has been awesome

3927

02:21:59,690 --> 02:21:56,710

the conversation on twitter and